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ABSTRACT
INTERCULTURAL CONTACT AND THE CREATION OF ALBANY’S NEW 
DIPLOMATIC LANDSCAPE, 1647-1680
by
Holly Anne Rine 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2004
This dissertation analyzes the process of Albany’s rise to the center o f American 
Indian-European relations on the northeast coast o f North America between the years 
1647-1680. By the year 1677 the Albany courthouse served as the meeting place for the 
negotiations that formed the Covenant Chain between the Five Nations of the Iroquois 
and the English colonies of North America. To reach this important development, 
however, took years of political, military, economic and cultural struggle. Moreover, 
these struggles were not merely between the Iroquois and the English who would 
eventually negotiate the Covenant Chain, but within them as well.
Moreover, this dissertation focuses on analyzing how the actions of the Dutch and 
smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensacks were imperative 
in establishing Albany as the center of the new diplomatic landscape of Indian and 
European affairs in northeast North America. In analyzing these developments this study 
explores how knowledge of specific lands and spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts 
and courthouses led to greater control of those places and spaces. As knowledge and 
control of these areas changed, new places would serve as centers of power and others
x
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would fall from their positions of power. Eventually, the seemingly constant shifts of 
control over certain regions would stabilize, allowing fewer groups to utilize their 
knowledge and control of the area around Albany, which allowed the city to serve as the 
site of future negotiations among Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.
Other events such as the Peach and Esopus Wars altered power relations between 
European and Indian residents o f the Hudson River Valley and also led to shifts in the 
geography of those relations for almost all of English North America. Furthermore, far 
ranging events such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with 
the Susquehannocks and the Third Anglo-Dutch War contributed to Albany’s rise to 
prominence in the 1670s. This study argues that it was the combination of all these 
events that created Albany as the new diplomatic landscape in northeast North America.
xi
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INTRODUCTION
“Yea ar com heir to Speake wth us off good thinges & wee will give you ane 
good Ansr.”1 Thus began the meeting between the Cayuga and Susquehannock Indians 
and Col. Henry Coursy, representative of Charles Lord Baron of Baltimore, at the Albany 
courthouse on August 22, 1677. This meeting ended a busy season of propositions, 
accusations, discussions and negotiations, which began in April of that year. During 
those few months, representatives o f the Mahicans, Mohawks, Cayugas, Oneidas, 
Onondagas, Senecas, Susquehannocks and smaller tribes along the Hudson River met 
with representatives of the colonies of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New 
York.2 These meetings were part of the beginning of the Covenant Chain of alliance 
between the English and the Iroquois. In the next few years, representatives from 
Virginia would also journey to the Albany courthouse for more negotiations with 
members of the Iroquois Confederacy.
To get to this point in the late 1670s, however, took years of political, military, 
economic and cultural struggle. Moreover, the struggles were not merely between the 
Iroquois and the English, but among them as well. Furthermore, the actions of the Dutch 
and smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensack to name only
1 Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records: 1666-1723  (Gettysburg, PA: Pennsylvania 
Historical Association, 1956).
2 Ibid., 39-49. Prior to the 1664 English takeover o f  N ew  Netherland, Albany was the Dutch community o f  
Fort Orange and Beverwyck. Fort Orange was a Dutch military and trading post and Beverwyck was the 
community attached to the fort. A lso prior to 1664, N ew  York City on Manhattan Island was known as 
New Amsterdam and was served by the fort o f  Fort Amsterdam.
1
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a few were imperative in bringing about the Covenant Chain. Events such as the Peach 
War and the Esopus Wars not only altered power relations among both the European and 
Indian residents of the Hudson Valley, they also led to a shift in the geography of Indian 
and European relations in the Hudson Valley as well as the entirety of English North 
America. The events that brought about these changes of power and geography were not 
limited to those that took place around Albany or in the Hudson River Valley such as the 
Peach War and the Esopus War. Far ranging events such as Bacon’s Rebellion, 
Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with the Susquehannocks and the Third Anglo- 
Dutch War also contributed to the change of geography of European and Indian relations, 
from one that was fractured and took place in various locations, to one that was centered 
in the Hudson River Valley. This study argues that it was the combination of the larger, 
more well known colonial events with the more overlooked events such as the Peach War 
and Esopus Wars that led to Albany’s rise to prominence as the center of Indian and 
European relations in seventeenth-century.
Scholars have thoroughly studied the role of the Covenant Chain in the history of 
Iroquois and English relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, 
they have not thoroughly explored the origins o f how the Covenant Chain came to be or 
how Albany came to be the geographic focus of these relations. This study ends with
3 Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape o f  Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth- 
Century America  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois 
Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation o f  Indian Tribes with English Colonies from  its beginnings to 
the Lancaster Treaty o f  1744' (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984); Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion 
and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-1685  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999); Daniel K. Richter and James Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their 
neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987); Daniel K. 
Richter, The O rdeal o f  the Longhouse: The Peoples o f  the Iroquois League in the Era o f  European 
Colonization (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1992)'Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in 
Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century, trans. Introduction by William Stama, reprint ed. (Lincoln:
2
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what scholars hold up as the beginning of the Covenant Chain. It argues that Albany 
became the center o f Indian and European relations along the northeastern seaboard of 
North America as a result of decades o f conflict between and among the various 
European and American Indian groups in the Hudson River Valley prior to the English 
takeover o f the colony in 1664. Individuals such as the English Governor Edmund 
Andros and the Onondaga sachem Garakontie are often the central focus of the 
establishment of the Covenant Chain. However, it is my assertion that the actions of 
various understudied individuals such as Jacob Jansen Stoll as well as groups such as the 
Esopus Indians and Fort Orange commissioners that created the conditions for both the 
Covenant Chain and the establishment of Albany as the center of the proceedings.
In making this argument, this study develops three main points. First, it shows 
the process o f how and why Albany became the center of Indian and European relations 
by the end of the 1670s. Location played a large role. The valley’s value for fur trade, 
agriculture and political and military power made the region significant on both local and 
international levels. The geographic attributes of the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys 
were directly linked to their economic and political importance for both European and 
American Indian powers (Figure 1). Economically the interior of what would become 
New York was the source of furs and potentially agricultural production that would both 
fuel and feed European colonial enterprises, and, of course, the Hudson River served as a 
direct link between the Atlantic Ocean and the interior lands. Yet to reap the benefits of 
such economic potential, Europeans needed the cooperation of the numerous Indian 
groups who occupied the land.
University o f  Nebraska, 1997); Stephen Saunders Webb, 1676: The End o f  American Independence 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
3
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Politically the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys served as the meeting point of 
Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and Algonquian powers and control o f this region 
would allow for greater control over the diverse populations of the area (Figure 2). New 
Netherland, which claimed the region, was faced with endless threats to its already 
tenuous hold on the land. Due to these constant threats, New Netherland authorities, 
particularly Director General Petrus Stuyvesant, were forced to place restrictions on 
individuals’, both Indian and European, movements on the land in order to retain control 
of the land and its small population. Also due to these various threats on the stable 
existence o f New Netherland, which came from all sides of the colony, Dutch authority 
was spread quite thin, and smaller, decentralized authorities developed throughout the 
colony. This decentralized fracturing of the colony, would also lead to Fort Orange’s 
development as a center for Indian and European affairs by the end o f the 1670s.
The area was home to the Mohawks, one of the five nations o f the Iroquois 
League and one of the most influential Indian groups in the seventeenth-century.4 
Numerous smaller Algonquian groups such as the Mahicans, Wappingers and Esopus 
also lived in the region, and, as will be shown, their actions also contributed significantly 
to the changing diplomatic landscape of North America. Because American Indian
4 The Great League o f  Peace among the Iroquois tribes o f  the Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas and 
Senecas was probably formed sometime around the late fifteenth century. This peace established a peace 
among those tribes and ushered in an era o f  warfare between the Iroquois League and neighboring tribes. 
Daniel Richter’s, Ordeal o f  the Longhouse, gives a thorough explanation o f  the paradox between the 
Iroquois’ policy o f  peace and war. In this work he stated that, “By 1600 the cultural ideal o f  peace and the 
everyday reality o f  war had long been intertwined.” Pg. 31. See also James W. Bradley, Evolution o f  the 
Onondaga Iroquois: Accom modating Change, 1500-1655. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987; 
Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape o f  Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth- 
Century Am erica  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).; Dean R. Snow, “Dating the Emergence o f  
the League o f  the Iroquois: A Reconsideration o f  the Documentary Evidence,” in A Beautiful and Fruitful 
Place: Selected Rensselaerswijck Seminar Papers, ed. Nancy Anne McClure Zeller (Albany, N Y : New  
Netherland Publishing, 1991), 139-144.; Bruce G. Trigger, “Prehistoric Social and Political Organization: 
An Iroquoian Case Study,” in Dean R. Snow, ed., Foundations o f  Northeast Archaeology. New York,
1987.
5
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societies were in physical possession of much of the land of the Hudson and Mohawk 
Valleys, they were in a strong position in their dealings with the various European groups 
who wished to take possession of the region for their own economic, military and 
political gain. The ensuing struggles, political, cultural and martial, that took place among 
the diverse population of the area for control of the land created significant shifts in 
power among people and places.
The second goal of this study is to explore how knowledge of specific lands and 
spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts and courthouses led to both greater access and 
control of those areas. As knowledge and control of these areas waxed and waned, new 
places would serve as centers of power and others would fall from positions of power. 
After the Peach War of 1655, the Dutch were able to claim greater control over the lower 
Hudson River. However, instead of Manhattan becoming the center of power for Indian 
and Dutch affairs, that center shifted up-river to the Esopus region and Fort Orange 
because of the ability of independent Indian powers to assert their authority on relations 
between themselves and the Dutch. By the time the English took over the colony, this 
constant shift of knowledge and control of specific lands and spaces had created the 
conditions for Albany’s rise as the center o f Indian and European relations in North 
America north of Carolina.
With the numerous ethnic groups occupying the region, no one group maintained 
enough power to assert their authority over the entire area. Therefore, although the Dutch 
West India Company (hereafter referred to as WIC) claimed control of the entire Hudson 
River Valley between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, different groups would maintain 
control over several smaller locations in what was identified as New Netherland. Control
7
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of all the lands and spaces within the region held great significance because there were so 
many different cultural and ethnic groups struggling for power in the region. As that 
control shifted between several groups, so did power relations throughout the entire 
valley. Eventually, the constant shifts in control over certain regions in the area would 
stabilize somewhat, thereby allowing for fewer groups to utilize their knowledge and 
control of Albany so that it would serve as the center for future negotiations among 
Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.
The third goal of this dissertation is to show how multi-ethnic interactions in war, 
diplomacy, trade and religion were integral to Albany taking its place o f prominence in 
Indian and European relations. Historians have analyzed these events and interactions in 
greater detail than they will be here, but often the studies of these events are in isolation 
from one another.5 This dissertation illustrates how the interplay between all of these 
events, as Europeans and Indians struggled against each other and among themselves,
5Randall Balmer, A Perfect Babel o f  Confusion: Dutch Religion and English Culture in the Middle 
Colonies, ed. Harry S. Stout, Religion in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Randall 
Balmer, “Traitors and Papists: The Religious Dimensions o f  Leisler's Rebellion,” New York H istory 70, no. 
October (1989): 341-372; Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New  
York (New York: Columbia University, 1971); Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew  Netherland Fur Trade, 1657- 
1661: Response to Crisis,” Halve Maen 59, no. 3 (1986): 1-4;; David G. Hackett, The Rude Hand o f  
Innovation: Religion and Social Order in Albany, New York 1652-1836, ed. Harry S. Stout, Religion in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991); Donna Merwick, “Dutch Townsmen and Land Use: A Spatial 
Perspective on Seventeenth-century Albany, New York,” William and M ary Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1980): 
53-78; Donna Merwick, “Being Dutch: An Interpretation o f  Why Jacob Leisler Died,” New York History 
70, no. October (1989): 373-404; Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English 
Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Paul Andrew Otto, “N ew  Netherland 
Frontier: Europeans and Native Americans along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664.” (dissertation, 
University o f  California, 1996); Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province: A Study o f  New York Politics and 
Society, 1664-1691 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina, 1977); William A. Stama, “Seventeenth 
Century Dutch-Indian Trade: A Perspective from Iroquois,” Halve Maen 59, no. 3 (1986): 5-8.Allen W. 
Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century, trans. Introduction by William 
Stama, reprint ed. (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska, 1997); James Homer Williams, “Cultural Mingling 
and Religious Diversity among Indians and Europeans in the Early Middle Colonies” (dissertation, 
Vanderbilt, 1994). Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape o f  Peace  is an exception to this assertion as 
he explores the interactions o f  the Dutch, French and Iroquois with one another in building a new landscape 
based on the Iroquois ideas o f  community and warfare.
8
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altered the cultural landscapes of Indian and European affairs on the eastern North 
American seaboard through the seventeenth-century. It also explains how Albany would 
stand at the center of the newly formed diplomatic landscape that these struggles created.
In working towards these goals, this study focuses on the period 1647-1680. The 
year 1647 marked the arrival of Petrus Stuyvesant in New Netherland as the Director 
General of the WIC colony. Upon his arrival Stuyvesant made a concerted effort to 
establish the authority o f the WIC among other colonizing countries such as England, 
France and-Sweden, spread the authority of the WIC over the colony from a centralized 
location at New Amsterdam and tried to establish WIC authority among the numerous 
Indian peoples within the claimed boundaries of the colony. The remainder of 
Stuyvesant’s tenure as Director General in New Netherland was filled with examples of 
these efforts including establishing a boundary with New England in 1650, removing 
New Sweden from claimed New Netherland territory in 1655, and establishing new 
communities, such as Esopus, and new courts in Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652. 
The period also included events outside of his control including the Indian attack on New 
Amsterdam in 1655, the Esopus Wars of 1658 and 1663, and the interactions between 
and among Indian groups and Dutch communities, such as the Iroquois and the residents 
of Fort Orange.
Because many of the events that led up to Albany taking its place as the center of 
European/Indian affairs were, in fact, outside of the control o f Stuyvesant or any other 
single European authority, the study does not end with the English takeover of New 
Netherland in 1664. Albany’s rise to prominence was a process, and although 1664 is 
often an ending or beginning point for studies dealing with New Netherland or colonial
9
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New York, the year does not hold the same significance here.6 In this study, 1664 is 
more significant as a turning point as a result of the end of the second Esopus War and 
not as the year England established authority over the once Dutch possession.
The study ends at the close of the decade of the 1670s because it is in that decade 
that the process of Albany’s rise is complete. It is during the 1670s when major events 
occurred outside of the boundaries of New York, but which led to the establishment of 
Albany as the center of Indian/European affairs on the eastern seaboard of North America 
north of Carolina. The end of the study does not coincide with other more common dates 
such as the Glorious Revolutions of 1688, because, while significant in the history of 
New York, the years of 1680-1688 do not add to the significance o f Indian/European 
relations in Albany.
Historiography
The scholarly literature of seventeenth-century European colonization of the 
Americas often has centered on European desires of domination over land and people.
As James Merrell discussed as late as 1989, many historians of European colonization 
would, at most, pay lip service to the presence of American Indians in their studies and 
continue to present North America as empty or a wilderness to be claimed by European
6 For the many studies that deal with either the Dutch or the English colonization o f  the area, 1664 is the
most natural ending or beginning point. See Paul Andrew Otto, “N ew  Netherland Frontier: Europeans and 
Native Americans along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664.” (dissertation, University o f  California, 
1996); Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province: A Study o f  New York Politics and Society, 1664-1691
(Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina, 1977); Joyce D. Goodffiend, Before the Melting Pot: Society 
and Culture in Colonial New York City, 1664-1730 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1992); Donna
Merwick, “The Rituals o f  Handelstijd: Beverwijck, 1652-1664,” in A Beautiful and Fruitful Place: Selected  
Rensselaerswijck Seminar Papers, ed. Nancy Anne McClure Zeller (Albany, N Y : N ew  Netherland 
Publishing, 1991), 317-326; Daniel K. Richter, “Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York- 
Iroquois Relations, 1664-1701,” Journal o f  American H istory 15, no. 1 (1988): 40-67. However, 
periodization o f  European affairs is not necessarily appropriate when discussing Indian affairs. See Alvin 
M. Josephy Jr. ed. Am erica in 1492: the World o f  the Indian Peoples Before the Arrival o f  Columbus (New  
York: Knopf, 1992). This collection o f  essays challenges the notion o f  1492 as the crucial date for Indian 
peoples that it has become for European peoples.
10
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civility. Merrell also noted that there was, however, good news for the field, as more 
historians became more intent on placing American Indians back into the story of
n
European Colonization. Recent studies by historians, such as Karen Kupperman’s 
Indian’s and English: Facing O ff in Early America, Michael Oberg’s Dominion and 
Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-1685 and Jose Antonio 
Brandao’s “ Your Fyre Shall Burn No More ”: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its 
Native Allies to 1701 have gone beyond merely adding Indians to the narrative of colonial 
American history. Indians have been placed as central figures instead of victims or as 
players who were merely acted upon instead of acting in their own interest. These 
scholars have also challenged the accepted narrative by discussing Indian motivation, 
strength and power within the colonial context.8
Another of the most influential studies to come after Merrell’s call for greater 
inclusion o f Indians in the narrative of colonial American history was Richard White’s 
work The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815.9 White argued that because the French were unable to exert their authority
7 James H. Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1989): 94-119. Along with the many monographs that have com e out in the 1990s and 
into the 2000s, the William and M ary Quarterly itself has increased their focus on American Indians within 
their pages with numerous articles and most notably, an entire issue in July 1996 devoted to “Indians and 
others in early America.”
8 Colin Calloway, New Worlds fo r  All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking o f  Early America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1997); James Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and  
Their Neighbors from  European Contact Through the Era o f  Removal (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina, 1988); and Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The 
Lower M ississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina for the Institute o f  Early 
American History and Culture, 1992). These authors have shown how interactions between Europeans and 
Indians actually created new communities for all groups involved including Indians, Europeans and 
Africans.
9 Richard White, The M iddle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the G reat Lakes Region, 1650-
1815  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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over the Indian population of the Great Lakes, they instead became mediators helping to 
broker mutual alliances between themselves and local Indian groups based on a shared 
need of survival and protection. This study, however, is not that of a Middle Ground 
located on the Hudson River. Unlike White’s emphasis on the creation of mutual 
alliances in a specific geographic region, this study depicts an environment of 
contestation for land, power and influence.
It also illustrates how local contests over land and space moved beyond a 
parochial stage into the Atlantic World. For example, Dutch wars with the Esopus 
Indians, located between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, in the 1660s drew WIC attention 
and resources away from maintaining and strengthening their New Netherland 
possessions against English incursions. The Dutch called upon the Mohawks to intervene 
and bring the Esopus to the negotiating table. While the Mohawks did intervene on 
behalf of the Dutch, they were unsuccessful. The ensuing hostilities, which would not 
end until late spring 1664, then contributed to the Dutch surrender of their North 
American possessions to England in 1664. With the English establishment of New York, 
the Dutch were eliminated as a power from North America, and England claimed control 
o f the North American seaboard from Maine to Carolina, thereby strengthening English 
colonial power in the north Atlantic.
While this dissertation is not arguing for the creation o f a Middle Ground along 
the Hudson River, it does add to the body of scholarly literature on Indian and European 
relations, particularly with the Dutch and English, in the Hudson Valley.10 Allen
10 William A. Stama, “Assessing American Indian-Dutch Studies: Missed and M issing Opportunities,” New
York H istory , no. Winter (2003): 5-31. In this article, Starna laments the state o f  American Indian-Dutch 
studies. On page 31, he concluded that apart from a few notable examples, such as Brandao’s “ Your Fyre 
Shall Burn No M ore”, “the history o f  Indian-Dutch relations, in spite o f  forty years o f  effort, is presently
12
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Trelease’s study Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, The Seventeenth Century stands as 
the most extensive study and comprehensive narrative of Indian-European relations in 
New Netherland and New York. While he thoroughly mines the primary sources and 
reconstructs events between Europeans and Indians in New York in vivid detail, he often 
does not give enough emphasis to the power and significance o f smaller tribes in the area. 
For example, the Iroquois are shown to have great influence, while the Esopus Indians 
are described as “too shy in the presence of [Dutch] soldiers,” and as having “begged the 
director not to start a war,” and also that they “dutifully promised” that they would sell 
their land to the Dutch.11 Contrary to Trelease’s depiction of their shyness, begging and 
dutiful fealty, this dissertation argues that the Esopus Indians were an independent power 
and integral to the events that would elevate Albany to its place of prominence in the 
1670s. The Esopus Indians were involved in several conflicts with the Dutch in the 
1650s and 1660s. As a result of these conflicts, the Esopus were instrumental in bringing 
about two fundamental changes to the intercultural landscape o f the Hudson River 
Valley: the end to New Netherland, and a shift of the geography o f Indian-European
entrenched as the intellectual underling in the broad context o f  New World Dutch studies. The few 
elaborations on themes and topics first introduced by Trelease, while useful, have only infrequently led to 
original or particularly informative studies.” However, the body o f  work that he cites is quite extensive, 
and while not providing a synthesis o f  American Indian-Dutch relations, has offered diverse and 
informative studies o f  those relations. See for example Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape o f  
P eace; Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal o f  the Longhouse\ Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New  
York; Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew  Netherland Fur Trade, 1657-1661: Response to Crisis,” Halve Maen 
59, no. 3 (1986): 1-4; Paul Andrew Otto, “New Netherland Frontier: Europeans and Native Americans 
along the Lower Hudson River, 1524-1664”; James Homer Williams, “Cultural Mingling and Religious 
Diversity among Indians and Europeans in the Early Middle Colonies” (dissertation, Vanderbilt, 1994); 
Thomas E. Burke, “Arent van Curler And the Fur Trade at Early Schenectady,” Dutch Settlers Society 
Yearbook 49 (1984-1987): 5-15; Jack Campisi, “The Iroquois and the Euro-American Concept o f Tribe,” 
New York H istory  78, no. October (1997): 455-472; Charles T. Gehring, William A. Starna, “Dutch and 
Indians in the Hudson Valley: The Early Period,” Hudson Valley Regional Review. 1-25; Joyce D. 
Goodfriend, “Writing/Righting Dutch Colonial History,” N ew York H istory 80, no. January (1999): 5-28; 
Daniel K. Richter, “Brothers, Scoundrels, Metal Makers: Dutch Constructions o f  Native American 
Constructions o f  the Dutch,” de Halve Maen 71, no. 3 (1998): 59-64.
11 Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York. 149-150.
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relations in North America. This is not to argue that the smaller Algonquian groups,
such as the Esopus, located along the Hudson River, had the power or ability to sway
Indian-European relations in the same way that the Mohawks did. Still, they played a
critical role in shaping European imperial policy concerning relations with Indians in
North America. By exploring the contributions of previously neglected groups and
events, we can answer the questions of how and why the Covenant Chain was able to be
forged in Albany in the 1670s thereby altering the power relations among Indians and
Europeans on the Atlantic seaboard of North America through the colonial period.
With its geographic focus on Albany and the Hudson River Valley, this
dissertation further adds to the study of the middle colonies and the quite extensive body
of literature on Albany itself. Much of this scholarship has focused on trade, politics, and
• 12ethnic and religious diversity. As Merrell argued, little of the literature on the history of 
New York, which does not deal specifically with Indians, such as Trelease’s work, 
incorporates the significance of Indians into their narrative or analysis.13 For example, 
Donna Merwick’s Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences 
rightly argues that Albany was continually remade as each group and generation,
12 Bonomi, A Factious People', Thomas E. Burke, “The N ew Netherland Fur Trade, 1657-1661: Response 
to Crisis,” 1-4; David G. Hackett, The Rude Hand o f  Innovation', Donna Merwick, “Being Dutch: An 
Interpretation o f  Why Jacob Leisler Died;" 373-404; Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630-1710', 
Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province', Donna Merwick, “Becoming English: Anglo-Dutch Conflict in the 
1670s in Albany, N ew  York,” New York H istory 62, no. October (1981): 389-414; Oliver A. Rink, “Private 
Interest and Godly Gain: The West India Company and the Dutch Reformed Church in New Netherland, 
1624-1664.,” New York H istory 75, no. July (1994): 245-264; Janny Venema, “Poverty and Charity in 
Seventeenth-Century Beverwijck,” New York H istory 80, no. October (1999): 369-390; James Homer 
Williams, “"Abominable Religion" and Dutch (Intolerance: The Jews and Petrus Stuyvesant,” de Halve 
Maen 71, no. 4 (1998): 85-91.
13 Literature that deals with the trade in New Netherland does not deal with Indians outside o f  their roles as 
fur suppliers, such as informants, couriers and diplomats, and often subscribes to the argument o f  Indians 
working to gain power as middle men in the fur trade.
14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“understood Albany at different layers of time.”14 She uncovered first how the Dutch and 
then the English worked, competed, and compromised in order to recreate the landscape 
according to their own ideas, beliefs and understandings of society and order. However, 
she introduced Indians only as minor actors who caused the major players to react in 
particular, distinctly European ways. This dissertation also explores how different ethnic 
groups tried to impose meaning and order on the land o f what will become New York. 
However, it also tries to insert the motives and significance of the Indian groups who 
were a part of the continual recreation of Albany and the colony as a whole.15
While this study focuses on a specific colony, New Nether land/New York, and a 
specific community, Fort Orange/Albany, it also moves beyond the traditional boundary 
lines drawn for seventeenth-century North America. By showing the constant shifts in 
control o f specific lands and spaces during this period, a map of 17th century North 
American political boundaries would be in constant flux with areas moving in and out of 
European and Indian control. At the same time this study works to show the connections 
between and among different colonies and Indians groups, which expands Albany’s area 
of influence beyond the borders of New Netherland and New York to incorporate New 
England, Virginia, Maryland and New France.16
14 Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630-1710. 2.
15Colin Calloway, New Worlds fo r  All. Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange 
Economy, and Mechal Sobel, The World They M ade Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth 
Century Virginia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987). All these authors stress the interaction o f  
different cultural groups to create wholly new communities instead o f  mere transferences o f  culture from 
one region to the next.
16 See Cynthia J. Van Zandt, “Negotiating Settlement: Colonialism, Cultural Exchange and Conflict in 
Early Colonial Atlantic North America, 1580-1660” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f  Connecticut, 1998). 
She argues for a more inclusive geographical approach to the study o f  colonial North America in an 
Atlantic context instead o f  focusing so narrowly on single colonies or regions as has been done 
traditionally. Scholars such as Ira Berlin, “From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of 
African-American Society in Mainland North America,” William and Mary Quarterly 53, no 2 (April
15
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William Cronon’s 1983 environmental history monograph Changes in the Land 
was one of the first studies to deal with how European and Indian contact affected the 
North American landscape, thus combining historical geography and the study of 
history.17 In the twenty-one years since the publication of Cronon’s work, few historians 
have looked at how the different cultural groups that occupied the land, the Dutch, 
English, French and Indians, defined and utilized the land and space they fought to gain 
or defend. Moreover, few studies take into account the changing meanings and uses of 
land and space as several groups occupied a common area, or as possession of a region 
shifted among groups. This study explores these issues as they relate to cross-cultural 
contests and negotiations in commercial and diplomatic terms in the seventeenth-century 
Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys.
Because there is a central focus on how different groups tried to impose their own 
authority on how people moved and worked on the land, this study also adds to the fields 
of historical geography. This dissertation is greatly influenced by the ideas of 
geographers D.W. Meinig and John Stilgoe. In his 1982 study, Stilgoe differentiates the 
meanings o f the terms landscape and wilderness as they are used in this study. The terms 
are the antithesis of one another. Landscape is not scenery, but “is essentially rural, the 
product of traditional agriculture interrupted here and thereby traditional artifice, a mix of
1996), 251-288 and John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making o f  the Atlantic World, 1400-1680,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) have been particularly successful in their Atlantic 
World approach in their studies o f  Europeans and Africans in North America.
17 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology o f  New England (New York: 
Hill & Wang, 1983). Also see Michael Williams, “The Relations o f  Environmental History and Historical 
Geography,” Journal o f  H istorical Geography 20, no. 1 (1994): 3-21.
16
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1 Rnatural and man-made form.” By this definition, a landscape must be a place affected 
by the touch of human activity. According to the perspective o f many European 
colonists, if  land had not been touched by human existence and activity, a region was not 
a landscape but a wilderness. The idea of wilderness as the absence of human activity, 
according to Stilgoe, came from a combination of pre-Christian beliefs of trees with souls 
and spirits living within the forests and Christian teachings o f wilderness as the home of 
demons.19 This antithesis was one that European settlers had to deal with in New 
Netherland, but was not one that Indians had to confront when Europeans arrived.
Many Europeans viewed North America as a wilderness, as defined by Stilgoe, 
although there was the presence of numerous Indian cultures putting their marks on the 
land. However, many Europeans did not consider Indians’ use o f the land as “proper 
use” and therefore considered the land, in their Christian understanding, a wilderness. 
Moreover, as Europeans and American Indians both continued to put their marks on the 
land of the Hudson River Valley, they did indeed create new cultural landscapes of 
Indian and European interaction that were neither fully European nor fully American
18 John R. Stilgoe, Common Landscape o f  America, 1580-1845 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1982)., 3. Stilgoe looks at landscape primarily from a European perspective arising from the idea of  
landschaft. Landschaft, he explains, showed the interconnectedness between humans and the land and 
included both human dwellings and human constructed structures crowded together and surrounded by 
fields, meadows and pastures, all o f  which had been worked by human hands. Although the term comes 
from a medieval European perspective, it fits very well into a discussion o f  American Indian landscapes. A 
significant difference however, is that Indian landscapes did not end at their fields’ edge, but extended into 
the woods and into European landscapes as well. For a discussion o f  landscape and world-view from an 
Iroquois perspective see Roger Merle Carpenter, “The Renewed, the Destroyed, and the Remade: The 
Three Thought Worlds o f  the Iroquois and the Huron, 1609-1650” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f  
California, 1999).
19 John R. Stilgoe, Common Landscape o f  America, 1580-1845. 7-12. Stilgoe argues that it was the 
retention o f  pagan beliefs and understandings o f  wild lands and wildness that informed European 
understanding o f  Christianity.
17
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Indian.20 The new cultural landscapes would include contests and compromises over 
how Indians and Europeans shared common spaces, such as towns, farms and woods. 
Merwick’s study is valuable in learning how the Dutch and then the English worked to 
create copies of their home cultures in Fort Orange and Albany, however, this 
dissertation explores how all the different ethnic and cultural groups compromised to 
create truly unique landscapes, particularly in Albany.
As Indians and Europeans created new cultural landscapes through conflicts and 
compromises over who had access to certain spaces and how these spaces were utilized, 
they would eventually create the new diplomatic landscape that was centered at Albany. 
This process of creating a new diplomatic landscape along the Hudson River was also 
assisted in 1652 when Fort Orange was established as a political center of New 
Netherland with its own court. This particular event allowed Indians and Dutch in Fort 
Orange to move beyond merely an economic relationship. With the establishment of the 
court, Indians, particularly Mohawks, were also able to negotiate for their presence in the 
courthouse. This was indeed the creation of a new cultural landscape, which developed 
into a new diplomatic landscape that placed Albany at the center o f Indian and European 
diplomacy by the end of the 1670s.
20 For further reading on landscape and the idea o f  wilderness see Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a 
Landscape o f  Peace)', William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong 
Nature,” in Out o f  the Woods: Essays in Environmental History, ed. Char Miller and Hal Rothman 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University o f  Pittsburgh, 1997); Warren R. Hofstra, The Planting o f  New Virginia: 
Settlement and Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); 
D.W. Meinig, ed., The Interpretation o f  Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and D.W. Meinig, The Shaping o f  America: A Geographical 
Perspective on 500 Years o f  History, A tlantic America, 1492-1800, 3 vols., vol. I (1986).
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Chapter Outlines
The chapters are arranged to first explain New Netherland’s relationship with its 
neighbors and how these relations created conditions for the independent development of 
Fort Orange as a political center within the colony. The dissertation then moves to 
explore events and issues that both Europeans and Indians faced within the claimed 
borders of New Netherland and New York. These events, such as the Peach War and 
Esopus Wars brought Indian participation into the realm of New Netherland politics and 
diplomacy in a way that they had not prior to the establishment of the Fort Orange court 
in 1652. Finally, the dissertation once again explores New York, and specifically 
Albany’s, relationship with other colonies and American Indian powers; however, at this 
point, Albany’s position as a colonial center of Indian and European affairs had been 
firmly established.
Chapter one explores the threats that the newly appointed Director-General of the 
WIC’s colony of New Netherland, Petrus Stuyvesant, faced from outside forces, both 
European and Indian. By utilizing official WIC correspondence from and to Stuyvesant 
as well as council minutes and maps, this chapter demonstrates several points. First, with 
Stuyvesant having to remain so focused on outside threats from New England, New 
Sweden and New France, Fort Orange, as the secondary seat o f power within New 
Netherland, was able to develop independently from the authority located in New 
Amsterdam. Secondly, as New Netherland authorities worked to establish their authority 
over the land it claimed, they were forced to shift their approach to claiming legitimate 
control of the land. As a result, New Netherland utilized the presence of forts on the land 
as their main symbol o f authority, and embarked on a strategy of land purchases and fort
19
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construction to bolster their claim to lands in the Hudson River Valley. Lastly, it 
introduces the Peach War o f 1655, and the rumors leading up to that war, as a major 
turning point in New Netherland’s efforts to establish authority over the Indian 
population as well as the beginning of Fort Orange’s rise as an independent center of 
Indian and European relations.
Chapter two explores issues o f control over the lands within the claimed borders 
of New Netherland, but outside of the actual Dutch settlements. This chapter focuses on 
two major ideas. First, it explores how knowledge of certain areas, such as woods, 
villages and rivers, was related to the ability of particular groups to control those areas. 
Because of Dutch lack o f knowledge of the land within its claimed borders, Fort Orange 
and Fort Amsterdam remained isolated from one another allowing the former to develop 
somewhat independently from the latter, especially in regard to Indian policy. As Fort 
Orange authorities tried to establish control outside of its walls, they did so out of 
concern for trade with Indians. Fort Amsterdam officials did the same, but they did so 
out of concern for safety from Indians. Furthermore, the attempts of both to gain control 
outside of their town walls were affected by issues of religion and European 
conceptualizations about “wildness”. Secondly, this isolation led Dutch officials to 
attempt to lessen the physical and political gap between the two settlements by 
aggressively working to settle what was known as the Esopus. The conflict that arose 
from this policy, between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians in the 1650s, would both 
expose the split relations between the two Dutch centers as well as begin the shift of 
power from Fort Amsterdam to Fort Orange in Dutch and Indian relations.
20
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Chapter three then moves inside Dutch settlements to explore the successes and 
failures of several groups including Mohawks, Mahicans, Lutherans, WIC officials, and 
residents of Fort Orange and Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck to assert their authority 
within town walls.21 The central argument of this chapter is that as the WIC worked to 
assert its authority in Dutch settlements, particularly Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 
through legal, religious and military means, Indians, especially the Mohawks, began 
asserting their own authority over spaces in the town, particularly the fort and the court, 
the latter of which was established in 1652. During this period, the Dutch courts of Fort 
Orange and Beverwyck met within the confines of the fort. With Indians able to gain 
access to the court and the fort to advance their own agendas, they became the primary 
force behind the creation o f a new diplomatic landscape in Fort Orange, and then Albany. 
This new diplomatic landscape was then established as the center o f relations between the 
American Indians and the Europeans in North America.
Chapter four moves back to the Esopus region in the 1660s, after the first Esopus 
War, which is covered in chapter two. This chapter argues that the Dutch actions to 
establish a stable interior to New Netherland, specifically the erection of a fort in the 
Esopus, led to further hostilities with the Esopus Indian population. More significantly, 
these hostilities created a shift in the geography o f Indian and Dutch relations. Whereas 
prior to the second Esopus War, Indian relations were split between the two Dutch 
centers, Fort Amsterdam and Fort Orange, after this war, Fort Orange became the center 
for such relationships. It was also after the second Esopus War that the Dutch created a
21 Beverwyck was established by the WIC directors in 1652 and was the community that Fort Orange 
served. Rensselaerswyck was the name o f  the Patroonship established by Killiaen van Rensselaer, and 
which surrounded both Fort Orange and Beverwyck.
21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stable community between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, just in time for the English to 
come in and continue to expand the settlements.
The final chapter looks at the region after the English takeover and the 
establishment of the colony of New York. While the wars, trade and diplomacy between 
the Dutch and the Indians of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys allowed Fort Orange to 
rise as the center of Dutch and Indian relations, events after 1664 that took place outside 
of New York, such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Third Anglo-Dutch War 
and the Five Nations’ War with the Susquehannocks led to the solidification of what was 
then known as Albany as the colonial center of Indian and European relations. 
Furthermore, relations were taken out of the fort and into the courthouse. However, by 
the 1670s, Albany was not just a center for New York, but the eastern seaboard of North 
American north of Carolina.
Moreover, the true significance in Albany’s establishment at the center for 
European and Indian relations was the fact that it happened as a result o f the cooperation 
and contests o f both European and Indian populations. These populations consisted of 
more well known groups and individuals, such as the Mohawks and Governor Andros, 
and lesser known peoples such as the Esopus Indians and Jacob Jansen Stoll, a Dutch 
settler. The interactions of these peoples that led to Albany’s role in the new diplomatic 
landscape o f North America also consisted of more well known events such as 
Metacom’s War and lesser known confrontations such as the Esopus Wars. It is by 
studying the combination of all the populations and events where we gain an 
understanding of the dynamics o f seventeenth-century Indian and European relations, and 
how they could create a new and unique context for cross-cultural diplomacy.
22
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CHAPTER 1
OUTSIDE THREATS AND INSIDE RUMORS
When Petrus Stuyvesant arrived in New Netherland in 1647, he was immediately 
confronted with the task of dealing with various threats, both Indian and European, to the 
stability of the colony. Stuyvesant worked diligently on dealing with the various threats 
from New England, New Sweden and New France. However, because Stuyvesant’s 
attention was often drawn to the various borders of New Netherland to fend off one 
challenge to New Netherland’s stability after another, Fort Orange, as a secondary seat of 
power within the colony, was able to develop independently from the authority located in 
New Amsterdam. This fractured nature of the colony of New Netherland challenged the 
stability o f the colony, by having different communities act independently from one 
another and the central authority of the WIC in New Amsterdam. Moreover,
Stuyvesant’s constant shifting from one problem to the next, and Fort Orange’s 
independence, created a fluid enough situation to allow for the creation of a new cultural 
landscape at Fort Orange, which would not exist in other New Netherland communities.
As a part of the creation o f new cultural landscapes resulting from the multiple 
threats, the Dutch residents of the Hudson River Valley were forced to alter their 
justification of rightful ownership of the land they claimed. As a result, New Netherland 
utilized the presence of forts on the land as their main symbol of authority. Eventually, 
the Mohawk Indians would be able to utilize this symbol of Dutch authority and
23
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manipulate it to their own ends, thus helping to bring about a new diplomatic landscape at 
Fort Orange and then Albany.
As part o f the creation of a new diplomatic landscape amongst a multitude of 
threats, the reliance on information provided by Indians and disseminated by Indian 
couriers played an important role. While the Dutch were dependent on Indian 
information and Indian messengers to provide intelligence and routes of communication 
between the physically separated settlements of New Netherland, that information was 
disseminated in what Europeans considered rumor, or unsubstantiated or unverified 
information. Yet it would be these “rumors” that the Dutch, and eventually the English, 
would have to take into consideration when making decisions or forming official policy. 
Dutch dependence on Indian information and “Indian intelligence”, especially in the 
isolated region of Fort Orange would also contribute to the creation o f the new diplomatic 
landscape in Fort Orange as the Mohawks would provide their information to the Dutch 
in the court at the fort. Such Indian intelligence could be both the source of threats and 
the source to their solutions.
The Threat to the East
The initial threats were posed by English and Swedish colonial settlements 
moving into territory claimed by the Dutch Republic. Soon, Stuyvesant would also grasp 
the urgency o f the threats posed by the Algonquian and Iroquoian residents in what he 
believed to be the rightful possession of the Dutch, especially along the Hudson River 
Valley. While the Dutch had claimed the region from the Connecticut River to Delaware 
Bay (although Stuyvesant would also at times claim Dutch jurisdiction from Cape Cod to 
Cape Henlopen), their hold on the territory was tenuous, and it was threatened from all
24
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sides. These threats were both real and perceived. No matter the origin or the form of 
the threat, the High Council of New Netherland located on Manhattan Island, Director- 
General Stuyvesant and the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam, found themselves 
scrambling to maintain their grip on the colony and especially for control along the 
Hudson River.
Upon his arrival in Manhattan, Stuyvesant was immediately confronted by New 
Englanders exerting pressure on the border between New Netherland and New England. 
Actually, part o f the problem was a lack of an agreed upon border. The first letter sent 
from the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam to Stuyvesant and the Council of New 
Netherland expressed interest and concern over England’s activity to the east. The main 
issue was a dispute over control of the Connecticut River, referred to as the Fresh River 
by the Dutch. The Directors were particularly concerned about the presence of a new 
English trading house on the Connecticut River at present day Springfield,
Massachusetts. In this letter they specifically addressed the issue o f the new trading 
house posing a direct threat to Fort Orange; as they noted, the two were separated by only 
ten leagues.1 They also specifically mentioned their concern over the fact that the 
Indians, not naming which Indians, claimed a right to sell the land for the new trading 
house to the English, because, according to the Directors, “it is within our boundaries,” 
they also warned that “we must prevent their [English] locating there by all means.” The 
Directors did qualify their “by all means” declaration by directing the New Netherland 
officials that the Englishmen’s “doings and arrangements must be carefully 
watched.. .and invasions or trespasses by them as well as by others must be prevented, if
1 However, these miles were over quite hilly terrain that neither the English or Dutch could traverse or 
defend very easily.
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possible.”2 The issue of New England’s activities to the east o f New Netherland was the 
focus of Stuyvesant’s early activities as director general o f New Netherland.
Stuyvesant actually took the initiative in facing the English challenge to Dutch 
territory before he received the somewhat tentative instructions from the Netherlands.
On June 25, 1647, Stuyvesant sent a letter to Governor John Winthrop in Massachusetts.3 
This would be the beginning of a long and involved correspondence with the New 
England governors. Like the majority of Stuyvesant’s official letters, the tone was 
cordial even when the message was not. Stuyvesant offered pleasantries and informed 
Winthrop that he would be at the latter’s service, “always provided it may not intrench 
upon the right o f my Lords & Masters, the Estates-Generall, or West Indie Company, 
whose indubitable right is to all that land betwixt that riuer called Conneticut & that by 
the English named Deleware.”4 With his statement, Stuyvesant not only staked his 
claim, but also let Winthrop know that Christian cooperation would only go so far.
By August of 1647, the New Englanders responded to Director Stuyvesant in a 
united front. In their letter they congratulated the new Director General on his safe 
arrival in Manhattan. They also made it clear that they would not back down and 
concede disputed areas to the Dutch. The Englishmen placed their statements within the 
context o f concern over the Dutch selling arms and ammunition to the Indians, “at long
2 Gehring, Charles T. ed. & trans., Correspondence, 1647-1653. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2000, 5. This letter was not dated, but was sent from Amsterdam in April o f  1647 and arrived in New  
Amsterdam on June 28.
3 This is the first extant letter from Stuyvesant. He wrote to Governor Eaton at N ew  Haven prior to his 
correspondence with Gov. Winthrop, this letter no longer exists. N ew  Haven was the most immediate 
threat to the stability o f  N ew  Amsterdam as it was located within Dutch claims.
4 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 7.
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Island within the River of Connecticut at the Narragansetts and other places within the 
English Jurisdictions.”5 Now that it was clear that neither side had any intention to 
concede its claim on the Connecticut River, relations between the Dutch and the English, 
especially those at New Elaven, declined rapidly.
New Haven Governor Theophilus Eaton wrote to Stuyvesant in June 1647 to 
acknowledge the new Director’s arrival and to propose an “equally proposition o f a 
neighbourlie correspndencie, that justice may haue a full & free passage in all occasions 
betwixt us.”6 By the time Eaton wrote his second letter in August of that year, his goals 
had changed to “witnes against your vnneighbourlie & iniurious course.” Eaton 
abandoned attempts at diplomacy as he argued vehemently against Dutch claims on land 
that he and the residents o f New Haven colony had occupied under the authority of King 
James and by purchase o f the land from the Indians “who were the true proprietours of 
the land.”7 Stuyvesant’s actions against New Haven colony caused Eaton to accuse the 
former of “disturbing the peace betwixt the Engl: & Dutch in these partes, which hath
Q
bynne [soe long & so hapilie] maintained betwixt the two nations in Europe.”
But this was not Europe and relations between countries on one continent did not always 
transfer so clearly to relations between the same countries on another continent.
The dispute over the boundary between New Netherland and New England 
dominated Stuyvesant’s activity for several years. He initially tested the waters to see if 
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to lay claim to the area along the Connecticut River, he also asked for a meeting between 
New Netherland and New England authorities in order to establish a stable and secure 
eastern border with New England. Stuyvesant would then be able to turn his attention to 
controlling the land and the people in other areas of New Netherland.
The correspondence between Eaton and Stuyvesant continued in a less than 
cordial manner. Governor Eaton, with his thriving settlement at New Haven, was 
particularly offended at the audacity that New Netherland, a place that he refused to 
recognize as a colony, but only as a mere plantation, was making claims on his colony.9 
By reducing the Dutch presence in North America to the status o f a plantation, Governor 
Eaton tried to establish English dominance in the region based on what he viewed was 
the success o f the various settlements. Furthermore, with the colony of New Haven, as 
well as Connecticut, being within the disputed area, Governor Eaton had greater incentive 
to prove the validity of the English claim on the land.
During this correspondence Stuyvesant and his New England counterparts 
illustrated the ideas behind what constituted a legal claim on North American land. As 
Jaap Jacobs has pointed out in his article on the border conflict, the two European powers 
had different criteria for claiming land. The legal basis for English land claim was the 
right of first occupation. The Dutch WIC however, required effective use of land by at
9 Ibid., 14, 15, 47. As Warren Hofstra explained in his book on New Virginia, “The term plantation  
customarily applies to the designs that English policy-makers in early-seventeenth-century London 
developed to impart both impetus and form to the movement o f  Scottish, English, and some German and 
French Protestants into the north o f  Ireland in an effort to wrest the region from the native Irish and reduce 
the threat o f  Catholic power to the security o f  England. The term was never employed so explicitly to 
describe efforts to occupy the margins o f  the English colonial world o f  the eighteenth century with white, 
Protestant, yeoman farm families amidst a war with French and Spanish colonists, Native Americans, 
Native Americans, and enslaved Africans.” Page 4. This also seems to apply for seventeenth-century 
English North America. Eaton only used the term plantation  in reference to N ew  Netherland, while the 
other English settlements were referred to as colonies.
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least fifty colonists.10 It is important to point out that Jacobs’s analysis of the
negotiations was from a European perspective looking at how matters of sovereignty
were defined in Europe. He noted that with expanding colonial empires, these definitions
were in a state of flux during the mid-seventeenth century, especially with England in the
midst of a civil war. With no mutually accepted terms concerning land possession,
Jacobs points out that, “there was neither right nor wrong in this situation; it was rather a
matter of opposing points of view.”11 With no accepted standard, the colonists would
12have to contest for the right to utilize their own terms concerning claiming land.
However, the correspondence between the Dutch and English governors seems to 
indicate that the colonists’ definitions of who controlled lands did not necessarily agree 
with that of their rulers at home. It would seem counterproductive for Stuyvesant to 
argue that the Dutch retained control of the Connecticut River Valley based on the WIC’s 
demand that the land be under effective use by at least fifty colonists. Dutch presence on 
the Connecticut River was limited to a few men posted at Fort Good Hope, a place that 
was quickly being surrounded by English settlers in the town of Hartford, Connecticut. 
The Dutch did not meet their own criteria for laying claim to the Connecticut River.
10 Jaap Jacobs, “The Hartford Treaty: A European Perspective on a N ew  World Conflict,” de Halve Maen 
68 (1995): 74.
" ib id ., 75.
12 See Patricia Seed, Ceremonies o f  Possession in Europe's Conquest o f  the New World, 1492-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a discussion on the varying cultural and political 
methods European powers utilized to claim dominion over territory. See also James Muldoon, “Discover, 
Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession o f  North 
America,” in The Many Legalities o f  Early America, ed. Christopher L. Tomlins; Bruce H. Mann (Chapel 
Hill: University o f  North Carolina for the Omohundro Institute o f  Early American History and Culture, 
2001), 25-46. Muldoon argues that debates over the international nature o f  land claims does not come into 
its own in Britain and British North America until the eve o f  the American Revolution. At this point in the 
seventeenth century, the nature o f  land claims remained a very local issue with wider implications.
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Due to the difficulty in getting settlers to occupy New Netherland, the Dutch 
changed their requirements for legal land holdings in North America. The Dutch claimed 
they owned the land because they had purchased the land outright from the Indians. This 
allowed Stuyvesant to assert to Gov. Winthrop that, “my Lords & Masters, the Estates- 
Generall, or West Indie Company, whose indubitable right is to all the land betwixt that
1 Triuer called Conneticut, & that by the English named Deleware.” Stuyvesant did not 
argue about land occupation. According to him, the Dutch held the claim to the land 
based purely on its legal purchase.
In the letters o f the New England governors to Petrus Stuyvesant, it continued to 
be Governor Eaton of New Haven who described and defended England’s claim on the 
Connecticut River. Eaton upheld the idea of right of first occupation in his arguments 
with Stuyvesant. However, Eaton went a step further and used Dutch reasoning in his 
arguments against Stuyvesant. He claimed rightful ownership “by lycence & auntient 
patent from King James, of famous memorie, since confirmed by his Maiestie that now 
is, first came into these ptes, & vppon due purchase from the Indians, who were the true 
proprietours of the land (for we fownd it not a vacuum) haue built, planted, & for many 
yeares quietlie, & without any claime or disturbance, from the Dutch or others, possessed 
the same.” 14 Jacobs points out that such an argument was actually rejected by English 
authorities in Europe because the Indians were not bona fide possessors o f the land. 
However, it appears that the situation on the ground called for new reasoning beyond 
what was deemed acceptable in Europe.
13 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 7.
14 Ibid., 13.
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Stuyvesant, knowing his situation called for a peaceful settlement of the 
boundary, continued to press for a meeting between New Netherland and the New 
England colonies to resolve the border issue. New England had a greater population than 
the colony o f New Netherland thereby allowing the former to create a much larger 
military force than the latter. Furthermore, many settlers in New Netherland did not feel 
it necessary to provide military service to the colony since the WIC maintained a military 
presence in the colony, although it was also not sufficient to protect the colony from the 
numerous threats it faced. Not only was New Netherland not in a position to fight its 
English neighbors, but Stuyvesant’s attention was needed throughout the colony. The 
meeting was continually pushed back and rescheduled for one reason or another.
Furthermore, the location of the meeting was a particular sticking point. 
Stuyvesant wanted a meeting at Hartford, in the disputed territory and near the Dutch 
Fort Good Hope. The New Englanders wished to have the conference in Boston. The 
meeting was finally held in Hartford in September 1650. By dictating the location of the 
meeting near the site o f the Dutch Fort Good Hope, Stuyvesant was able to illustrate the 
Dutch presence and, although minimal, the Dutch power in the region and negotiate for a 
more favorable boundary line for New Netherland than if the meeting took place in 
Boston or even New Haven. This was one of the earliest examples of how the competing 
powers o f the region tried to exert their influence over the diplomatic landscape of the 
area. Although Stuyvesant had much weaker military support to back up his claim, he 
was able to mitigate this apparent weakness by including an important symbol of Dutch 
power on the landscape, Fort Good Hope, to establish an element o f control during the 
negotiations.
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The 1650 Hartford Treaty did help to stabilize New Netherland by removing a 
significant threat coming from outside the colony. With the treaty, the border between 
New England and New Netherland was finalized. New Netherland lost its claim to the 
Connecticut River, although they were allowed to retain control over Fort Good Hope. 
However, the Dutch really had no realistic claim on the Connecticut River as it was 
populated by the English. The Dutch retention o f Fort Good Hope was merely a symbolic 
gesture, and the fort was soon abandoned. However, forts were very important elements 
of the Dutch presence in North America, as we will see, and the existence of Dutch at 
Fort Good Hope allowed the Dutch to negotiate from a more powerful position, than if 
Stuyvesant conceded Good Hope’s loss prior to the meeting. Furthermore, although the 
treaty would not be ratified in Europe for several years, it appeared to be sufficient for the 
purposes o f the colonists in North America. Stuyvesant and the Council at New 
Amsterdam could then turn their attention to other areas of the colony where Dutch, and 
particularly WIC, control of land and people was in doubt.
The Threat to the South 
With concerns of a direct attack o f the English on New Netherland at least 
temporarily allayed, Stuyvesant and the Council still had to contend with the loss of 
Dutch authority along the South or Delaware River. The WIC was adamant concerning 
its claim to land from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. However, it was also 
willing to give up claim to some of that territory in return for a certain amount of peace of 
mind. The WIC directors indicated that they would be happy to agree on a boundary 
with the Swedes as well as with the English, but they saw little hope in that occurring.15
15 Ibid., 58, 107, 154.
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In 1654 the Swedes did take over the inadequately defended Fort Casimir on the
Delaware River without having to fire a shot. With the Swedish capture of the fort, the
Dutch had no real presence on the Delaware River. The Directors in Amsterdam
adamantly held to the ideas that the Delaware was Dutch territory and that they had the
strength to defend it. They therefore instructed Stuyvesant to retake the territory from the
Swedes. Stuyvesant decided that the winter of 1654-1655 was not a good time to retake
the Delaware; he, therefore, set sail to retake Fort Casimir in September 1655. It was an
extremely quick expedition and the Dutch retook Fort Casimir and then expelled the
Swedes from their Fort Christina before the end of the month. However, this victory
would come at a very costly price as events unfolded in New Amsterdam during
Stuyvesant’s absence. These events will be discussed below.
The Swedes did not pose the only European threat to New Netherland’s south.
The authorities in New Amsterdam were also concerned over relations with the English
in Virginia as well as those in New England. While the WIC authorities in New
Amsterdam did not foresee a possible threat to their territory by the Virginians, they did
view the Englishmen to their south as a possible economic threat and acted accordingly.
On December 16, 1653 New Netherland sent Reverend Drisius to Virginia to conclude an
“alliance, correspondence and commerce” between the two colonies.
He was also to propose and ask for a provisional continuation of the 
commerce and intercourse between the two places, a free pass or 
safeguard, signed by the Honorable Governor for some of their merchants 
and yachts, to pay and collect debts among the inhabitants of Virginia; as 
we on our side have given and are still willing to give, passes to come and 
go, to ships and yachts coming to us from Virginia.16
16 Edward T. Corwin, ed., Ecclesiastical Records o f  the State o f  New York, 7 vols., vol. 1 (Albany: State of 
New York, 1901): 319.
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Whereas Stuyvesant was able to negotiate a boundary with the New England authorities 
from an advantageous position at Hartford, where a WIC fort was located, he held no 
such advantage with the Virginians. Without a previous presence on the landscape, and 
without any power within the colony of Virginia, he was forced to send a representative 
to Virginia in hopes of gaining favorable trading conditions.
In 1659, Stuyvesant became alarmed again that the Swedes were purchasing 
Indian land around Fort Nassau. He ordered the Dutch on the Delaware to buy the land 
around the fort to prevent Swedish acquisition. He was particularly concerned that the 
Swedes, through the continual purchase of land would be able to cut off communication 
between Fort Nassau and Fort Orange. Similarly, he was concerned that the Swedes had
• 17 *designs on the Hudson River. These threats did not come to fruition, but they 
nevertheless caused Stuyvesant to keep a very wary eye on events to his south and 
especially along the Delaware River. These activities continue to illustrate the fractured 
nature of Indian and European relations in the mid-seventeenth century. There was no 
central location for dealings with Indians and Europeans. Interactions between Indians 
and Europeans continued to take place in many locales as the situation warranted.
The Threat to North 
The Dutch in New Netherland did not have to contend with threats just from the 
English and the Swedish; they also had to guard their northern holdings from the French 
in Canada. In the 1650s, wars between the Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians 
threatened to cut off Fort Orange’s fur supply from the north. As a result, much official
17 Letter from Stuyvesant to Beekman, May 24, 1659. William Beekman Letter Book, 1658-1664. New- 
York Historical Society collections. Manuscript microfilm reel #20, pg. 215.
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Dutch attention was drawn to the immediate needs of the trading enterprise around Fort 
Orange.
On March 21, 1651 the Amsterdam Directors commented on the Mohawks’ attack
on Canada where they captured eight or nine Christians whom they were threatening with
torture if they did not receive a large ransom. The Directors conceded that to assist
is the duty of all Christians, but every one is bound to care for himself and his 
own people; your Honor cannot be ignorant, that some time ago men of this 
nation have been ransomed at the expense o f the Company and by the 
contribution of the community, for which we have never been repaid; so that we 
think, that when the complaints reach France, they will take care of their own 
countrymen.18
While the Dutch were not directly involved in this war, the residents of Fort Orange and 
Rensselaerswyck could not avoid the repercussions of such a war. Furthermore, the Fort 
Orange authorities would tend to ignore the advice of the WIC Directors to let France 
take care of their own countrymen. By ransoming captured Frenchmen from the 
Mohawks the Dutch at Fort Orange placated both Mohawks and French in order to keep a 
peaceful border to their direct north. The Dutch may not have liked ransoming captured 
Frenchmen, but they saw it as necessary. These actions also contributed to the constant 
evolution o f a new cultural landscape as Dutch, Mohawks and French remained in 
contact from these interactions. By the summer o f 1653, war between the Iroquois and 
the French eliminated peaceful relations along the northern borders of New Netherland, 
and drew much of New Netherland’s attention north as well.
18 Berthold Femow, ed., Documents Relative to the H istory and settlements o f  the towns along the Hudson 
and Mohawk River (with the exception o f  Albany) from  1630-1684, and also illustrating the relations o f  the 
settlers with the Indians (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1881), 27. Hereafter cited as Femow, DRCHNY 13
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English Incursions into New Netherland
One of the most significant barriers to maintaining control of the territory claimed 
by the Netherlands was lack of population. Although the Dutch believed that purchasing 
land from its rightful Indian owners guaranteed their legal claim to the territory, without a 
human presence on the land, it was vulnerable to take over, particularly by the larger 
English population to their east. Stuyvesant harbored much resentment towards non- 
Dutch residents within the colony. However, members o f the WIC in Europe did not 
share this sentiment. The WIC Directors usually supported English settlement within the 
boundaries of their colony as long as the groups were in manageable numbers and swore 
to uphold the laws and rights of the company.19 These individuals and groups were not 
necessarily seen as threats by the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam, because they did 
not challenge the WIC’s dominance in the beaver trade.
However, when a group of Englishmen expressed their desire to settle and trade in 
New Netherland, the WIC Directors vehemently objected to the presence of an “English 
tradinghouse ten leagues from Fort Orange.” Not only did the Directors wish to keep the 
English traders away from Fort Orange, but they also indicated that they must prevent 
“by all means” the Indians selling land to the English within New Netherland 
boundaries.20 As long as the Englishmen were not challenging WIC authority they were 
welcomed by those in Amsterdam. However, Stuyvesant did not share the Directors’ 
opinion on English settlements within New Netherland. He would argue against English
19 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 4.
20 Ibid., 5. All land within New Netherland had to be purchased from the Indians by the WIC and then 
granted to individuals. It was acceptable, according to some WIC officials, for English settlers to occupy 
and farm land that they acquired from the WIC after the WIC acquired it from the Indians. Direct purchase 
o f land by anyone, regardless o f  nationality, that bypassed the WIC was not considered legitimate.
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presence within the WIC colony on economic, political, and religious grounds, with 
much of his arguments focused on the use and control of land.
The WIC recognized their vulnerability from lack o f population. In March 1650, 
the Committee of the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC contracted a charter to transport 
200 settlers to New Netherland. One half of the compliment were to be farmers and farm
laborers, the other half were to be “conversant with agriculture” and the WIC would
0 1furnish them with the necessary supplies for the voyage. In this way the Dutch would 
be better able to defend their territory and to illustrate to English settlers that the Dutch 
possessed the land by both legal purchase and by proper occupation and use of the land. 
These terms satisfied both Dutch and English definitions of land possession. The need to 
populate New Netherland, especially the most vulnerable area between New Amsterdam 
and Fort Orange, would be an issue throughout the colony’s existence. Unfortunately, 
there is no record that the requested settlers ever arrived in the colony.
Even with limited but growing Dutch population and military force in the region, 
the English governments in New England and Maryland did not directly invade the Dutch 
colony. However, the influx o f individual and small groups of English settlers into the 
colony created its own set o f problems for the WIC. The Dutch authorities’ insistence on 
a boundary between the English and Dutch colonies underscored their desire to keep the 
English contained in New England and Maryland. Throughout 1650, the WIC was 
concerned with continued reports of a possible war between the English to the east of 
New Netherland and the Wappinger Indians, a Munsee speaking group along the Hudson 
River. An English victory over the Wappinger Indians would allow the English to
21 E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial H istory o f  the State o f  New York, 14 vols. 
(Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856), 1: 370.
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occupy the land by the right o f conquest. According to his official writings, Stuyvesant 
did not see this as an imminent threat, however, he feared the possibility enough to reach 
out to the English he wished to keep out of New Netherland.22
In order to prevent English incursion as a result of a war between them and the 
Wappingers, New Netherland proposed a joint Anglo-Dutch alliance in order to avert war 
with the Wappinger Indians altogether. The reasoning behind such an alliance was that 
the Dutch and Wappingers already had signed a treaty after Kieft’s War, and a Dutch 
alliance with the English could help to bring about a peace between the Wappingers and 
the English before a war ever started. Such a course of action would then eliminate the 
possibility of the English moving into the Wappingers’ land along the North River as part 
of a right of conquest. Furthermore, such an alliance would allow the Dutch to keep a 
wary eye on their English neighbors and their military capabilities. While this 
arrangement made sense to Stuyvesant, the New Englanders saw little advantage for them 
in an alliance with their Dutch neighbors, and the alliance never came about. Moreover, 
these events continued to illustrate the fractured nature of Indian and European 
interactions at this time. Without a single, coherent policy, the Dutch, as well as the New 
Englanders, were forced to react to controversies with the different Indian groups, 
whenever and wherever they happened to present themselves.
Although the threatened war between the English and the Wappingers never came 
about, WIC authorities continued to fear the usurpation of what they considered to be
22 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 27.
23 Kieft was the Director o f  N ew  Netherland before Stuyvesant. The colony experienced a devastating war 
with Indians in the 1640s.
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Company land. In March 1651 the WIC directors warned Stuyvesant not to grant land to 
anyone without properly acknowledging the authority of the WIC. He was also forbidden 
to grant land to anyone who could not prove that he had the means to populate and 
cultivate the land.24 This statement reflects the precarious nature o f Dutch land claims. 
The WIC claimed land based on the supposed legal purchase o f it from the rightful 
owners, the Indians. They also controlled the distribution of that land to individuals who 
were able to make right and proper use of the land. Proper use o f the land in this instance 
was agricultural use, which would not threaten Dutch fur trading enterprises in the 
region. However, those who were able to meet the WIC’s requirements o f populating and 
working the land often found themselves at odds with the Company concerning land use. 
This was the case with foreign settlers (meaning both non-Dutch and non-Dutch 
Reformed) as well as Dutch landholders such as the Rensselaers around Fort Orange.
On December 11, 1653 George Baxter and several Dutchmen petitioned Director- 
General Stuyvesant concerning the legitimacy of the settlements on Long Island that were 
populated by both Dutch and English. Baxter was an Englishmen who cultivated land on 
western Long Island. He started his petition by stating, “first o f all, we acknowledge a 
paternal government which God (in nature) has established in the world for the 
maintenance and preservation o f peace and the good of mankind.... We therefore humbly 
conceive our privileges to be the same, harmonizing in every respect with those of the 
Netherlands, being a member dependent on that state and not a conquered or subjugated 
people.” Baxter’s petition for privileges and protections under the WIC, based on fealty
24 Feraow, D R C H N Y 13: 27.
25 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 90.
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to the Dutch authority, was met with derision by Petrus Stuyvesant and members of the 
Council. According to the Directors of the WIC, Baxter met the conditions for land 
ownership in the colony. He and his neighbors pledged their willingness to obey the laws 
of New Netherland and also settled and cultivated the land. Therefore there should have 
been no issues regarding Baxter’s and his neighbors’ rights to live peacefully in the 
borders of New Netherland.
Stuyvesant, however, did not see the situation quite in those terms. He was 
primarily concerned with the fact that the petition was written in English and translated 
into Dutch. The idea that “a foreigner or Englishman has to tell them what to remonstrate 
and demand” was an insult to Stuyvesant. In his reply, Stuyvesant noted that other New 
Netherland jurisdictions were “unaware o f such a remonstrance and should be considered 
too careful to sign what an Englishman has drafted, as if there was no one o f Dutch origin
96intelligent enough and capable to draft a petition to the Director General and Council.” 
The other jurisdictions that he mentioned consisted of populations of Dutch majority that 
did not have to prove themselves as loyal to the WIC to the same extent as the 
communities on Long Island and other communities made up of large numbers of non- 
Dutch, and particularly, large numbers of English. Furthermore, the fact that an 
Englishman was speaking for an otherwise Dutch community showed Stuyvesant’s 
discomfort with the creation of new cultural landscapes where non-Dutch played a 
significant role. Stuyvesant was trying to create an extension of the Dutch Republic in 
North America, and he wished to do so with no English interference. However, in the 
atmosphere in which he lived, one of constant challenges and negotiations for power, he
26 Ibid., 90-97.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was unable to stop the formation of new cultural landscapes which incorporated 
significant non-Dutch elements.
Despite Stuyvesant’s personal feelings towards the English presence within New 
Netherland, by 1654 greater numbers o f English settlers were moving into what the 
Dutch called Vreedlandt and the English called Westchester, as well as other areas along 
the Hudson River. Like the English settlers on Long Island, this community had been in 
existence north of Manhattan well prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in the colony, and they 
also pledged fidelity to the WIC. They had also established farms and continued to 
populate the land. Again, the community lived up to the requirements on legal 
settlements set forth by the WIC. However, WIC representatives in the colony perceived 
the majority English community between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange as a threat to 
the internal stability of New Netherland. Therefore, those WIC representatives who 
made up the Council in New Amsterdam ordered the group in Westchester to leave.
77Officially they were accused of “usurping” WIC land.
The concerns of the people of New Netherland surrounding the infiltration of the 
English into Dutch territory were compounded early in 1654. In February of that year, 
the Council took up a discussion on the scarcity of lead and powder among the Mohawk 
nation. They, and the residents of Fort Orange, were concerned that if  munitions were 
cut off completely to the Mohawks, the trade at Fort Orange and Beverwyck would come 
to an end. The council minutes show that their concern was not that the Indians would be 
unable to hunt beaver for the international trade, but “that the aforesaid nation might seek 
the munitions from our neighbors the English and be successful therein, which in these
27 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 36-38.
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dangerous times might bring more and greater misfortunes to this province.”28 That 
greater misfortune was seen as the possible end of the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks. 
The members o f the Council reasoned that should the Mohawks turn to the English for 
trading purposes, then the Mohawks would in turn switch their friendship to the English
9Qat which time New Netherland would be completely isolated. Although the colony was 
short on lead and powder for their own supply, the Council deemed it necessary to 
provide the Mohawks with what they could. With the Council taking the lead on these 
negotiations, it shows that Indian policy was not only being driven from New 
Amsterdam, even though the Mohawks were located just west of Fort Orange, but also 
continued to be a part of Dutch policy with their European rivals.
With their elevated concern that the Mohawks would ally themselves with the 
English, the New Netherland authorities proceeded with extra urgency to try to remove 
the English from the Hudson River valley. On April 19, 1655 the Council of New 
Netherland once more warned Thomas Pell and others against settling on the lands of the 
Vreedlandt. Again, to the Dutch the land was clearly theirs because Gov. Kieft 
purchased it years earlier from the Indian residents of the area who they believed to be 
the rightful owners o f the land. The English, however, believed that their occupation was 
the critical factor in establishing ownership of the land, not to mention that they had 
earlier been given permission to settle the land and continued to pledge loyalty to the 
company. The council warned them “not to proceed with building, clearing, pasturing 
cattle or cutting hay or whatever else may be necessary for the cultivation of the soil upon
28 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 116.
29 Femow, DRCHNY  13:35.
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the aforesaid purchased and long possessed lands contrary to the agreement made at 
Hartford and to remove within fifteen days” or risk persecution according to law.30 Like 
the Council’s directive of a year earlier for the residents of Vreedlandt/Westchester to 
leave the land, the English settlers also ignored this order, thereby illustrating Dutch 
inability to actually control much of the land they claimed under the jurisdiction of New 
Netherland. Furthermore, WIC inability to control this particular area and the people 
who occupied the land served as another example of how different regions within New 
Netherland continued to develop independently of one another, despite governmental 
efforts otherwise.
Furthermore, the Westchester residents’ resistance to the Council’s orders for 
them to leave the land further illustrates how English settlers were able to form a new 
cultural landscape within New Netherland. This new cultural landscape was based on 
English colonial understanding of rightful land use and ownership. Stuyvesant and the 
Council continued to resist, in vain, the creation of these new non-Dutch landscapes 
within the border of what they claimed as New Netherland.
Indian Threats
The English were able to ignore the directives o f Stuyvesant and the Council with 
impunity due to the numerous threats the colony then faced. A small group of English 
farmers, no matter how strategically located, did not pose the same threat as a large 
English attack, Swedish usurpation of land, or Indian attack. However, this small group 
of English farmers did expose the lack of control that the WIC maintained over the land 
and the people who occupied it. WIC representatives in the colony were unable to 
respond to multiple threats at the same time. Furthermore, we see that the authorities in
30 Ibid., 38.
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New Amsterdam were often less concerned with events to the north of Fort Orange than 
with those to their east and south. These events were often left to the residents of Fort 
Orange and Rensselaerswyck to deal with. This was true in dealings with both the 
French in Canada, including the “Canadian Indians,” and the Iroquois. This early 
differentiation between the concerns and responsibilities o f the settlements would 
contribute to the formation of Fort Orange and eventually Albany as an independent 
colonial center.
This separation of responsibilities would become even more pronounced during 
and after 1655. With the growing threat o f the Swedes on the Delaware River and then 
the Peach War attacks on Manhattan Island, Stuyvesant’s attention was needed elsewhere 
and the residents o f Fort Orange were left to deal with affairs in their region.
Furthermore, it is during and after 1655 that the Mohawks begin to expand their own 
political activities into Fort Orange.
While Stuyvesant was concerned with Swedish activity on the Delaware River, 
the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Algonquians in the 1650s got the attention of the 
WIC Directors in Amsterdam. In April of 1652 Directors in Amsterdam expressed their 
concern over the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Indians. They were particularly 
concerned by a request of the Canadian Indians to go into the Mohawks’ country. This 
would require them to pass over the North River, and they asked for permission to do so. 
The directors understood that granting the Canadian Indians permission to travel over the 
North River and over New Netherland territory would cause great trouble with the 
Mohawks. Since the Dutch were dependent on the Indians, especially the Mohawks, to
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maintain their fur trading industry, the last thing they could afford was to allow the 
Mohawks’ enemies to travel through Mohawk territory.
Although the WIC directors continued to hope to entice the northern Indians to 
come down to New Netherland to trade their beaver pelts, they also understood the 
necessity of maintaining their alliance with the Mohawks. In order not to jeopardize any 
future relations with the Canadian Indians, the Directors also wanted to make sure that
•> i
Stuyvesant refused the Indians’ request “politely.” It is interesting to note that 
according to the communication from the WIC officials in Amsterdam, the Canadian 
Indians asked for permission to cross over the North River, not Dutch land.32 Such 
emphasis on the river was not unique. It was the river more than the land that the Dutch 
knew and possessed.
In the Mohawks’ invasion of French Canada when they had taken several 
prisoners, Algonquians from Canada were said to be traveling down into the Hudson 
River Valley to wage war on the Mohawks.34 To face this threat the Dutch continued to 
propose a mutual defense against the Indians, which they initially brought up during the 
concern over a war between the English and the Wappingers. By proposing this mutual 
defense plan, the Dutch would benefit from the English military power that outnumbered
31 Ibid., 34; and Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 153.
32 The Gehring translation states that the Indians requested “passage to the North River.” In both Gehring’s 
and Femow’s translations the emphasis is placed on the River itself, and not the land.
33 See Merwick, Possessing Albany, 4, 107-114 where she discusses the importance o f  water and 
specifically the Hudson River to the Dutch in New Netherland. She stated on pages 107-109 that, “Water 
was the sine qua non o f  the trading system. The rivers and kills were essential sources o f  energy and 
transport. They were also sources o f  imagination and self-referentiality. They were full o f  power and 
meaning.” They were filled with power and meaning particularly because they linked the sources o f  Dutch 
control, the forts, and they were one o f  the few geographic regions where the Dutch were able to assert 
their authority, especially over Indian populations.
34 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 28-35.
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the Dutch two to one. At the same time the Dutch would be protecting their own interests 
from the same military threat by keeping their friends close and their enemies closer. The 
English, seeing no advantage for themselves in such an alliance, politely declined.
Luckily for New Netherland, their failed attempt at solving these particular problems was 
neutralized by the fact that the Dutch did not become immersed in hostilities between the 
Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians.
Possible threats from Indian sources were not restricted to the Iroquois’ wars with 
the Canadian Indians. Although many tribes signed a treaty with the Dutch after 
Governor Kieft’s war in 1645 the potential for violence continued. In George Baxter’s 
1653 petition to Governor Stuyvesant, he stated that the settlers on Long Island continued 
to expect another war with the Indians. Baxter predicted such an event because the 
Indians committed several murders under the supposed pretext that they had not been 
paid for their lands. Stuyvesant, already upset that this petition was originally written in 
English by an Englishman, replied to Baxter “the assertion and allegation of the 
remonstrants that murders had been committed by the Indians, under the pretense of not 
having been paid for their land, is made entirely without foundation and in bad faith.” 
According to the Dutch, they had bought the land from the Indians, and therefore, it was 
the Dutch under the authority of the WIC who had legal deed to the land. Baxter claimed 
that he and his fellow petitioners purchased the land from the Indians.
Stuyvesant did not accept that Baxter and his associates had a legitimate claim to 
protection from the WIC if  they did not gain title to their land through the WIC, since all 
land purchased from Indians had to be approved by the WIC. Stuyvesant made his
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feelings concerning Baxter’s claim to the land known in his somewhat hostile reply. He 
stated, that
if  we accept the assertion of the remonstrants that the murders were 
committed under the pretext of not having been paid for the land and 
compare it with their statement in the preamble that they themselves had 
bought the land from the Indians, would not the lack o f payment then be 
their fault as buyers, and therefore would not they themselves be the cause
"VSof this claim by virtue of their default?
Whether Baxter was stealing land from the Dutch or the Indians, Stuyvesant did not 
recognize Baxter’s claim to it. Stuyvesant wanted the WIC to dictate the process of 
creating new communities and thereby the creation o f Dutch landscapes in New 
Netherland.
Nor did Stuyvesant accept Baxter’s explanation for the growing Indian threat on 
Long Island. According to Stuyvesant the reasons were much more o f a spiritual nature. 
Stuyvesant admonished Baxter for not taking the time to investigate the reasons behind 
the recent murders committed by the Indians. Stuyvesant explained that Indians on 
Staten Island killed some settlers because they claimed that Cornelius Melyn was a 
sorcerer who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to 
kill him and all the people on Staten Island to protect themselves from the sorcery of the 
Christians.36
35 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 97.
36 Ibid., 97.
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Importance of Forts to Dutch Goals
The WIC claimed the land on the Delaware, like the land along the Hudson and 
Connecticut Rivers, based on purchase of the land from the Indians.37 As shown above, 
however, the Dutch colony was constantly faced with threats from outside factions. So 
while the WIC could claim land based on legal purchase from the Indians and in some 
cases through settlement and use of the land, the WIC’s practical efforts to maintain 
control of the land was through the presence of forts on the land. Forts Orange and 
Amsterdam on the Hudson allowed the Dutch to claim control of that river, while Fort 
Good Hope was the Dutch symbol of authority on the Connecticut River. On the 
Delaware River the Dutch maintained at first Fort Nassau and then Fort Casimir. It was 
in the presence of these forts that the WIC placed its hope of maintaining control over 
their lands.
The Dutch had to rely on forts as a military presence in North America partly 
because it could not rely on numbers as the English could, especially in New England. 
While New England experienced an influx of colonists during the Great Migration, New 
Netherland was never so fortunate as to attract many willing Dutch men and women to 
settle in the colony. With the forts, they were able to establish an authoritative presence 
and protect New Netherland’s most valuable areas, the rivers that supported the fur trade. 
Furthermore, while the Iroquois had fortified towns, Europeans had little access to them, 
and when Europeans did access Iroquois “castles”, as they were called, it was usually 
either as captives or under highly controlled circumstances. Fort Orange, however, 
played a most significant role in the history of the region. Its use as a place of
37 See above for discussion o f  Dutch shifting from land claims based on proper use to land claims based on 
purchase from Indians.
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intercultural exchange, whether through trade or diplomacy, allowed it to develop as a 
colonial center of European and Indian affairs.
The importance of the forts was apparent in a 1647 letter from the WIC Directors 
to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam that discussed the boundary disputes 
with both the English and the Swedes. There was confusion as to exactly what 
Stuyvesant was trying to claim as New Netherland territory. Stuyvesant had argued for 
different boundaries with the separate English authorities. With some he claimed land 
from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. With others he claimed land from the 
Connecticut River to Cape Henlopen, and finally at other times he claimed territory from 
Cape Henlopen all the way to Cape Cod. Due to the confusion, the Amsterdam Directors 
wrote:
Now your Honor says in your last letter, (that the) Directors.. .did not 
claim our ju(risdiction) farther, than from (the) Southriver in the South to 
the (Freshwater) river in the North, which your honor thinks it (ought to 
be beyond) question, because the (country, the) streams and rivers,
(situate) between the two, are lined (with) our forts, but that in the 
protests against the English, your honor pretended a little more, namely 
from Cape Malabare, (called) Cape Cot by our people, to Cape 
Hinloopen: Yet your honor says if we might have the first mentioned in 
peace, it would be the best to be satisfied with it.38
It seems that Stuyvesant, by making grand claims to territory, was giving himself room to
negotiate in order to maintain what he saw as New Netherland’s legal territory “beyond
question” because it was “lined with our forts.” The Dutch forts were the symbol of
Dutch authority, even though militarily they were neither well armed nor sufficiently
manned. However, the forts were erected to protect the main land use of the colony,
trade, and were, therefore, a physical manifestation of Dutch power and control over the
38 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 68.
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land the forts occupied. Stuyvesant could not claim that the territory the WIC claimed 
was lined by their settlements and farms, so the presence of the forts stood as the 
evidence of Dutch power and control over a certain area, as tenuous as that control may 
have been.
On the Delaware, Stuyvesant took it upon himself to replace the original Dutch 
fort on that river, Fort Nassau, which was located on the east side o f the river, with Fort 
Casimir, which was built on the west side o f the river. As was discussed above, the 
Swedes and Dutch had rival forts on the Delaware, and the two nations traded claims to 
the river by taking over one another’s forts. The populations were quite minimal. It was, 
therefore, the possession and presence of forts on the river that allowed the nations to 
claim control o f the river itself and allowed a small force to control trade and access to 
the interior lands. Moreover, the presence of a garrisoned fort could force competing 
powers, such as Maryland and Virginia, to pay required duties in order to sail and trade 
up the Delaware River. Unfortunately, these claims of power and control were seldom 
backed up with the actual ability to assert real authority over the areas surrounding them.
Fort Orange, as the WIC’s fort located furthest inland, played a unique role in 
defining the borders and function of New Netherland. Fort Orange did not control entry 
to the Hudson River, but allowed the Dutch to assert some authority over the interior 
lands beyond the Hudson River. Fort Orange was the one Dutch fort located closest to 
lands contested by Dutch, Indian, English and French powers. After the fall of Fort Good 
Hope in the 1650s, Fort Orange defined the northern limits of New Netherland and stood 
as a bulwark against encroaching English interests in the area. With the presence of Fort 
Orange on the upper reaches o f the Hudson and near the mouth o f the Mohawk River and
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the interior hunting grounds, New Netherland was able to exert its authority over access 
to those lands.
Because of Fort Orange’s important position, WIC authorities found it quite 
necessary to protect it. In the same 1647 letter that discussed New N etherlands 
boundaries as “beyond question” due to the presence o f the forts, the WIC directors 
expressed concern over a desire by the Swedes to establish their own fort north of Fort 
Orange. The Directors indicated that such an event would be “very injurious for us.”39 
This statement was quite odd seeing that the Swedes really had no access to the lands 
north of New Netherland. However, it stood as an additional perceived threat from the 
north, in addition to the actually threat from France in Canada.
In response to the Mohawks’ war with the Canadian Algonquians in 1653, the 
WIC suggested establishing a post eighteen to twenty miles north o f Fort Orange to allow 
the Canadian Indians to trade more easily with the Dutch. However, such a move was 
not to the Dutch advantage.40 By building a post outside o f the perimeter of forts 
constructed by the Dutch, the WIC risked increasing the vulnerability of Fort Orange, 
which was already isolated from other Dutch settlements. Furthermore, the Dutch could 
ill afford to alienate the Mohawks with a futile attempt at enticing the Canadian Indians 
south. Armed with the knowledge o f the situation on the ground, the New Netherland 
Council rejected the WIC’s suggestion and moved to appease the Mohawks and to 
prevent them from becoming allied to the English. The Dutch in New Netherland were 
fully aware the English had more to offer the Mohawks in material aid, therefore, the
39 Ibid., 69.
40 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 35; and Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 211.
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New Netherland council resolved to supply the Mohawks with a moderate amount of 
powder and lead. Supplying the Mohawks with powder and lead was a practice that 
would continue throughout the existence of New Netherland.41 Furthermore, building a 
new fort north of Fort Orange would place it beyond the limits of Dutch shipping and 
Dutch ability to control the river. However, the rejection of the plan and the appeasement 
of the Mohawks also allowed Fort Orange to develop its importance as a center of 
European/Indian relations in a region that had no defined political boundaries, and where 
no power was capable of imposing defined boundaries that other groups would accept.
The WIC’s forts on the Delaware River allowed them to maintain a presence 
where they had few actual settlers. In the correspondence between the WIC directors in 
Amsterdam and Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam, the main focus in 
discussion of Dutch territory on the Delaware River was on the forts as the Dutch worked 
to retain possession of the area. In April of 1652 the Directors of the WIC wrote to 
Stuyvesant and the Council that they did not see much hope in arranging a boundary with 
the Swedish government. The letter continued with a discussion of Dutch forts in the 
area, the possible need to build additional forts, and the necessity of preventing “people 
who have been so bold to stir up the Indians against us” from erecting strongholds on 
islands around Manhattan.42 While these actions seem quite obvious and of little 
consequence in such a context, the maintenance of forts was crucial in retaining a 
presence on the land and attempting to control the people of New Netherland and the 
Hudson River Valley in particular.
41 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 35; and Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 116.
42 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 155.
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The importance of forts in New Netherland was expressed not just through 
correspondence between WIC officials in Amsterdam and those in New Amsterdam. The 
significance of forts on the land was also expressed through Dutch maps. One o f the 
most widely used maps in works on New Netherland is the 1656 van der Donck map 
(Figure 3). This map depicts Nova Belgica Neiuw Nederlandt as encompassing the area 
just east o f the Fresh or Connecticut River to the area just west of the Delaware River.
The map shows fairly detailed knowledge of the rivers, streams and coastlines of the 
colony. The Connecticut, Hudson and Delaware Rivers appear quite accurate up to the 
limit of travel by European vessels. However, the map depicts the Great Esopus Kill as 
connecting with the Susquehanna River and eventually emptying into the Delaware.43 
Along the banks of the main rivers, the map identifies the forts of the region. The Dutch 
Forts of Orange and Amsterdam on the Hudson River, and Fort Good Hope on the 
Connecticut River were identified on the map. The Delaware River forts o f Nassau, 
Christina and Elsenburg (the latter was a Swedish fort) were all identified as well.
The landed areas in between the rivers were not as well documented. These areas 
were filled with the names of Indian groups whose further presence is often noted by the 
use of small houses indicating their general whereabouts. Names of islands in the 
Hudson River are listed mainly along the east bank o f the river and fill in an otherwise 
blank area o f land. This is especially noted in the land opposite the Esopus. Other areas 
that lacked European settlements were filled in with drawings of small hills and trees.
The area o f land between the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers was left virtually empty,
43 Although it was an error, this connection actually gave greater significance to settling the Esopus region 
as it would, according to the map, give the Dutch an inland water connection between the Hudson and 
Delaware Rivers.
53
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 3. Van der Donck Map. Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society Map
Collection
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filled only by the names of a few tribes, with no corresponding houses. The “LANDT” 
from the words proclaiming the region “New Nederlandf ’ also fills this area of the map, 
along with a few groupings o f trees. Actually one of the few signs o f human occupation 
of this region between the two rivers is the designation of “Mr Pinsers handel huys” or 
the trading post of Pynchon at Springfield, which posed a relatively serious threat to 
trading activities at Fort Orange.
The most significant symbol of European occupation, and thereby European 
control, of this area was the fort. Van der Donck used both words and a four-pointed 
symbol to mark the locations of Fort Orange on the Hudson River as well as Forts 
Nassau, Christina and Elsenburg on the Delaware River. It is also interesting to note that 
Fort Orange is identified with a different typeface than the others, thereby indicating a 
certain differentiation from other New Netherland forts. The typeface is larger and less 
resembles script writing thereby making it stand out. In contrast to Fort Orange, the 
Rensselaerswyck settlement of Greenbos is identified with smaller italicized type. The 
community o f Greenbos, which was part of the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, was 
established on the east side of the Hudson River to keep residents away from the fur 
trade; it had not been a viable community for several years at this point. Most residents 
of Rensselaerswyck preferred to reside on the west side o f the Hudson River, closer to 
what they saw as the vast Iroquois beaver hunting grounds north and west o f Fort Orange.
New Amsterdam’s presence at the southern tip of Manhattan Island was identified 
with the same fort symbol as the smaller Dutch settlements, including that of Fort Good 
Hope. Additionally, the van der Donck map includes a straight-on view o f New 
Amsterdam, as one would approach the town from the sea. In this depiction of New
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Amsterdam, there are two dominant features. The first is a device to load and unload 
ships, which is in the center foreground of the drawing and stands as a prominent symbol 
of the importance o f trade in the area, especially in New Amsterdam. The second 
dominant feature is the fort, included therein was the church and the statehouse. All of 
these features of the landscape of New Amsterdam stood as the dominant symbols of the 
authority of the WIC in New Netherland. The residences o f the town are in small clusters 
outside of the fort and are also lined all along the outside of the edifice.
This particular map also shows the locations of two Dutch forts without actually 
identifying them by name. These forts include Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River 
and Fort Casimir on the Delaware River. The former had been rendered obsolete for 
several years by the time the van der Donck map was published in 1656. It is still 
important to note that even though by the time the English and Dutch finally came to an 
agreement concerning the boundary between their respective colonies in 1650, the 
English had already established themselves as the dominant European force around the 
then Connecticut River. The 1650 Hartford Treaty placed the Connecticut River on the 
English side of the boundary, but allowed for the Dutch to maintain Fort Good Hope 
along the river. However, it was not as if  the fort posed any threat to the English 
presence in the area, especially once William Pynchon established his trading house well 
north o f Fort Good Hope and cut it off from any Indian trading activity.44 Although the 
English then claimed the Connecticut River and Fort Good Hope was no longer a 
productive Dutch outpost, it nevertheless stood as a symbol of Dutch presence in the 
region. Furthermore, van der Donck’s inclusion of the fort maintained the symbolism of
44 Pynchon will be discussed further in chapter five.
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Dutch presence on the land and its symbolism of the power of New Netherland for 
Europeans who would acquire knowledge of the region solely through stories and maps.
The van der Donck map stands as evidence of the importance o f forts for the 
Dutch in laying claim to the territory they called New Netherland. Forts stood as the 
most visible sign o f Dutch power in the area, not merely on maps, but on the landscape. 
And as Fort Orange was uniquely depicted in van der Donck’s map, it maintained a 
unique position within New Netherland. It helped to fend off threats from English 
interests in the area and it aided in maintaining peaceful relations with area Indians whom 
the Dutch depended on for trade. In the years after 1655, Fort Orange would play an 
even more important role as Indians, particularly Mohawks, would begin to utilize the 
fort to achieve their own political and military ends.
1655 as a Turning Point 
In 1655, New Netherland faced a series of calamities that threatened the stability 
of the colony. New Sweden’s establishment of Fort Christina and conquest of the Dutch 
Fort Casimir gave rise to the possibility of New Netherland losing the southern half of its 
colony. This possibility was averted when Stuyvesant led a Dutch expedition that 
removed the Swedes from the Delaware River. However, while fighting the Swedes, the 
Dutch faced an Indian war known as the Peach War in the heart o f New Netherland, 
which offered the potential o f ripping the colony in two.
Events o f 1655 illustrate how complicated and tenuous relations were among 
Europeans and between the European and Indian powers in the mid-Atlantic region.
While Petrus Stuyvesant was busy defending the southern edges of New Netherland from 
the Swedish encroachment on WIC lands, several bands of Indians led a raid on New
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Amsterdam. Included in this group were the Wappingers and Esopus Indians, both of 
whom played significant roles in European/Dutch relations. Prior to the raid word was 
circulating that Indians were going to attack the Dutch throughout Long Island, being 
careful to pick them out from the English inhabitants of the area.45
The Peach War itself offers a look at the possible importance of the geographic 
interior of New Netherland in European/Indian relations. On the morning of September 
15, 1655 several hundred Indians arrived in New Amsterdam, entered the city and began 
searching through houses of European residents of the Island. They broke into the house 
of Isaac Allerton, an English trader who was also a member of the New Amsterdam 
community, and supposedly searched Allerton’s Manhattan home because he had traded 
with rival Indians, the Narragansetts 46 In the course of the day the invading Indians 
informed the New Netherland council that they were only looking for their “Northern 
Indian” enemies and would soon be leaving the island. Also during this time, the Indians 
exacted their revenge on Hendrick van Dyck, a local resident who had killed an Indian he 
accused o f stealing peaches from his orchard. Thus the conflict received its name, the 
Peach War. Eventually, the Dutch authorities who remained in Stuyvesant’s absence 
took action and retaliated against the Indians. The Indians spent the next three days 
destroying both farms and people and taking over 100 settlers prisoner. Staten Island and 
Pavonia bore the brunt o f the attack and residents lost all o f their homes in the attack.47
43 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 39. This initial discussion and rumors circulating about this possibility will be 
discussed below.
46 Paul Andrew Otto, New Netherland Frontier, 216
47 Ibid., chapter 5. Otto’s emphasis in his work is on Dutch relations with the Munsee speaking Lenape 
Indians o f  the Lower Hudson River. It was the Munsee speaking Lenape Indians who were the main 
participants in the Peach War. It was the Munsee speaking Esopus Indians who will be the subject o f  
discussion later in this dissertation. Otto argues that the Peach War was an event that got out o f  hand with
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In his study of Indians in seventeenth-century New York, Allen Trelease notes 
that another explanation for the Peach War was that the Swedes bribed the Indians to 
attack New Amsterdam while the Dutch were attacking New Sweden to the south. This 
explanation is supported by a report indicating that the chief sachem of the 
Susquehannocks was seen with the attackers. Trelease, however, discounts the idea that 
the Susquehannocks and other Indians could have been somehow involved with the 
Swedes because attacking New Amsterdam would not be as effective as a direct attack on 
the Dutch at New Sweden.48
In response to the war, Stuyvesant and the Council tried to prevent further damage 
by trying to control the movements of both Dutch and Indians upon the land. Prior to the 
end of hostilities, the Council in New Amsterdam released, in 1655, an order prohibiting 
individuals from traveling on or even gathering near the Hudson River in Manhattan.
The New Netherland council knew that they were unable to control Indian activity on the 
river and did not relish the idea of having to ransom individuals who opted to conduct 
any sort o f business with the Indians on the west bank of the Hudson. In hopes of 
preventing further loss and another Indian attack on Dutch settlements the Burgomasters 
and the Council in New Amsterdam tried to impose their will on this dangerous 
landscape by restricting Indian movements within towns. These new regulations 
included prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to specifically designated 
places in order to trade. In addition, all Dutch settlers were forbidden to bring Indians
the absence o f  Director Stuyvesant. He stated, “with others in charge o f  the colony, one o f  these tense 
situations erupted into warfare” (pg. 216). Also see Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, 138- 
147. Trelease finally concluded that, “The Peach War turned out to be no war at all in any meaningful 
sense o f  the term” (pg. 147). However, the war had significant consequences on Dutch policy toward the 
Indians and future Indian/European relations in the region.
48 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 139.
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into their houses or shelter them overnight.49 This way, the WIC authorities could, in 
theory, control the development of the cross-cultural space of the town, and keep 
elements o f the wilderness, namely the Indians, out of Dutch spaces. These issues will be 
discussed in greater length below.
After the Peach War, the main groups of people Stuyvesant had to deal with were 
the Indian tribes o f the region. On October 18, 1655 Pennekech, chief o f the Hackensack 
Indians sent fourteen Dutch men, women and children who his people had captured back 
to New Amsterdam. With the release of the captives, Pennekech also requested that the 
New Netherland officials show their good faith by sending the Hackensacks powder and 
lead. Stuyvesant and the Council responded to this by not only sending Pennekech the 
powder and lead, but also releasing both a Wappinger and an Esopus captive from the 
war. The Council found out about a week later when Pennekech requested additional 
lead and powder that the remaining Dutch captives were separated among several Indian 
groups who were moving into the interior.50 The interior lands were still very much 
Indian dominated landscapes. Although the Indian nations in the immediate vicinity of 
New Amsterdam negotiated for a peace, they still held power outside o f Dutch 
settlements, and the Dutch were forced to respond to this continued Indian power where 
the Dutch held no influence.
49 These same restrictions were put into place in Fort Orange and later in Esopus as w ell, and residents o f  
both settlements proved unwilling and/or unable to comply with these restrictions on trade with the local 
Indian populations.
50Gehring, Council Minutes 1655-1656, 102-104, 119, 132, 299. Dutch prisoners were held by 
Wiequaskeckse Indians also referred to as Westchester Indians, and Highland Indians who were located 
north o f Westchester on the east side o f  the Hudson River. The Council continued to work for the release 
o f captives, particularly children, through early 1656.
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However, the resulting peace brought a halt to hostilities between the Dutch and 
Indians of the lower Hudson River Valley. With the end of major Indian resistance 
around New Amsterdam, it is at this point that Indian relations begin to shift north. 
Independent Indian power and therefore Indian control of land lay outside the immediate 
vicinity of Manhattan Island, including the lands between New Amsterdam and Fort 
Orange. As New Amsterdam became more of a Dutch landscape than an inter-cultural 
one, Indian influence on the land would be felt further to the north o f Manhattan and 
would eventually settle in Fort Orange. As we will see, post 1655 policy changed how 
people, both Europeans and Indians moved and lived on the land as many more 
regulations and actual attempts to enforce these regulation came about as a result of the 
Peach War. One of the problems Stuyvesant wished to gain control of was the 
proliferation o f rumors throughout the colony.
Rumors
Rumors were a threat to the stability of New Netherland under Stuyvesant right
from the beginning. As he started his negotiations with the New England colonies, and
especially the colony o f New Haven, concerning a boundary between the two, he
received a letter from Deputy Governor Goodyear from New Haven warning the Dutch
governor that, “many vaine rumours may arise whereby iealousies & discontents may be
fomented.”51 Soon after Goodyear’s warning, Stuyvesant received a letter from New
Haven’s Governor Eaton filled with jealousies and discontents. He wrote,
I heare allsoe you threaten to bume or beate downe our trading howse, 
built vppon our owne purchased land, within our owne limmits,. . . and 
which is yett worse, it is reported to us by several persons and from 
severall places, that your secretarie hath indeauoured by a slanderous
51 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 19.
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report to incense the Long Isl: Indians, and your selfe att Aurania fort, 
have attempted to trye other companies of Indians against the English.52
Stuyvesant and the New England governors discussed this particular rumor from
November 1647 through May 1648. It is interesting to note, however, that Stuyvesant
seldom discussed this rumor directly with Eaton, who originally brought it to light;
instead he dealt with Deputy Governor Goodyear or Governor John Winthrop in Boston.
Stuyvesant directly denied the veracity of the rumor that the Dutch were arming the
Indians at Fort Orange and hoped to attack and “beate downe” the English trading house
at Springfield. He referred to the said rumors as “scandalous reportes” and “soe farre
from the rules and principles of Christianitie and Charitie.”53
Stuyvesant did not necessarily speak directly to Eaton, nor did Eaton directly
speak to Stuyvesant. In response to Stuyvesant’s letter denying the rumor, Winthrop
wrote that Governor Eaton had informed Winthrop the story was “Indian intelligence and
did gaine but little Credit with him.”54 However, the issue of “Indian intelligence” was a
crucial factor in communications in seventeenth-century New Netherland, as much of
their information came from Indian sources.55 Where Easton may have discounted
52 Ibid., 23. The trading house Eaton referred to was Springfield and “Aurania fort” was Fort Orange.
53 Ibid., 27.
54 Ibid., 29. Here Gov. Eaton equates the idea o f  Indian intelligence with rumor. Eaton did not put much 
credence into information derived from Indian sources, thereby equating them with the European concept 
o f  rumor. The Dutch, however, including Stuyvesant but particularly the residents o f  Fort Orange, were 
dependent on “Indian intelligence” for information concerning the further reaches o f  the colony which 
could often only be accessed by Indians. The Dutch, therefore, saw much value in Indian intelligence and 
often treated rumors, or false intelligence, as truth for lack o f  other viable sources o f  information.
55 Marion A. Cail, “The Dissemination o f  Rumor Among the Cherokees and Their Neighbors in the 
Eighteenth Century” (Masters Thesis, College o f  William and Mary, 2000); and Gregory Evans Dowd, 
“The Panic o f  1751: The Significance o f  Rumors on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly 53, no. 3 (1996): 527-560. Both these works discuss the importance rumor played on 
both Indian and European societies on the eighteenth century southern frontier where reliable information 
was indeed scarce. With the constant rumor o f  attacks coming from both sides, both Indians and Europeans
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“Indian intelligence,” Indian information continued to gain greater credence in European 
relations, not only with Indians, but also with one another. Due to a lack o f safe and 
reliable communication routes, the Dutch remained dependent on Indian intelligence, 
which often was rumor, or at least considered a rumor. Moreover, the information 
provided by Indians would drive Dutch decision making and policy towards Indians and 
other Europeans.
The next significant threat of the period came in 1650 with the rumor of a war 
between the English in New England and the Wappinger Indians. The Wappinger Indians 
were located between present day Kingston to the north and Westchester to the south and 
between the Hudson River to the west and the Housatonic River to the east. This position 
placed them on either side of the Hartford Treaty line o f 1650 that demarcated the 
boundary between Dutch possessions to the west and English possession to the east. The 
Wappingers were, from the European perspective at least, an international threat. 
Depending on the outcome o f such a war, either the Dutch or the English could make 
significant inroads into the other’s territory, thereby disrupting the stability o f either New 
Netherland or the New England colonies.
The Wappingers were one of several Indian bands to sign a treaty with the Dutch 
in August 1645 at the conclusion of Governor Kieft’s war. The terms of this agreement 
called for both sides to refrain from war and that all grievances would be resolved 
through negotiations and not through revenge. This agreement opened the way for
abandoned settlements and prepared for war. Gregory Evans Dowd, “The French King Wakes up in 
Detroit: "Pontiac's War" in Rumor and History,” Ethnohistory 37, no. 3 (1990): 254-278 argues that during 
Pontiac’s War, Indians used rumors in order to influence French policy to return to New France after their 
defeat in the Seven Year’s War. This is a departure o f  the idea that France influenced Indian policy at the 
time, and, instead, illustrates both Indian motivations and Indian power.
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greater cooperation between the Wappingers and Dutch in the form of formal 
negotiations, which were at first centered at Fort Amsterdam. These negotiations moved 
Dutch and Wappinger relations into a new realm that went beyond mere economics into 
diplomacy. Furthermore, the elimination of revenge killings would eliminate the 
constant threat o f violence breaking out between Wappingers and the small, scattered 
Dutch settlements along the Hudson River. Unfortunately, many individuals, both Dutch 
and Wappingers, did not necessarily abide by these agreements, as we will see later, 
thereby further illustrating a lack of control by either Indians or Dutch in certain areas in 
the Hudson River Valley.
From the Dutch perspective, the Wappingers, while not necessarily allies, were at 
least not enemies. The same did not hold true for the English, who had no such treaty 
with the Wappingers. New Netherland officials did not want to see violence break out in 
the territory after five years o f relative peace, especially if that violence originated with 
the English. More importantly the New Netherland officials recognized that an English 
victory in such a war with the Wappingers would lead to the English trying to move into 
the sparsely populated area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The English 
would claim right of conquest, although the Dutch claimed the land. Furthermore, an 
English settlement mid-way between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam would cut the 
northern part o f colony in two through the crucial highway of the Hudson River, thereby 
eliminating Fort Orange’s free access to the Atlantic Ocean and would irreparably 
damage Dutch participation in the Atlantic World fur trade. The directors of the WIC in 
Amsterdam were particularly concerned by this possibility.
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With an influx of English settlers into the lands north o f Manhattan Island in the 
1640s, the Dutch under Petrus Stuyvesant were not prepared to allow the English to 
disrupt the peace and dominate the Hudson River valley.56 In response, Stuyvesant and 
the Council tried, with little success, to remove some of the more significant English 
settlements in the Hudson Valley. While this threat of war between the English and the 
Wappingers remained merely a threat, it would encourage the Dutch to try to stave off 
such a scenario from taking place. The Directors of the WIC remained concerned with 
the colony’s vulnerability to English incursion and recognized that an English presence 
within the colony was coming from different sources, not just as a result of war.
The rumors leading up to the Peach War began as early as 1652. At this time 
Reverend Wilhelmus Grasmeer, former minister in New Netherland, testified in 
Amsterdam concerning one Comelis Melyn, a resident of Staten Island. Grasmeer 
claimed that he
had heard the Manhattans Indians of New Netherland, living at Nayack, a 
place on Long Island directly opposite Staten Island, frequently say, that 
the said Comelis Melyn had made them believe and declared to them,
Director Petrus Stuyvesant would, as soon as he had built a wall around 
Fort Amsterdam, come to kill them, namely the savages, whereupon the 
said savages fled and came armed to Gravesend.57
Comelis Melyn was also the individual whom the Staten Island Indians believed to be a
sorcerer, which led them to threaten to kill Melyn and all the Dutch on Staten Island.
56 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 10, 14, 17, 18, 27; and Trelease, Indian Affairs, 8. Trelease identifies several 
bands o f  Algonquian Indians as Wappinger. These bands known individually as the Rechgawawancs or 
Manhattans, the Wecquaesgeeks or Westchester Indians, the Sintsinks, the Kitchawanks, the Nochpeems, 
the Siwanoys, the Tankiteke or Pachamis, and the Wappinger proper. These groups were often referred to 
collectively as the Highland Indians and occupied the lands surrounding the Hudson River south o f  present- 
day Albany.
57 Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records 1: 303. Indians on Staten Island also claimed that Melyn was a sorcerer 
who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to kill him and all the people 
on Staten Island.
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While nothing of consequence came out o f the rumors surrounding Comelis
Melyn, the rumors themselves caused great concern with Stuyvesant and the High
Council. In July 1654 the Council met to discuss the continued spreading of rumor of
attacks. The minutes read:
Whereas we have been reliable informed that some among our subjects 
once again, as last year, have taken up and circulated false, spurious and 
self-contrived rumors, dishonoring the high administration o f this province 
and the Netherlandic nation; namely that some members of the high 
council together with some Dutch inhabitants were to have hired and 
incited some Frenchmen and Indians to massacre and plunder the English 
people residing among us; which circulated rumor, although false, 
unchristian and completely without foundation, was, nevertheless, 
disseminated so obstinately and impudently by some (mostly English 
refugees from New England) in order to incite greater turmoil among the 
good inhabitants; and in order to give more credence to their lies, they 
abandoned their houses and plantations, most of them going to the village 
of Gravesend, where some robbers, bandits and pirates have banded 
together and quartered themselves for some time now .58
The council determined to pursue and prosecute any and all who took any part in the
rumors and deny them their rights of citizenship and their rights to their land.
New Netherland could not afford to maintain such a dissenting population within
their borders. This was especially true when that dissenting population consisted
of untrustworthy Englishmen.
O f course, the rumors persisted. In January 1655, George Baxter was again the
subject of discussion with the Council. This time he spread a rumor that England would
soon be moving to take over Long Island and bring it under the jurisdiction of the New
England colonies. According to the rumors, this event was to occur by May o f 1655 at
the latest. The Council stated in this session that they knew the reports to be false, but
58 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 155.
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they also took the opportunity to protest continued English movement into lands the 
Dutch purchased from the Indians.59 English control of these lands could easily cut Dutch 
settlements off from one another. Stuyvesant was also hindered from any further 
investigation of the rumors as they were forced to wait until the ice and snow melted to 
pursue his inquiry. Due to the fact that New Netherland was held together by rivers, the 
harsh winters of the Hudson River Valley made holding and defending the colony even 
more difficult. The fact that Fort Orange was often cut off from New Amsterdam for 
several months o f the year served as a threat to the colony’s stability. Moreover, the 
isolation of Fort Orange from the rest of the colony due to the weather assisted in the 
community’s independent development from the political center o f New Amsterdam. 
Because Fort Orange was often physically isolated, its residents were forced to act 
politically independent at times, which aided in Albany’s eventual rise as a colonial 
center of power among Europeans and Indians.
By early September 1655 the rumors kept circulating. A letter to the Council 
from the residents of Gravesend reported that they daily heard stories that the Indians 
intended to destroy the Dutch residents of Long Island, and that the Indians had warned 
the English to separate themselves from the Dutch or fear suffering the same fate. The 
Dutch inhabitants of Gravesend though it would be best to pick up and move to 
Manhattan to avoid such a fate, especially since, it was “reported that the Indians of the 
north and of the neighboring places are making great preparations to carry out their plans 
quickly.”60 The council had sympathy for their situation, but concluded that there was
59 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 9.
60 Ibid., 85.
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
insufficient evidence to justify a removal from Long Island. Furthermore, such an act 
would only serve to leave the land firmly in the hands o f the English.
The officials remained concerned as rumors continued through October 1655.
This time the Council concluded that the cause of these new rumors was the continual 
contact between the European settlers of Manhattan Island and the Indians as well as 
contact between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council 
ordered, “that no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel, 
however, it may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the 
Indians.” They went on to order the Indians, “in case anyone crosses over without 
showing the sign and token of the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are 
to detain and subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.”61 The Council and 
Stuyvesant went so far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official 
communication between the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed 
the “swarming and unseemly clamor” of their fellow Dutch settlers looking for 
information from the Indians concerning activities beyond the confines of Manhattan 
Island. Not only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and 
discouraged them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could 
to WIC officials in new Amsterdam. Such swarming of colonists at the river also helped 
lead to increased rumors.
Indian intelligence, whether true or what many perceived as rumor, created a need 
for WIC authorities in New Amsterdam to attempt to further control peoples’ movements 
on the land. They were especially concerned with the movements of the Dutch colonists 
who were often starved for information on other areas o f the colony brought in by
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traveling Indians and Indian messengers sent from other settlements. However, the 
continued dependence on Indian messenger and Indian information, especially for 
communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam, caused New Netherland to 
remain susceptible to reacting to bad information. Furthermore, Fort Orange’s relative 
isolation within New Netherland and their dependence on the Mohawks for their fur trade 
created an atmosphere where Dutch officials in Fort Orange relied heavily upon Mohawk 
information. This, in turn, led to the eventual presence of Mohawks into the Fort Orange 
court as informants, witnesses and diplomats.
Ibid., 86
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CHAPTER 2
OUTSIDE OF TOWNS
With the external threats to New Netherland alleviated, at least temporarily, with 
the Hartford Treaty of 1650 and the removal of the Swedes from the Delaware River, the 
internal weakness of the colony was exposed by the Peach War of 1655 and the 
continued and contentious English presence within the colony. The next step for Petrus 
Stuyvesant and other representatives of the WIC was to gain control of the colony by 
establishing a greater Dutch presence in the areas outside of the few settlements. The 
creation of a settlement at Esopus could also have lessened the dependence on Indian 
intelligence and Indian messengers as the New Netherland towns would be more closely 
connected physically. Significant efforts were put into gaining greater control of areas 
along the Hudson River in order to connect the trade center at Fort Orange and the 
Patroonship o f Rensselaerswyck to New Netherlands political center at Manhattan.
Through these efforts, such as the settling of the Esopus region, and the results of 
these efforts, namely the Esopus Wars, Fort Orange’s position as a center for not just 
trade, but diplomacy among Indians and Europeans, was rapidly developing. In fact, Fort 
Orange’s importance to growing diplomatic involvement between the Dutch and 
surrounding Indian groups expanded to the point that it set itself apart from N ew  
Amsterdam as the location for Dutch negotiations with Indians. Furthermore, much of 
this alteration in the role o f Fort Orange as a diplomatic center came about, not as a result
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of WIC policy, but as the result of Mohawk influence both among other Indian tribes and 
within the court of Fort Orange.
Fort Orange’s centrality in the fur trade remained the colony’s most significant 
source of potential revenue, yet it remained quite isolated from New Amsterdam to the 
south. In fact, the Dutch had little influence, and indeed, little knowledge o f lands inside 
their claimed boundaries but outside of their town walls, although they were quite 
familiar with the waterways that linked them. Their forts stood as their symbol of power, 
and their power existed almost solely within those forts. Except for the waterways,
Dutch knowledge of areas outside of their settlements was quite limited.
Dutch Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys
From the time of Fort Orange’s establishment in 1624 until New Netherland’s 
surrender to the English in 1664, there were few documented Dutch forays into the area 
outside of the fort’s protection. It was through the accounts of these infrequent journeys 
that the Dutch of New Netherland gained some of their direct intelligence o f the area. 
Otherwise, they had to rely on “Indian intelligence.” However, the Iroquois Indians 
remained in control o f how and where the Dutch received their information during these 
trips beyond the towns. It is also important to note that most of the documentation of 
land to the west of the Hudson River and the Dutch settlements on it was actually written 
by Frenchmen, including many Jesuits who traveled in the area. Both the French and the 
Dutch were interested in the region to the west of Fort Orange for its significance in 
harvesting furs. The French, however, were also interested in the region for its potential 
in harvesting souls. As a result, the French had a much greater knowledge o f the
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Mohawk River Valley, which the Dutch saw as their greatest source o f revenue in New 
Netherland due to its use as hunting grounds for beaver furs.
Prior to the reports of the more extensive French travels in the area; Harmen 
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert kept a diary of his trip to the territory o f the Oneidas in the 
winter of 1634-1635. The purpose o f this trip was to inquire as to the extent of French 
incursions into hunting grounds around Oneida Lake, west of Fort Orange. As William 
Stama explained, the Dutch feared that a French truce and trading agreement with the 
Iroquois would divert the fur trade north to Montreal and render Fort Orange obsolete 
thereby ending the Dutch colonial enterprise of New Netherland.1 Van den Bogaert 
traveled with two Dutch companions for six weeks through eastern Iroquoia, and his 
account stands as the earliest known written record of Europeans in the interior lands 
west of the Hudson River.
Van den Bogaert’s account is highly valuable for its ethnographic information. It 
is also useful for gaining insight into who was traveling in this highly coveted land. On 
December 21, 1634 the group’s guide Sqorhea led them to a small village called Osquage 
where they met the sachem, whom they referred to as Oquoho, meaning wolf.2 In this 
meeting Oquoho informed the European travelers that yes indeed Indians allied with the
'Charles T. Gehring trans. and William A. Stama eds., A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634- 
1635: The Journal o f  Harmen M eyndertsz van den Bogaert, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1988, xix; and in Dean Snow, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna eds., In Mohawk Country: Early 
Narratives about a Native People, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996, 1. A version o f  this 
diary was also included in the 1909 collection entitled Narratives o f  New Netherland, 1609-1664 edited by 
J. Franklin Jameson. However, all references to the van den Bogaert diary will be from the Gehring and 
Stama translation.
2 Gehring and Stama clarify that the ch ie fs  name was most likely not Oquoho, and that the term probably 
identified the ch ie fs  clan affiliation. In addition to the w o lf clan, Mohawks also include members o f  the 
turtle and bear clans. A Journey, 7 and note 56 on page 37.
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French had been traveling in the area near the Sinnekens.3 The Iroquois chief also 
informed the Dutchmen that in his own overland travels he had encountered an 
Englishman coming from the land of the Susquehannocks in order to learn their language 
for the trade. It is unfortunate that he could give no other information as to the English 
man’s destination or place of origin, which could have provided insight into the source of 
threats to Dutch economic interests.
»
On December 30 the men approached an Oneida village near Oneida Lake. The 
Oneidas explained to the Dutch, that yes, the French had been there. The French entered 
the lake and traveled down in order to trade with the Indians there. The French had easy 
water access to the area by traveling up the St. Lawrence River from Montreal into Lake 
Ontario, and then using the Oswego River that flows into Oneida Lake. The Dutch 
traders were informed that six Frenchmen had been trading in the village in August, and 
the presence of French goods in the village appeared to confirm the statement. The 
Oneidas went on to chastise the Dutch comparing their paltry payments for furs with the 
generosity of the French traders.4
The following day Arenias, whom the Dutch identified as the sachem of the 
“castle” or fortified town, returned to the Oneida village from their travels among the 
French Indians. While discussing the location of additional Iroquois villages over a 
makeshift map consisting o f com kernels and stones, the Oneida Indians informed the
3 Sinnekens, or Senecas is a term often used by Europeans to describe Iroquois Indians who are not 
members o f  the Mohawk tribe. Therefore, when encountering the term “Seneca” or some variation, one 
does not necessarily know if  the reference is to a member o f  the Seneca tribe, or to a member o f  the other 
three members o f  the Iroquois, the Cayugas, the Onondagas or the Oneidas. As the Dutch became more 
familiar with the Iroquois tribes there were more references to the individual tribes and less use o f  the term 
“Seneca” as all-inclusive for non-Mohawk Iroquois.
4 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 12-13.
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Dutchmen that in the high country near the Oneida Lake lived a people with horns. They 
further explained that while there were many beaver beyond the Oneida village, they 
should not travel that far because of the presence of French Indians.5
It is not clear if the Oneidas were associating the French Indians with the “people 
with horns”, or exactly what was meant by the description. It does appear that the 
Oneidas were trying to discourage the Dutchmen from traveling beyond the Oneida 
village. Stama and Gehring state that by telling the Dutchmen o f the people with horns, 
the Oneida were trying to frighten the Dutch in order to prevent them from exploring the 
region. This in fact does appear to be the reasoning behind the story of the people with 
homs. However, Stama and Gehring argue that preventing further Dutch exploration of 
the region would “thereby prevent expansion of trade. Such an expansion would have 
eroded a middleman position already held or anticipated by some o f the Five Nations 
Iroquois.”6 However, instead of protecting their supposed economic interest in the fur 
trade, as Stama and Gehring propose, it appears that the Oneidas were trying to 
discourage the Dutchmen from traveling into, and thereby protecting, the traditional seat 
of authority among the Iroquois tribes held by the Onondagas. The Iroquois maintained 
the position o f Onondaga as the center of their power and authority even when the 
Mohawks were actively establishing Fort Orange as the center for Indian/European
5 Gehring and Stama, Journey, 14. A lso see Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native 
Caribbean, 1492-1797  (New York: Methuen, 1986). Hulme discusses Native populations o f  the Caribbean 
informing Europeans o f  the presence o f  cannibals and other threatening populations who were always 
located on the next island, or just beyond their present locations. Such information could serve to either 
discourage further European exploration or to paint neighbors, and often enemies, as a threat to the lives o f  
both Indian and European and worthy o f  fighting to destroy.
6 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 44 note 97. This economic interpretation o f  Iroquois participation in the fur 
trade continues to be challenged by historians. The most convincing argument against this interpretation is 
Jose Antonio Brandao’s “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More".
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relations. The Iroquois often talked of having to return to Onondaga to decide on matters 
discussed with Europeans in Albany. It appears that even in 1635 the Oneidas were 
trying to protect the importance of Onondaga from penetration by the Dutch instead of 
trying to protect their interest in the fur trade.
The Onondagas’ villages would be the next encountered had van den Bogaert and 
his companions continued to travel into the interior. Instead of guiding the Dutchmen 
further into the interior, the Oneidas sent word to the Onondagas to the west, and a group 
of Onondagas arrived in the Oneida village on January 9. The Dutchmen met with the 
Onondagas who brought gifts o f beaver pelts for the Europeans. The Onondaga named 
Canastogeera then told van den Bogaert and his party to return in the summer and offered 
to show them the lake and where the French came to trade. Two days after this meeting in 
the Oneida village, van den Bogaert and his companions returned to Fort Orange,
• 7 •accompanied part of the way by the sachem Arenias. Dutch movements in Iroquoia 
were highly controlled by members of the various Iroquois tribes. While they were 
guided to many Iroquois villages and met with many Iroquois sachems, the Iroquois with 
whom the Dutch traders met made sure access to their communities was on their terms. 
This was similar to what the Dutch were trying to do, especially after 1655, in controlling 
and limiting Indian access to Dutch towns. However, due to the Dutch lack of 
knowledge and power outside o f their own towns, as well as Dutch dependence on Indian 
trade which forced the Dutch to allow Indians into their towns, the Iroquois were much 
more successful at controlling European movements within their communities. 
Furthermore, with the Iroquois able to keep the Dutch out of their centers o f power, they
7 Gehring and Stama, Journey, 18-21.
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were the driving force behind Fort Orange’s development as a new center of power for 
Indian and European relations.
French Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys
Although there are few records regarding Dutch travels into the interior lands of 
the Mohawk River Valley, there was more written documentation concerning French 
movements in the lands of the Iroquois beyond Fort Orange. However, these documents 
consist primarily of captivity narratives of Jesuit missionaries written to bring attention to 
the Fathers’ dangerous work among the “barbarians.” These Jesuit Relations described 
the torments and tortures the Iroquois inflicted on the Jesuits as they worked to try to 
baptize the American Indians and claim their souls for Christ.8 Because they were 
captives, the French Jesuits’ movements in Iroquoia were highly controlled by their 
captors. And while their accounts were intended for a religious purpose, they are still 
able to give an idea of both Indian and European movements on the land. All of the 
accounts described the ease o f Indian movement upon both the land and the water and in 
several kinds o f weather conditions. The Relations also described Indians’ access to 
European villages, especially Fort Orange.
The most famous of the Jesuit Relations that refers to both the Dutch in New 
Netherland and the Iroquois was that o f Father Isaac Jogues who was captured by 
Mohawks in 1643 and eventually made his way to Fort Orange with his captors. While 
in the Dutch settlement he escaped with the assistance of several Dutch settlers. He 
wrote several accounts of his experiences as an Iroquois captive in the vicinity of the 
Dutch settlements on the Hudson River. He traveled with several of his Iroquois captors
8 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and A llied  Documents; Travels and Explorations o f  the 
Jesuit M issionaries in N ew France, 1610-1791 (New York: Pageant Book Co., 1959).
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to trade with the Dutch and then to fish “seven to eight leagues below the settlement of 
the Dutch.”9 Jogues’s group traveled with ease through the area and consisted of both 
men and women participating in the fishing expedition. Although traveling in the 
territory claimed as and labeled on maps as New Netherland, Jogues gave no account of 
encountering a Dutch man or woman until his actual arrival in the Dutch settlement of 
Fort Orange. Jogues arrived in Fort Orange, again accompanied by a large group of 
Iroquois who were traveling through the settlement on their way back to their own 
village. Jogues’s movements while in the company o f the Dutch will be dealt with in the 
following chapter. However, while he was in the custody of the Dutch he made several 
observations o f the area comprising New Netherland.
Jogues wrote of Fort Orange’s proximity to the Mohawks’ settlement less than 
twenty leagues distant, and noted that it could be accessed by either land or water. He 
did not, however, give any indication of who traveled these routes or how often they were 
utilized. In describing the area between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, he merely 
stated the distance between the two at 100 or 120 miles and used the rest o f the paragraph 
to give details o f the Indian populations who lived between the two European settlements. 
He particularly wrote about the Mahicans, and the troubles that had recently occurred 
between and among the Indians and the Europeans. His picture was not a favorable one 
for the Dutch, stressing the isolation and limitations of the Europeans in their own
9 Barthelemy Vimont “O f the Deliverance o f  Father Isaac Jogues, and His Arrival in France, 1643-1644” in 
In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a N ative People eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring and 
William A. Stama (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 22-28. While Vimont is listed as the 
author o f  this account, the editors explain that he was responsible only for introductory and connecting 
material, while the majority o f  the text was taken from Jogues’s own letters.
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settlements.10 Perhaps most significantly, Jogues’s account showed the important 
presence of Indians within the colony of New Netherland, especially between the 
settlements o f Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Jogues was not the only Jesuit to write of New Netherland and the surrounding 
lands. Jerome Lalemant was superior of the Jesuits in New France from 1645-1650 and 
again from 1659-1665. During this time he wrote Relations based on the letters and 
testimony of the Jesuit missionaries under his authority. In 1646 he wrote a report 
describing the trip of Isaac Jogues and Jean Bourdon to Mohawk territory in order to 
establish a mission among the Iroquois.11 The Frenchmen left New France accompanied 
by four Iroquois and two Algonquian Indians. They traveled to the Mohawks’ 
settlements via Lake Champlain and then into Lake George, which Jogues named the 
Lake of the Blessed Sacrament. From there they traveled by land, crossing the Hudson 
River above Fort Orange. The group then descended the Hudson River and encountered 
no other Europeans until they arrived at Fort Orange, where they, Iroquois, Algonquian 
and Frenchmen alike, were well received and stayed freely in the confines of the town. 
After several days they traveled into the Mohawk villages.12 Once they left Fort Orange, 
they provided no reports of any encounters with Dutch settlers outside of the walls of 
Fort Orange.
10 Isaac Jogues, “Novum  Belgium and an Account o f  Rene Goupil, 1644” in In Mohawk Country, eds. 
Snow, et al, 29-37. See also, Merwick, Possessing Albany, chap. 1.
11 Isaac Jogues escaped his initial capture by the Mohawks in 1643 and returned to France for a short time 
before returning to the Jesuit missions in N ew  France. After his trip to establish a mission among the 
Mohawks he returned to Trois Rivieres only to be reassigned to the Huron mission. He and his Jesuit 
companion Jean de la Lande were captured again by Mohawks as they traveled to Huronia. Jogues was 
killed in October, 1646 in captivity.
12 Jerome Lalemant, “O f the Mission o f  the Martyrs, Begun in the Country o f  the Iroquois, 1646” in In 
Mohawk Country, eds. Snow, et al, 56-61.
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While in the Mohawks’ land, Jogues and le Lande met with an assembly of
Mohawks that also included a contingent of Onondagas. Jogues gave the Onondagas a
gift of wampum to establish relations and open up their villages to the Jesuits as well. He
then informed the Onondagas that the French could travel into the Onondagas’ lands by
three roads. One path was through the Annierronnons or Mohawks, another was by way
of Lake Ontario and the Oswego River, or finally through the lands of the Hurons. The
Onondaga elders were taken aback at such a proposal. The Onondagas’ response was
recorded as “ ‘It is necessary to take the road which Onontio has opened; the others are
too dangerous; one meets in them only people of war, men with painted and figured
faces, with clubs and war hatchets, who seek only to kill’ -adding that the way which
1 ^leads into their country was excellent, entirely cleared, and very secure.”
In other words, the Onondagas were telling the French Jesuits that there was one 
way to enter the lands of the Iroquois and that was through either door o f the longhouse 
that represented the Five Nations. In this case the French were told to enter through the 
eastern door o f the longhouse that the Mohawks guarded. The Onondagas made it clear 
to the French that this path was already cleared and should be the one they used to come 
to Iroquoia. Furthermore, the use o f warnings about war-like people was quite similar to 
the warnings of “people with horns” the Oneidas gave van den Bogaert and his 
companions a decade earlier in order to discourage them from exploring the land beyond 
the Oneidas. With this warning, the Onondagas were trying to restrict both French and
13 Ibid., 59-60. The word “Onontio” was used by all Iroquois to describe the French Governors. Onontio 
was a literal translation o f  the first French governor who they had regular contact with, Montmagny or 
“great mountain.” This use o f  Onontio was similar to the use o f  “Corlaer” in reference to the governors of 
New Netherland and New York.
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Dutch access to the eastern door o f the Five Nations’ longhouse, which was guarded by 
the Mohawks. Furthermore, this would restrict European access to just the eastern tribes 
of the Mohawks, Oneidas and Onondagas. O f course, by taking the path to the eastern 
door, it also meant that the Frenchmen would travel through or near Fort Orange. As late 
as 1700, a map by William Wolfgang Romer depicting the territory of the Five Nations of 
Iroquois showed a path leading from the lands north of then New York. It started at Lake 
Champlain (identified as Corlaer’s Lake) and Lake George (still identified as Lac des 
Sacrament) through Albany. The path then traveled west along the Mohawk River. This 
path maintained the eastern door o f the Five Nations longhouse as the primary route into 
Iroquoia, thereby allowing for the Iroquois and particularly the Mohawks to control 
Europeans’ movements into their lands.14
While traveling throughout northeast North American Indian territory in search of 
souls ready for baptism, the French Jesuits also created maps in order to assist other 
missionaries who would venture into the Indian settlements. A map depicting Jesuit 
travels among the Hurons and Iroquois in the 1640s is one such document. The map is 
dedicated to the location of particular villages the Jesuits visited in their travels. The only 
prominent geographical features on this map are the waterways, with Lakes Champlain 
and Sacrament shown much larger than they actually are. Along with these two lakes, 
the Dutch settlements of Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam are depicted. The Dutch 
settlements stand on the eastern door to the Iroquois nation and, as the written documents 
have shown, the settlements played an important role in the lives of Jesuit missionaries to 
the Iroquois. It is interesting to note that not a single English settlement is identified on
14 Wolfgang William Romer, Map o f  the Five Nations, 1700. National Map Collection o f  Canada, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada, Map #12545.
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this map, indicating that for these Frenchmen, English colonial settlements were of little 
significance in comparison to the Dutch.15 Another French map from the 1640s seems to 
have utilized some of the information from the Jesuits’ compilation map (Figure 4). Here 
the cartographer identified the names and locations of many Indian tribes and the many 
waterways throughout New France. He identified the general location of New England, 
but the only European settlements included in his work were Trois Rivieres and the 
Dutch settlement of Fort Orange, just east of the “trois villages d’Iroquois” and just south 
of Lac Sacrament.16
Fort Orange and the Surrounding Lands
The largest population center in New Netherland was New Amsterdam, but Fort 
Orange, being the center of the fur trade, was of vital economic importance in the 1640s. 
Fort Orange was New Netherland’s most inland settlement, the center of the colony’s fur 
enterprise, and was already becoming a cross-cultural center in North America.17 
Furthermore, after the Hartford Treaty of 1650 and the abandonment of Fort Good Hope 
on the Connecticut River, Fort Orange was the colony’s only inland settlement, and 
closest to the Indian traders on whom the colony depended.
15 Tire des Relations de la Nouvelle France et des Hurons en 1643 et 44, 1644 et 45, 1645 et 46, 1646 et 
47. National Map Collection o f  Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Map #153447.
16 Nouvelle France, 1646. National Map Collection o f  Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Map #44351.
17 This is especially true after the abandonment o f  Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River following the 
Treaty o f  Hartford in 1650.
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Figure 4 Nouvelle France, 1646. Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, 
National Map Collection, Map #44351
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Regardless of Fort Orange’s growing importance in the 1640s, prior to the 
establishment of a court in Fort Orange in 1652, all legal matters for the community were 
decided in New Amsterdam. Laws came from New Amsterdam, and the local schout or 
sheriff was instructed with the responsibility of enforcing all laws. O f course, with the 
main function of Fort Orange being to serve the fur trade for the WIC, many of the laws 
imposed on them dealt with the issue of controlling people’s participation in that trade. 
The issue of controlling trade included - indeed was built around - controlling peoples’ 
movements on the land. The WIC’s goal of regulating the trade and protecting their 
interests did not change once the court was established in Fort Orange in 1652. However, 
both before and after 1652, the WIC had enough troubles enforcing laws that controlled 
peoples’ movements and activities in town, and trying to control peoples’ movements 
outside o f the town gates proved more difficult.
One of the largest concerns that the WIC and the magistrates o f Fort Orange dealt 
with was “runners in the woods.” This practice allowed individuals to leave the confines 
of the town in order to meet Indians in the woods to conduct their fur trade. The practice, 
however, often led to complaints of Indians accosted by overly aggressive Dutchmen 
eager to get a good deal. The Indians’ complained primarily o f physical abuse and, once 
accosted in the woods, the inability to move freely about the town to trade their goods. In 
June of 1655, when the trading season was getting underway on the upper reaches of the 
Hudson River, the WIC granted its permission for the Fort Orange and Beverwyck 
representatives to establish and publish an ordinance concerning running into the 
woods.18 The WIC stated that running in the woods should be regulated and “shall find
18 The WIC established the town o f  Beverwyck in 1652 when it established courts both there and at Fort 
Orange.
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most proper and necessary for the best of the community and the prevention of evil.”19 
The concern of traders running in the woods was over more than protecting their trade. 
Dutch men and women traveling in the woods also presented the colony with a spiritual 
dilemma.
The idea that the woods were home to Indians, who, while providing the 
livelihood for many Dutch traders, were equated with ideas of evil, remained a concern 
for many New Netherland leaders. Religious leader Domine Johannes Megapolensis 
wrote A Short Account o f  the Mohawk Indians in the 1640s during his time in 
Rensselaerswyck. In this short description he made three references linking the 
Mohawks to the devil. One reference related to the Mohawks’ appearance with face 
paint, another described how the Mohawks referred to themselves “Ihy Othkon ( ‘I  am the
90devil) ”, and he also stated that “They worship and present offerings to the Devil.” 
Although Megapolensis wrote that Christians met with Indians and Indians slept in the 
houses of the Dutch, and they “think no more about it than as if  we met with a Christian,” 
his basic distrust of the Mohawks’ spiritual connection with the devil worried him as well
9 1as other leaders of the WIC in New Netherland.
Megapolensis’ observations concerning relations between the Mohawks and the 
residents o f Rensselaerswyck is illustrative o f how the area around Fort Orange
19 Femow, DRCHNY  13:39.
20 Johannes Megapolensis, “A Short Account o f  the Mohawk Indians, 1644” in In Mohawk Country, eds. 
Snow et al., 38-46.
21 Ibid., 43. Megapolensis, in this account, seems also to have a fairly low opinion o f  his fellow Europeans. 
He wrote, “The inhabitants o f  this country are o f  two kinds: first, Christians— at least so called; second, 
Indians.” His and Petrus Stuyvesant’s concern over the spiritual well being o f  the colony played a great 
role in regulating peoples’ movements through New Netherland.
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developed independently from official WIC desires. Megapolensis made it clear that 
according to the religious tradition he shared with Stuyvesant, the Mohawks were 
considered evil denizens of the wilderness. However, his statement that Christians of the 
upper reaches of the Hudson River invited the Mohawks to sleep in their homes shows 
how both Christians and Indians were creating new cultural landscapes contrary to the 
traditional Dutch beliefs of civil Christian landscapes and Indians as part of the 
wilderness.
Megapolensis’ connection between the Indians and ideas o f the devil was not a 
new one. It came out of a tradition of associating wilderness and those who dwelled in 
the wilderness as outside the bounds of civil existence. Roderick Nash, in his influential 
book, Wilderness and the American Mind wrote of the roots of European Christians’ 
ideas on wilderness. He stated, “In early medieval Christianity, wilderness kept its 
significance as the earthy realm of the powers o f evil that the Church had to overcome.... 
wilderness represented the Christian conception of the situation man faced on earth. It 
was a compound of his natural inclination to sin, the temptation o f the material world, 
and the forces of evil themselves.”22 Truly these ideas continued to hold sway over the 
population o f New Netherland.
George Baxter, who Stuyvesant saw as an English threat to the stability of the 
colony of New Netherland, even used this idea of Christianity overcoming and taming the 
wilderness in his 1653 petition to Stuyvesant. As part o f his petition he argued that he 
and his neighbors, “transformed from a wilderness of woods and erected into a few small 
villages.” He also claimed that “being in a wilderness” they were “unable to promote the
22 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4 th edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2001), 17-18. Also see John R. Stilgoe, Common Landscape o f  America, 1-24.
85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
good of the country.” His argument presented the idea that transforming the wilderness 
as a Christian took precedence over the fact that he was an Englishman, therefore, 
Stuyvesant should assist him and his neighbors in their endeavor to continue transforming 
the wilderness. Unfortunately for Baxter, Stuyvesant did not agree with his assessment 
that Baxter was providing a benefit for the cause of Christianity.
The WIC found it a challenge to balance the need to tame what they saw as the 
wilderness, or a land untouched by Christian activity, and the need to control those who 
ventured into the woods. A week after the original June 1655 call to regulate running in 
the woods, the Council at New Amsterdam was still citing the need for “a strong 
ordinance for up here [Fort Orange] concerning the going into the woods of the Dutch.”24 
Not only did the council want to prevent the Dutch settlers from heading into the woods, 
but they also wanted to prevent them from sending signals to the Indians as well as to 
make sure they did “not call from the houses standing at the hill where the Indians have 
to pass through.” Such activity was seen as unseemly and quite undignified.
Moreover, such actions also threatened the colony by breaking down the order the WIC 
officials was trying to impose.
Curiously enough, the Council, in working diligently to prevent the Europeans 
from heading into the woods, used language in their call for this ordinance that would 
allow the Indian traders to “go freely where they want” upon entering the Dutch town. 
Later the Council stated that incoming traders “whether they be Christians or their Indian
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brokers, .. .to let them go where they see fit.” This attitude towards the Indians in the 
Dutch settlements stands in contrast to Indians working to control European movements 
within Indian lands. Although it appears that captives were actually given quite a bit of 
freedom to move about the Mohawk villages when they were not bound, Europeans did 
not travel to or between Indian villages without guides, and as shown above, without 
warnings.26 With this the Indians, particularly members o f the Iroquois nation, were 
quite successful at protecting their settlements from uninvited interlopers. Captives were 
given more freedom because many were to be adopted into the Indian community so 
were not seen as a threat the way uninvited Europeans were. Such freedom of movement 
for Indians within Dutch town limits would soon be changed in the face of events of 1655 
and will be discussed in the next chapter.
By the end of July in 1655, the New Amsterdam Council was pleased to learn of 
Fort Orange’s ordinance against the Dutch traveling into the woods to intercept Indian 
traders. Donna Merwick discussed this topic in detail in Possessing Albany while paying 
particular attention to activities in the year 1660. At this point, the community of 
Beverwyck that surrounded Fort Orange had its own court. It was during the trading 
season o f that year that the Beverwyck court took on the question whether the fur trade 
should be conducted solely within the confines of the fort and thereby be more easily 
regulated by the WIC. According to Merwick, “Townsmen were being asked what they 
wished to make of the marginal, and always dangerous, area just outside the palisade. 
They were being asked whether they wished to diminish the role of the town by moving
26 Many captives would eventually be adopted into the Iroquois communities, so were not necessarily 
considered to be or treated as captives.
27 Merwick, Possessing Albany, 88-99.
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vital action outside its walls.”28 But would moving vital trade activity outside of the 
walls actually diminish the town? The land outside the walls was often dangerous, but 
moving further outside of the walls would also help lead to the Europeans extending their 
limited influence beyond the town walls. Moving outside the walls would extend their 
Christian influence into the “wilderness.” After much debate between townsmen who 
wished to maintain the tradition and the order that came with trade being restricted to the 
fort and those who wished to branch into the woods and away from the prying eyes of the 
WIC, Fort Orange representatives of the WIC, decided that trade would remain confined 
to the town. However, a new provision allowed for individuals to beckon Indians from 
“on the hill” as they approached the town with their furs. Such a compromise allowed
29the Dutch traders to extend their trade practices from a safe distance.
However, the compromise of calling Indians from “on the hill” exemplifies WIC 
officials’ unwillingness or inability to extend their authority into what they perceived as a 
wilderness. They continued to perceive the woods as a place outside of the realm of 
Christian civility and law. By compromising and allowing the Indians to travel freely 
where they pleased within the town, the WIC officials in Fort Orange created conditions 
where the Indians who came into Fort Orange and the Dutch residents of the town could 
create new cultural landscapes within the walls of Fort Orange. Furthermore, once legal 
proceedings began to prosecute Dutch traders who continued to venture into the woods, it 
opened the door for Indians, and the information they could provide, to enter the Dutch 
court system. From that point, a new diplomatic landscape was being forged.
28 Ibid., 89.
29 There will be more on this subject in chapter 3.
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Dutch Control of Water
Whereas the Dutch had little control or even knowledge o f the land outside of 
their settlements, their authority increased somewhat when the topic of control and 
knowledge turned to the water. Seventeenth-century Dutch maps depicted very little 
detail of landscape features, although the van der Donck map covers a very large area. 
What was emphasized, however, were the waterways and coastlines. These are shown in 
great detail although the accuracy of the watercourses decreases the further into the 
interior they are located.30 In 1660, a cartographer made a copy o f a map originally 
created circa 1630. This map covered an even larger area o f land than the van der Donck 
map, including the St. Lawrence River south to the James River, and it emphasized the 
rivers to an even greater extent than van der Donck. Particular emphasis was given to the 
rivers that New Netherland then, or at one time, claimed, including the Connecticut, 
Hudson, Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers, the latter of which was especially 
highlighted. This was done possibly to fill in knowledge of land the Dutch claimed but 
neither had control of nor knew well. Finally another 1660 copy of a circa 1630 map
• « T tdepicted nothing but the Hudson River with detailed notations of river depth soundings. 
These maps illustrated the tentative hold the Dutch maintained on the lands of New 
Netherland, while at the same time displayed Dutch knowledge and control over the 
waterways connecting their forts. As long as the Dutch could control the rivers with the 
use of forts, they were able to lay claim over the surrounding lands. Of course, Fort
30 For example, the map shows the Esopus Creek connecting the Delaware and Hudson Rivers.
31 New-York Historical Society Map Collection. Other maps included illustrations o f  depth soundings in 
the Long Island Sound, also claimed by N ew  Netherland.
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Orange, in its unique interior position, played the key role of allowing the Dutch to lay 
claim to the valuable, fur bearing lands of the Mohawk River Valley to the Great Lakes.
Knowledge of the Hudson River was crucial because it served as the only true 
connection between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, since the European settlers had 
neither the knowledge nor ability to travel overland. Even Fr. Jogues had to make his 
escape to a ship where he was hidden for several days from his Mohawk captors. In fact 
when he left the ship, members of the crew told him his safety would, no longer be 
guaranteed when he went back to land.32 Dutch traders knew that their advantage over 
Indians, especially in the contested region around Fort Orange, was greater on the water. 
Jogues could not be hidden on land, even within Fort Orange, due to the Mohawks’ 
greater access to that area, and the Dutch authorities’ inability to control Indian 
movements, even within the Dutch town. When Jogues left the ship, the crew no longer 
felt a responsibility for him and left without him. For his final escape Jogues returned to 
a different ship and sailed down the river to safety in New Amsterdam. Because goods, 
as well as Dutch people and Dutch information all traveled via water, it was important for 
the WIC to regulate peoples’ movements there as well. Early ordinances restricting 
travel on water included a 1647 order that no one could leave the colony on a ship or bark 
without a pass from the Director General and Council. Because that was really the only 
feasible way of traveling through or out of the colony, such a provision was designed to 
control almost all European movement in New Netherland.
32 Vimont, In Mohawk Country, 26-28.
33 Charles T. Gehring ed, Laws & Writs o f  Appeal, 1647-1663  (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1991), 4.
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Water travel also provided the opportunity for smuggling, which Stuyvesant and 
the Council worked to curb. All ships had to load, unload or be inspected in New 
Amsterdam prior to continuing their journeys, whether up to Fort Orange or out to the 
Atlantic.34 Of course, the continual reissue of such ordinances through the 1650s and a 
1654 directive for all residents of New Netherland to be on the look out for and report all 
activities of smuggling and piracy suggests that although the Dutch traveled with more 
ease and had a stronger knowledge of waterways, they still had a difficult time enforcing 
their will.35
One of the most important issues affected by water travel was communication. 
Once the upper reaches of the Hudson around Fort Orange froze over, communications 
between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam were totally dependent on Indian messengers. 
The Dutch found the dependability of this form of communication to be less than ideal 
because once the messenger left the settlements, European official had little control of 
what course or how long the messenger took to get to his destination. And although the 
Dutch may have been able to chastise the Indian couriers, not much occurred beyond that.
Dutch inability to control the Indian messengers was a reflection on their 
dependence on the service that the couriers provided. It was necessary for the Dutch to 
communicate between their settlements and across the lands that they held little control 
over. Because they had such little knowledge of the lands outside of their settlements and 
were unable to travel over those lands effectively, the Indian messengers were a crucial 
communication tool within New Netherland. Dutch dependence on these Indian couriers
34 Ibid., 6 ,1 0 , 11.
35 Ibid., 39, 86, 87.
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placed the couriers in control of the flow of information that had to go overland. In turn, 
the Dutch had to make policies and decisions based on the information received via the 
couriers. Because o f this, the Indians who served as messengers for the Dutch had 
significant sway over what information was disseminated through the colony, and how 
quickly. This relates back to the importance of “Indian intelligence” and rumor in Dutch 
decision making. Much o f the time the Dutch could not differentiate between rumor and 
true intelligence. That inability to tell truth from rumor and Dutch inability to take 
responsibility for their own communication of information made it easier for rumor to be 
taken as truth and forced the Dutch to compromise their positions, whether it was 
abandoning land or proposing an alliance with England due to rumors of war. In this 
manner, Indian information, whether truth or not, influenced the continual creation of 
new cultural landscapes. This would be particularly significant when the Mohawks and 
their information and testimony made its way into the court at Fort Orange.
Post-Peach War Provisions 
While the WIC tried to control the lands outside of their settlements by 
controlling peoples’ access to those lands, they also experienced what they viewed as the 
evils of the wilderness invading their settlements. 1655 proved to be a pivotal year for 
New Netherland and how its officials approached both Indian and European movements 
on the land. As rumors o f an Indian attack on the Dutch on Long Island and Manhattan 
circulated through the colony, residents, especially in outlying regions, became 
concerned for their own safety. During the actual war in September 1655, many residents 
living along the Hudson River but outside of the fortified communities o f New 
Amsterdam and Fort Orange abandoned their lands. The settlers o f the Esopus
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abandoned the region for fear o f attack by Indians such as the Wappingers and Esopus. 
Both tribes lived in the area, and both participated in the attack on Manhattan Island. 
However, abandoning the lands o f the Esopus area was not looked upon favorably by the 
WIC officials since such action left yet another area vulnerable to continued English 
incursion into the lands between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Fearing further loss and increased English expansion into the colony, Stuyvesant 
ordered the removal o f leading Englishmen from Westchester to eliminate them as a 
threat to the heart of New Netherlands trade route along the Hudson River.36 At the 
same time he ordered stringent restrictions on Dutch colonists’ movements outside of the 
settlements to keep them from being taken captive by Indians and held for ransom that
' I ' j
the Dutch could not afford to pay.
Stuyvesant came up with ideas not only on how to prevent future attacks by both
Indians and English, but also with ideas on why the Peach War came about, which again
reflected the spiritual dilemma of a colony in the “wilderness.” The Director-General
proclaimed that it was,
evident that general sins are the cause of general punishments. Therefore, 
in my opinion, that common and public sins such as drunkeness, 
profanation of the Lord’s name and Sabbath, the public and common 
cursing even by children along the streets, the gatherings o f sectarians and 
other disorderly groups, be countered and promptly prosecuted by the 
renewal of good regulations and laws.38
To Stuyvesant, as a committed Calvinist, it was obvious that a general lack o f piety
allowed for the evil that resided outside the town walls in the woods to invade the
36 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 62, 65.
37 Ibid., 69.
38 Gehring, Council Minutes 1655-1656, 134; and Femow, DRCHNY  13: 53.
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sanctity of a Christian settlement. As Megapolensis cast doubt on the Christian 
commitment of the residents of Fort Orange in the 1640s, Stuyvesant saw that same lack 
of commitment as the leading cause ofNewNetherland’s struggle to survive and prosper. 
To Stuyvesant, something obviously had to be done to rectify this situation. The 
Christians had to be watched more closely and regulated more sufficiently. With new 
regulations and establishing a public school to keep the youngsters of the streets, it was 
hoped that New Netherland could avoid such divine punishments in the future.
Changes in how people moved on the land outside of the Dutch settlements came 
quickly after the Peach War hostilities ended. In October 1655, the Council became 
increasingly wary “that in these dangerous times some Christians do not hesitate to go 
into the country in small parties or when going out in stronger force, to separate from 
each other, or are not as they ought to be, on their guard, nor do they mind their guns, but 
which carelessness and negligence it has already happened, more than once, that some
TQ
Christians have been taken prisoner by the Indians and others killed.” In response the 
council forbade anyone from going into the countryside without first obtaining consent 
from the Director General and Council. Once outside of the confines of New Amsterdam 
and Fort Orange, Dutch settlers were outside of the reach of what protection New 
Netherland officials could offer. Unfortunately for the Director General and the Council, 
individuals and small parties continued to travel outside the protective walls of the Dutch 
settlements.
39 Gehring, Council Minutes. 1655-1656, 95-98. This came after a group o f  thirty Indians attacked and 
captured a group o f  only six Dutch settlers traveling in the woods. The Indians demanded a ransom o f  
cloth, weapons and tools which the Council refused to pay because they believed it would only encourage 
more captures with higher ransom demands.
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The officials remained concerned as rumors of additional Indian attacks continued 
through October 1655. This time the Council concluded that the cause of these new
i
rumors was the continual contact between the settlers and the Indians as well as contact 
between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council ordered, “that 
no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel, however, it 
may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the Indians.” 
They went on to order the Indians, that “in case anyone crosses over without showing the 
sign and token of the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are to detain and 
subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.”40 The Council and Stuyvesant went so 
far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official communication between 
the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed the “swarming and 
unseemly clamor” o f their fellow Dutch settlers looking for information from the Indians. 
Not only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and discouraged 
them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could. Such 
swarming and clamor also led to increased rumors. This also illustrated how the river 
served as a border, beyond which the WIC held little sway.
In November 1655, the Council also promulgated their new restrictions on Dutch 
settlements, especially in the outlying regions. One new tenet forbade the establishment 
of separate farms or plantations, and any new settlement had to consist of at least ten 
households. Those who refused to form concentrated settlements did so at their own risk 
and were to be fined an annual sum of twenty-five guilders. The WIC remained adamant 
that they control how Dutch colonists would convert what they saw as wilderness to a
40 Ibid., 101.
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productive, Dutch landscape. The Council also called for the erection o f two 
blockhouses. One would be built near present-day Hackensack and the other near the 
Wiequaeskeck Indians in Vreedlandt, or Westchester, “Where the best and most suitable 
land lies.” The land in the vicinity of the Wiequaskeck Indians also happened to be the 
home of the English settlement that Stuyvesant was trying desperately to drive from New 
Netherland. A new blockhouse would be a convenient location to watch, not only 
Indians, but also untrustworthy Englishmen in the midst o f New Netherland.41 A new 
blockhouse would also add to the Dutch military presence on the landscape, no matter 
how poorly defended that blockhouse may have been.
At this time the council refocused its energy on removing the English presence in 
the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The Council and Stuyvesant ordered 
the Dutch military to go to Vreedlandt to forcibly evict the English settlers, as described 
in the previous chapter. Their instructions included the destruction o f the houses, except 
a handful to shelter the soldiers. When the soldiers arrived, most English settlers refused 
to leave and twenty-three were taken as prisoners, only to be released soon after. The 
settlers o f the area petitioned immediately to continue to submit themselves to the 
government of New Netherland. This petition was eventually granted because the Dutch 
did not have the strength to eliminate all the English settlements within their borders.
Yet, the WIC continued to work to gain control of outlying areas in order to create 
greater stability within the colony.
41 Ibid., 134, 186, 256. After his expulsion by the Dutch in January 1656, Pell tried to repurchase 
Vreedlandt/Westchester from the Indians in March 1656, although, according to Dutch understanding, the 
Dutch had already purchased the land from the Wiequaeskeck Indians. See Documents 62, 65.
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Separation between Settlements
Although the fighting in the Peach War was limited to the southern reaches of the
colony and in New Amsterdam, the colony of New Netherland as a whole was being
threatened. In Rensselaerswyck and Fort Orange, officials and settlers were concerned
that these settlements might also be affected by the war. However, there was also the
belief that due to the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks, the threat was minimal for the
settlements on the northern reaches of the Hudson River. In October of 1655 Jan Baptista
van Rensselaer wrote from Beverwyck to his brother Jeremias that,
up here we have made an alliance with [the Mohawks], so that I trust that 
with God's help we need not expect any trouble. If the war with the 
Indians continues, I fear that we shall suffer great distress through the 
destruction [of buildings] by fire and those who started this business will 
deserve more blame than thanks and in the end get their deserts for 
plunging the whole country into blood for some trifling cause.42
He then went on to discuss the business of the colony and the economic consequences of
the Indian wars, such as the halt put on merchant ships sailing from New Netherland
which caused several merchants, including van Rensselaer, to declare that the Council
was responsible for all lost profits. He, and other merchants, would eventually be fined
for their protests.
However, van Rensselaer’s words indicate the fragmented nature of the Dutch 
North American settlements. First it is important to note that van Rensselaer was the 
head of his own colony, or Patroonship, of Rensselaerswyck, so his interests were often 
separate from that o f  the WIC settlements anyway. In the matter o f  Indian affairs, he did 
not consider New Amsterdam’s problems with the several Algonquian groups to directly
42 Arnold J. F. Van Laer, ed. Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651-1674  (Albany: University 
o f the State o f  N ew  York, 1932), 21.
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affect his own situation, until he was forbidden to send any ships from the colony. The 
separation of settlements was more pronounced on the upper reaches of the Hudson River 
for two reasons. First, the WIC settlement of Fort Orange and Beverwyck were 
physically separated from the center of power at New Amsterdam by over 100 miles of 
Indian held land connected only by river, which was sometimes frozen. This isolation, 
especially in the winter, created the ever-present need o f Dutch dependence on Indian 
messengers who were able to move over the land. Second the patroonship of 
Rensselaerswyck, which was comprised of land surrounding Fort Orange, was separate 
from the WIC settlements of Fort Orange and New Amsterdam and operated under its 
own jurisdiction. Such conflicts surrounding the separation of the settlements would be 
present through the remaining existence of New Netherland. However, the idea that 
residents of the northern reaches of the Hudson could remain separate from Indian issues 
elsewhere in the colony would soon come to an end.
The best way for the Dutch WIC to counter this separation between settlements 
was to continue to purchase land, and more importantly to occupy that land to gain 
control of the area. According to Dutch practice, the clearest ways to protect the colony 
was to continue purchasing land that would give them what they perceived as legal rights 
to the territory. The WIC continued to purchase land from the Indians, as did the colony 
of Rensselaerswyck. These purchases allowed them to argue against English movements 
into the region because the Dutch authorities would hold legal title from the original 
occupants of the land.43
43 N-YHS Indians collection, Folder 1; N-YHS Albany Co. Land Patents lists several land transactions 
between the Dutch and Indians during the 1650s and up. It is difficult to trace or locate these purchases 
with any accuracy due to obscure and moveable reference points such as trees and rocks. Often times the 
transaction would be described as follows: “April 29, 1651 colony o f  Rensselaerswyck purchased from
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Although the Dutch continued to purchase land and expand their legal claim and 
boundaries, they also continued to try to lessen their disadvantage by populating the 
colony, particularly the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. Of course, this 
is something they had been trying to accomplish for some time with little success. 
However, in 1652, the Dutch established a settlement at the mouth o f what was called the 
Great Esopus Kill, centered at present day Kingston. A new settlement between Forts 
Orange and Amsterdam at this time would help to increase the population of the land 
between these two important centers and counter the threat the English, had recently 
presented with their rumored war with the Wappingers. Furthermore, in 1652 Fort 
Orange and the adjoining town of Beverwyck were established as independent 
communities with their own courts. The Esopus region was placed under the jurisdiction 
of the court o f Fort Orange. With the Esopus settlements under the jurisdiction of Fort 
Orange, the Fort continued to grow in power as a political center along the upper half of 
the Hudson River.
The Esopus settlement would be most significant because it was located between 
the two trade centers and would thereby help ease the isolation o f Fort Orange at the 
same time, as it would stave off English movement into the area. The Esopus settlements 
would also prove to be a stumbling block to stability, however, as relations between the
two Indians, Naenkipquieck and Naenemari, sole owners and proprietors o f  a certain parcel o f  land and two 
kills laying on the west shore o f  the North River.” The records became a bit more detailed with greater 
information throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries. These early transactions do 
continue to give proof o f  the WIC’s commitment to obtaining legal title to land in order to show outright 
ownership. They also continue to provide evidence o f  Dutch lack o f  knowledge o f  the land they claimed. 
As Dutch and then English knowledge o f  and ability to control the land they claimed in the Hudson River 
Valley increased, so did their ability to document land they purchased from Indians. For additional 
information concerning Dutch land purchases from Indians see Shirley W. Dunn, The Mohicans and Their 
Land 1609-1730, Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1994, especially chapter 8 and appendix A. 
Also see Charles T. Gehring. Land Papers, 1630-1664. New York Historical Manuscript Series. Baltimore: 
Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.
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Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians created greater tensions within New Netherland 
that would finally lead to a devastating war. This war would weaken the Dutch forces in 
New Netherland and help contribute to England’s speedy takeover o f New Netherland in 
1664. Moreover, these tensions between the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians 
would be a key event that would help solidify Fort Orange’s (soon to be Albany) place as 
the center o f Indian and European diplomacy on the eastern seaboard of North America. 
Even as the WIC continued to expand their holdings by settling the lands between Fort 
Orange and New Amsterdam, more obstacles continued to present themselves. One of 
the largest obstacles to a stable New Netherland, as Stuyvesant saw it, was the alcohol 
trade. He was concerned with the many problems alcohol caused in the colony among 
both the Dutch colonists and the Indians.
The alcohol trade that took place in the woods was of particular concern for 
Stuyvesant.44 An early case from the Fort Orange court illustrated several issues 
concerning Dutch movements o f alcohol outside of towns. In June 1653 an extraordinary 
session of the Fort Orange court was called to deal in part with Jacob Symansz Clomp 
who was accused of selling brandy to Indians in the Esopus and Catskill. Although 
Europeans had settled these areas, they were still quite rural and very isolated. As 
fledgling communities, they were placed under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. However, 
their distance from their legal center made it difficult for the members of the court to hold 
much sway over their southern neighbors.
44Peter C. Mancall, D eadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early Am erica  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University, 1995). Mancall discusses the built in conflict in trying to restrict sale o f  alcohol to Indians at 
the same time colonial success hinged on the sale o f  European commodities, such as alcohol, to Indians. 
Chapter 3 will discuss Stuyvesant and the WIC’s attempts to control the Indian alcohol trade within the 
Dutch communities.
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Clomp was a bark skipper, and therefore had complete access to the main 
thoroughfare o f the colony, the Hudson River. His ease of access to the Hudson River 
combined with the weakness of Dutch authority over the lands where he sold the alcohol, 
probably led Clomp to believe the risk of being caught was minimal. But the WIC’s 
desire to control illegal river trafficking and alcohol distribution to Indians led to Clomp 
being brought to trial. Clomp eventually confessed to selling the alcohol after Jan 
Dirrixsz van Bremen and Jacob Theunisz van Naerden each testified under oath to 
Clomp’s actions. Yet Clomp’s role as a bark skipper proved too valuable for the WIC 
representatives in Fort Orange to punish him to the full extent o f the law. After Willem 
Fredrickson posted a significant bond for his release, Clomp was granted permission to 
take his bark back to Manhattan, as long as he filled his vessel to capacity with grain.45
The lack of enthusiasm in punishing Clomp for an offense deemed critical to 
maintaining the safety of the colony was then contrasted in October 1654 when Clomp’s 
sail and rudder were taken from him as punishment for selling hogs promised to Eldert 
Gerbertsz to other people.46 From Clomp’s experience, we see that the priority of WIC 
officials in New Amsterdam may have been in protecting against the illegal alcohol trade, 
but the WIC officials in Fort Orange were more interested in protecting the livelihood of 
its settlers. Clomp’s cases continued to reveal the continuing conflict of priorities among 
the WIC settlements. While Stuyvesant remained concerned over the illicit alcohol trade 
with Indians and the potential threat such actions could cause, leaders in Fort Orange
45 Charles T. Gehring ed. Fort Orange Court Minutes, 1652-1660 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1990), 59. Hereafter, cited as Gehring, FOCM.
46 Ibid., 157-158.
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only acted against Clomp’s illegal activity when it threatened the livelihood of a resident 
of Fort Orange.
Joannes Dijckman and members of the Fort Orange Court investigated 
accusations and suspicions of alcohol sales to Indians in the lands between Fort Orange 
and Fort Amsterdam, and again with tepid enthusiasm for actual prosecution. In 
December 1653, the court questioned Lourens Jansz of Beverwyck concerning 
Christoffel Davits’ alleged activities in selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians in the 
Esopus region. His testimony indicated not only that Davits sold the alcohol, but also did 
so against the pleadings of local sachems not to.47 In February 1654, more questioning 
occurred surrounding Christoffel Davits’ participation in the alcohol trade. In the 
interrogation of Marcelis Jansz van Bommel, the court received testimony that “trouble
A O
among the Christians and Indians had resulted” from Davits’ alcohol trade.
In May of 1654, the authorities in Fort Orange opted to post notices restricting 
river travel in hopes of curtailing the alcohol trade in the more remote areas of the 
colony, such as Catskill and Esopus. The notices declared that no one from the 
jurisdiction “Shall be allowed to sail hither from here in any rowboats, canoes or other 
vessels without having the same inspected here... and without having obtained proper 
consent to go thither.”49 Immediately after the new notice was read in court, Rutger 
Jacobsz was fined for having sold alcohol to some Indians.50
47 Ibid., 75. There are many examples o f  sachems from various tribes asking for the intervention o f  the 
Dutch authorities to stop Europeans from selling alcohol trade. In these exchanges the sachems were then 
told to instruct their people not to buy the alcohol and the Europeans would stop selling it. It became quite 
a Catch-22.
48 Ibid., 91. The trouble indicated had to do with the loss o f  property o f  Thomas Chambers in the Esopus. 
Chambers h im self would create some o f  his own problems brought about by Indians and alcohol.
49 Ibid., 127.
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It was another two years until the next case surrounding selling alcohol to Indians 
took place in Fort Orange. During this two years free of alcohol-related court action the 
Peach War took place, which may have renewed interest in preventing hostilities between 
Dutch colonists and Indians due to the alcohol trade. In 1656 Willem Hoffmeyer 
confessed to “once with two half barrels in a canoe and afterwards with five half barrels 
of good small beer mixed together, sailed up the river and sold and peddled beer among 
Indians (notwithstanding the strict prohibition o f the director-general and council).”51 
Hoffmeyer was indeed punished for his acts, and interrogation concerning the selling of 
alcohol to Indians along the river and outside of the towns continued in the Fort Orange
c7
court, but with little being done in the way of punishment for such acts. While the 
interest to bring a stop to the alcohol trade may have grown out o f the events of 1655, the 
ability of the WIC officials in Fort Orange, or in New Amsterdam, to enforce their 
regulations outside of their communities remained weak.
Selling alcohol to Indians was a large source of contention between the settlers in 
Esopus and those in Fort Orange. The former were often accusing the latter of providing
50 Ibid., 128.
51 Ibid., 253. N-YHS Beekman Letter Book contains a correspondence between Beekman and Stuyvesant 
that illustrates the problem o f alcohol was present throughout the colony. Beekman complained o f the 
actions o f  John Becker who, in 1659 and 1660, sold alcohol to both Dutch soldiers on the Delaware and 
Indians. Intoxicated soldiers burned an Indian canoe and Beekman was forced to generously compensate 
the Indians to prevent retaliations. When an Indian died as a result o f  his drinking, his companions, “placed 
the dead savage on a board, which they fastened with four crotchets and placed it opposite the door o f  John 
Becker, in the underwood, some o f  them said because he did drink him self dead... he must bewail the 
house where he purchased the liquor.” Beekman was wary o f  punishing Becker, however, because Becker 
was a very popular individual who also read the sermons on Sundays. So while Stuyvesant tried to 
legislate morality, the farther from the center o f  authority in New Amsterdam, the less leverage he had.
The case o f  Hoffmeyer will also be discussed in chapter 3.
52 Ibid., 255, 186-187, 345-348, 387-389. Paulus Jansen was found guilty o f  selling alcohol to Indians in 
the summer o f  1658, and received a sentence o f  six years banishment from the colony. However, he 
showed up again in court records less than two years later. See FOCM, 484.
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the Esopus Indians with alcohol much to the danger of the Esopus settlers. They also 
often wrote to Director-General Stuyvesant expressing their concerns in this matter.
While the Fort Orange settlers could not claim innocence in this matter, it would be the 
Esopus region’s Dutch residents’ actions selling and distributing alcohol that would 
precipitate a crisis with the Esopus Indians.
Esopus Settlement and the First Esopus War 
When the Peach War broke out, the young settlement at the Esopus disbanded for 
fear that the Indian attacks may have moved northward. After the fighting ended, a 
certain sense o f normality resumed throughout the colony, and the residents of the Esopus 
moved back to continue their farming. However, the Esopus settlers did not believe it 
necessary to adhere to the new policy set forth by the Council calling for concentrated 
settlements. The fighting after all did not occur in the Esopus, and therefore they 
continued in their practice of establishing separate farms. Such independent and defiant 
actions showed the continuation of the fractured nature of the colony, and the limited 
authority of the WIC outside of the settlements. Furthermore, though Esopus was under 
the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, due to their physical separation from Fort Orange, the 
Esopus residents could not count on their neighbors to the north for protection. Although 
the Esopus settlers defied the Council and Stuyvesant by not farming in a concentrated 
settlement, the Directors of the WIC believed the area was worth defending. In 
September of 1657, the Directors informed Stuyvesant that he and the Council should 
consider erecting a blockhouse on the boundaries o f the Esopus and New England. The
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Directors considered this measure “not only useful, but also necessary” although there
53was not any money for the company to pay for it.
The Esopus region was seen as worthy of such attention for both its agricultural 
importance and its strategic location. The area was settled as an agricultural community, 
not a trading post, and since so few New Netherlanders were engaged in agriculture, it 
was important to protect the colony’s most promising grain producing region. In a letter 
to Stuyvesant in May of 1658, Thomas Chambers, one of the leading residents of the 
area, claimed that the land of the Esopus could feed the entire colony of New Netherland, 
and that “it would be a sin which could be avoided if we should have to leave such 
splendid country.”54 Lending both credence and hope to this claim was the fact that the 
harvest of 1657 was particularly good. Records from 1658 indicate a significant amount 
of agricultural goods, such as wheat, oats and peas, traveling down the North River from 
Esopus to New Amsterdam as well. The combination o f a good harvest and the hopes of 
developing new agricultural lands was welcome news. Jeremias van Rensselaer 
explained that there was still a great need of opening farmland quickly in order to support 
the colony. He stated, “the burgomasters of Amsterdam have sent many people to the 
South River [Delaware River] and there is as yet not much farming done, as the land is 
still full o f trees, which must first be rooted up.”55 This need for food throughout the 
entire colony coupled with Chambers’ claim of the Esopus region’s ability to feed the
53 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 73.
54 Ibid., Ibid., 77-78.
55 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 64.
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colony supported the WIC’s desire to protect the region in 1657 by erecting a 
blockhouse.
Furthermore, the Dutch settlement in the Esopus, between New Amsterdam and 
Fort Orange, helped to link the principal trading centers of the colony. At the same time, 
the Dutch presence in the Esopus region helped to offset the ever-present threat of a new 
English settlement taking root along the North River. Most importantly in the eyes of 
many New Netherland traders and merchants, and to the WIC, the Esopus settlements did 
not threaten trade at Fort Orange as Schenectady would in the 1660s.56
However, there was a definite competitiveness between the people of Fort Orange 
and the settlers of Esopus. The latter tried, with little success, to make sure that they 
received proper attention and resources and were not overlooked in favor of the more 
populated and lucrative Fort Orange. Jacob Jansen Stoll, another leading burgher in the 
Esopus, inquired of Stuyvesant if  the residents o f Fort Orange were allowed to openly 
sell alcohol to the Indians. He reported that all the Dutch residents of the Esopus had 
seen the Esopus Indians drinking daily and the latter claimed they received the alcohol 
from Fort Orange. Stoll concluded his letter warning, “no good can come from it, but it 
must tend to the ruin of the whole country.”57 It was three weeks later when Thomas 
Chambers wrote his letter to Stuyvesant in which he claimed that the Esopus was capable 
of feeding the entire colony o f New Netherland. In this letter he included his concern 
that the whole area would be lost due to problems with the Indians caused by alcohol.
56 Thomas E. Burke, Mohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community o f  Schenectady, New York, 1661-1710  
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ). For scientific evidence supporting Chambers claim o f the fertility o f  the 
land in the Esopus, see David J. De Laubenfels, “Soil,” in Geography o f  New York State, ed. John H. 
Thompson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1977), 104-110.
57 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 77. Stoll’s personal experience in Fort Orange will be explained in the next 
chapter. By 1658 he had developed a less than favorable record with the court at Fort Orange.
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Chambers reported that intoxicated Indians fired at and killed Harmen Jacopsen and also 
set fire to the house of Jacop Andrijansen.
As residents of the Esopus and of Fort Orange continued to accuse each other of 
supplying potentially hostile Indians with alcohol, they continued to add to the fractured 
nature of the colony. Although the Esopus was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, its 
residents continued to appeal to New Amsterdam for assistance, while accusing residents 
of Fort Orange of trying to undermine the success o f the new settlement. Also, while 
Dutch colonists of the Esopus continued to form tense to hostile relations with the 
neighboring Esopus Indians, the Dutch colonists at Fort Orange, together with the 
neighboring Mohawks and the Mahicans, were forming a new cultural landscape within 
the walls of Fort Orange and its court. As problems between the Dutch settlers of the 
Esopus and the Esopus Indians escalated, the Mohawks were able to take advantage of 
the situation to increase their own influence on the new cultural and developing 
diplomatic landscape of Fort Orange.
Problems with Indians
The importance of the fledgling community along the Hudson River was again 
made evident in the spring o f 1658 when the Esopus Indians murdered a Dutch settler 
and, as van Rensselaer put it, “greatly annoy[ed] the farmers there.” On May 18, 1658 
Thomas Chambers again wrote to Stuyvesant, this time to inform him of the settlers’ 
precarious situation, which again involved alcohol sold to Indians. The European settlers 
were unable to compel the Esopus Indians to turn over the individual who murdered 
Andrijansen. Chambers explained to Stuyvesant that the Indians, “use great violence 
everyday which we are not capable to relate to your honors and derisively say, that if  they
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kill a Christian or more, they can pay for it in wampum and we have so far been obliged
f O
to carry out their wishes.” He continued his plea for help by reminding Stuyvesant and 
the Council that in “this fine country.. .there are 990 schepels of seed-grain in the 
ground.” Chambers’ less than subtle reminder concerning the agricultural importance of 
the Esopus reinforced the idea that agricultural production would help to stabilize the 
colony as a whole, at the same time the alcohol trade threatened to rip it apart.
Not only did Chambers appeal to the evident threat to the Esopus’ agricultural 
production, but he also argued that the community deserved assistance on religious 
grounds. He pleaded that, “between 60 and 70 Christian people live here and attend 
divine service on all the proper days and that we maintain our reader at our own expense; 
therefore we believe, that your honors would regret sincerely, if so many innocent souls 
should be so wretchedly murdered and driven away by the cruel barbarians.”59 Chambers 
pointed out that the community was not guilty of the general sins that supposedly led to 
the Peach War. Furthermore, although they had no church building they were, according 
to Chambers, maintaining their piety thereby making them deserving of the protection of 
both God and the WIC. Chambers and his fellow Esopus settlers were, according to his 
understanding, moving out as Christians into the wilderness in order to wrest the land 
from the control of the devilish Indians and into the control of worthy Christian souls. In 
Chambers’ letter for help it is evident that the Esopus Indians had the upper hand in their 
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Stuyvesant agreed that this threat in the Esopus was well worth his time and attention and
quickly traveled to the settlement there accompanied by approximately seventy soldiers.
Residents north of the Esopus also took note o f the development of events down
river. Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote home to the Netherlands on June 3, 1658 that,
As to the condition of the country it is so so, for the Indians in the Esopus 
have set fire to a house and shot dead a Dutchman and they greatly annoy 
the farmers there, so that the General has gone there with 70 soldiers.
How it will end time will show. If war is started there, our colony will 
hardly remain exempt, for the places are but 13 or 14 Dutch miles apart.
The best reason I have for hoping that it will not happen is that it is 
another nation of Indians than those who dwell among us. Otherwise, 
everything in the colony is flourishing and the good Lord grant that it may 
long continue.60
His response illustrates the importance of the Esopus region to the overall safety of the 
Dutch along the Hudson River Valley. The colony remained under constant threat of 
English incursion and hostilities with Indians in places besides Esopus. Yet, Stuyvesant 
believed that the location of Esopus between Fort Orange and Manhattan Island, along 
with its function as an agricultural community, was important to the survival of the 
colony. The settlement linked the two New Netherland settlments and presented the 
potential to provide the colony with significant agricultural products. These two 
advantages of the community gave Stuyvesant the incentive to protect the region with the 
few soldiers available to him. Van Rensselaer’s response also provides evidence that the 
residents o f Rensselaerswyck believed themselves to be removed from the events in 
Esopus, just as they had with the Peach War, as most of their dealings remained with the 
Mohawks and the Mahicans, who were not allied with the Esopus.61 O f course van
60 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 98-100.
61 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 42. Describes a renewal o f  peaceful relations and cooperation between the 
Mohawks and the Dutch in 1657.
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Rensselaer’s response can be justified as Rensselaerswyck and Esopus had no official 
relations. However, there remained tensions between residents of Fort Orange and 
Esopus, although the latter was under legal jurisdiction of the former.
In the late 1650s, the Esopus Indians were in quite a unique situation compared to 
most of the other smaller tribes located along the Hudson. They had participated in the 
Peach War three years earlier, but were not included in the subsequent peace treaties. 
Indian groups south of the Esopus and in the vicinity of more densely populated New 
Amsterdam, such as the Hackensacks and Tappan Indians, along with the Long Island 
tribes, agreed to peace terms with the Dutch. The areas around New Amsterdam were 
never seriously threatened by major Indian attack afterwards. The Esopus Indians, 
however, were located further up river and the Dutch were not able to maintain any type 
of dominance over them as Thomas Chambers’ letter, mentioned above, illustrated. The 
Esopus Indians were also not under the control of any other Indian group, thereby 
allowing them to stand as an independent force in the region. Furthermore, though 
southern Indians were no longer in a position to render aid to the Esopus, the Dutch kept 
a watchful eye. They remained aware of both old Indian alliances and Indian 
independent power, and to counter these threats, the Dutch required the southern Indians 
to declare their neutrality on several occasions during what came to be known as the 
Esopus War.
Prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, Stuyvesant, as previously 
mentioned, traveled to the region in hopes of avoiding another conflict so close on the 
heels of both the Peach War and the war with New Sweden. His troops were spread 
throughout the colony and the Dutch were in no position to engage in a new fight with
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the Esopus Indians. When Stuyvesant arrived in the Esopus he informed the settlers that 
the only way he would help them militarily would be if they settled in a compact 
settlement to avoid attack.62 O f course, this was something he had required of them three 
years earlier. Stuyvesant noted how the English had been forming such settlements and 
they had been thriving. The settlers reluctantly agreed, and then Stuyvesant and the 
Esopus settlers met with the Esopus Indians at the home of Jacob Jansen Stoll whose 
house was located closest to the Indian settlements. Stoll’s home held significance in the 
Esopus community. Not only did he live closest to the Indian settlements, but his home 
was also used for church services, thereby bringing the Dutch Calvinist tradition right to 
the edge o f the forest, or as many of the Dutch would have perceived it, the edge of the 
wilderness.63 Such a meeting would have definitely created a new cultural landscape as 
Dutch and Esopus Indians both contributed their understanding o f the meetings’ 
significance and could have forged a new space for negotiations between the two 
cultures.
However the meeting did not take place in a timely enough manner to please 
Stuyvesant. The Esopus sachems failed to show for several days and often practiced 
stalling tactics. They would return to the woods to confer about topics and not return 
when they had agreed to. Often only one sachem would return and state that he could not 
make decisions without the others’ consent. The Esopus utilized the woods beyond the 
Dutch settlement in order to retain control of the process of dealing with the Dutch, and
62 Prior to actually landing, Stuyvesant utilized his boat as his point o f  operations. He felt more secure o f  
his position on the water than on the land, even though there were no actual hostilities at this time. When 
they did leave the ships, Stuyvesant and his men stayed at the farm closest to the water.
63 Femow , DRCHNY  13: 82-87.
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the Dutch were unable to alter the approach. The Esopus had access to the Dutch 
settlements during negotiations, but the Dutch were unwilling to venture into the woods 
in order to speak with the Esopus Indians. The Dutch position o f power remained in their 
settlement, as close to the water as possible. Once they ventured into the woods, 
Stuyvesant and the soldiers would become much weaker and much more vulnerable.
When the Esopus were present and Stuyvesant had his chance to speak, the 
account indicates that Stuyvesant first attempted to get the Indians to turn over the 
murderer of the Dutch settler, which he failed to do because the Esopus sachems claimed 
the individual had fled their jurisdiction. Even if the murderer was still within the Esopus 
settlements, the Dutch were unable to travel into the woods to claim him. Stuyvesant, 
out of possible frustration, then challenged the Esopus in attendance by boasting, “that if 
any of the young men present had a great desire to fight, they might come forward 
now.”64 No one met his challenge at the time, although it appears that there were not 
many young men at the meeting as most were out hunting and did not return for some 
time. However, upon the return of the younger Esopus Indians, many were ready to meet 
Stuyvesant’s challenge and the group was reported to be about 500 warriors strong.65 
These young men represented what was known as the Bareback faction of the Esopus 
Indians who were opposed to acquiescing to any Dutch demand or desire. However, all 
parties managed to avoid open conflict at this time.
64 Ibid., 80-86.
65 The validity o f  this statement o f  500 Esopus warriors should be questioned. If they did indeed show with 
500 warriors, it is most likely many were in fact not from the Esopus nation, but possibly disgruntled allies 
from the Peach War.
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Stuyvesant continued to work to avoid a costly war, and at the same time saw for 
himself the value of the region to the future of the Company and the colony. As settlers 
reluctantly began creating a concentrated settlement, Stuyvesant himself purchased 
several tracts in the Esopus region. He also recruited carpenters from Fort Orange to help 
with both the settlement and his own buildings. Unfortunately, due to the distractions of 
the Indian threat and trying to build a settlement, their crops were not doing well.66 
Stuyvesant returned to the Esopus in October 1658 for a meeting between himself, the 
Dutch settlers and the Esopus sachems Pappequaken, Preuwamackan and Nachchamat. 
The meeting was to bring about a temporary agreement o f coexistence between the
f i lsettlers and the Esopus Indians.
This meeting was held at the home of Thomas Chambers instead of that of Jacob 
Jansen Stoll. Chambers’ home was located closest to the water and provided Stuyvesant 
quick access to his position of power, the river. It also brought the Indians further into 
the settlement and away from the woods, which they used so adeptly in the previous 
meeting to avoid making agreements with the Dutch. The location change did not seem 
to work to the advantage of the Dutch, however. After discussing concessions to be 
made by both sides, the Esopus sachems informed Stuyvesant that the other sachems 
Poenap and Calcop were not present and they could do nothing without their input. They 
informed Stuyvesant that they would go back to their villages and return with Poenap and 
Calcop the following day. Stuyvesant wrote that he thought the move was “to be a
66 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 91.
67 Ibid., 88-98.
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subterfuge only, to gain time either until my departure or until the arrival of other 
savages, yet to give them full measure, I allowed them this delay until tomorrow.”68
While Stuyvesant’s agreement may appear quite magnanimous, he did not really 
have much ability to detain the Indians without causing more problems. He was, 
however, correct and the sachems did not return as promised. Stuyvesant sent Jacob 
Jansen Stoll and Marten Metselaer into the woods to the Esopus village to find out what 
had happened. The men returned with the news that “the chiefs had made game of them 
and had plainly said, they had no intention of giving satisfaction as they considered what 
they had done o f no consequence.”69 At this point, Stuyvesant opted to leave the region 
and ordered Ensign Dirck Smith and fifty soldiers in the community with the instructions 
to keep all Indians out of the settlement, except with the permission of Chambers or Stoll, 
to attack Indians only in defense, and to protect the settlers while they commenced their 
farming.
Throughout the winter and into the spring open hostilities were avoided. 
Stuyvesant, who was in the Esopus early in 1659, was in communication with Jeremias 
van Rensselaer in March and April of that year concerning acquiring matching horses to 
use before his carriage, thus indicating at least some semblance o f normalcy in the region 
as well as the WIC’s renewed commitment to the region.70 Throughout the winter, spring 
and summer the residents and Stuyvesant also worked to acquire a minister for the
68 Ibid., 95.
69 Ibid., 95. However, the fact that not all the sachems were present at the meeting to conclude the 
negotiations did make the meeting o f  no consequence for the Esopus.
70 Van Rensselaer kept livestock, including horses and cattle, in the Esopus region, and the Director 
General wished to pick up horses from him in the Esopus region. See Correspondence o f  Jeremias van 
Rensselaer, 157.
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Esopus settlement, and in August of 1659 the WIC sent Domine Harmanus Bloem to the 
region. The WIC Directors in Holland agreed to this to combat “the bad condition of the 
public church service in the open country.”71 Although there were some signs of life as 
usual in the region, there were increasing signs of tension as well. First, there was 
growing concern of an English settlement south of the Esopus and north o f New 
Amsterdam. Stuyvesant wrote to the Directors in Holland that the Dutch should resist by 
sending not only more Dutch families, but also “homeless Polish, Lithuanian, Prussian,
72Jutlandish or Flemish families” to counteract the English presence along the Hudson. 
Stuyvesant and the WIC were unable to get many Dutch families to emigrate to New 
Netherland because economic and living conditions in the Dutch Republic were good and 
few Dutch families wished to leave thriving conditions to gamble their livelihoods on an 
overseas colony. Therefore, Stuyvesant was forced to ask the WIC in Amsterdam to 
recruit families from much less prosperous areas of Europe to populate New Netherland. 
Second, due to continued threats from the Esopus Indians, the settlers were unable to 
bring in a crop for a second year, although reports from Rensselaerswyck state that its 
wheat crop was very good for 1659.
In late summer 1659, tensions and suspicions started rising. In August the Esopus 
settlers indicated that their suspicions against the Esopus Indians were raised by the fact 
that they heard through their informants, a Mohawk Indian, a “southern savage,” 
Wappinger Indians, and Highland Indians, that the Esopus Indians were preparing for
71 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 98.
72 Ibid., 107.
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war.73 By the end of the month, Sergeant Andries Laurensen informed Stuyvesant that 
the Esopus Indians had been quiet. However, he also said that Christoffel Davits was 
continuing to sell alcohol to the Indians, and that an Esopus Indian named Poenap, who 
was named earlier as a sachem, was found intoxicated near the Dutch village.74
In September Laurensen wrote that he was informed by “a certain savage” that the 
Esopus Indians were preparing for war. Furthermore, the alcohol distributor Davits also 
informed Laurensen that the Esopus Sachem Calcop told him, “he should move away for 
the savages not only the barebacks but also the sachems had resolved to beat us.”75 
While Laurensen was concerned, he questioned the veracity o f the information, mostly 
due to its source, Christoffel Davits. A few days later some Esopus Indians, including 
women and children as a sign o f their peaceful intentions, arrived in the Dutch village. 
According to the report, two Mohawk sachems, along with “Sinnekens and southern 
Indians,” accompanied the Esopus Indians and advised, “that they should reconcile 
themselves again with the Christians, for which purpose they had now come.”76 The 
Esopus Indians inquired of the Dutch why they were not out plowing, and grew wary of 
Dutch activities. They also indicated that the Bareback faction was still strong and also 
displeased with some of the restrictions placed on Esopus Indian movements in the area, 
particularly with farmers blocking o f a path commonly used by the Esopus Indians. Even 
with the presence of allied Indians encouraging peace, the double threat of increased
73 Ibid., 104. This also illustrates the Dutch dependence on intelligence from Indians outside o f  towns, 
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numbers of English combined with the displeasure of the Bareback Esopus made the 
Dutch nervous.
The tensions finally broke later that same month when Jacob Jansen Stoll led 
some of his neighbors into the nearby woods and fired on a group of Indians who were 
intoxicated on the alcohol they received as pay for working in Thomas Chambers’ 
fields.77 The Indians were, according to Stoll, disorderly and in a drunken rage. Ensign 
Smith wrote to Stuyvesant informing him of the events in the Esopus and also to inform 
Stuyvesant that he did not order the attack, but that Jacob Jansen Stoll led it. When Stoll 
returned to the village “abusing the ensign violently” and said “I know very well what 
orders [Smith] had from the Honorable General and how [Smith] sat there all in the fort 
for eight days.”78 The fault for this event seems to lie with the Dutch settlers. The fact 
that Thomas Chambers gave brandy to several Indians as pay after he had complained to 
Stuyvesant about Fort Orange residents selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians seems to 
indicate he was looking for a fight. Furthermore, Stoll’s quick actions to leave the fort 
and attack the Indians against the wishes of Stuyvesant and against the authority of 
Ensign Smith also indicate that his actions were offensive.
Many other residents of New Netherland did not support the Esopus settlers’ 
actions and believed that Stoll and Chambers had brought trouble upon themselves. 
Jeremias van Rensselaer ignored Stuyvesant’s requests for help for the Esopus settlers,
7Qbecause he believed it was the fault of the Dutchmen there. Although the Esopus
77 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 88-90, 119; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 171-173. 
A group o f  Catskill Indians corroborated the story to vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange, and placed 
the blame squarely with the Dutch.
78 Femow, DRCHNY  13:115.
79 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 179.
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region was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, relations continued to remain fractured 
and Fort Orange authorities would not support their neighbors in the Esopus. At this 
point, it remained up to Stuyvesant to try to protect the Esopus region from New 
Amsterdam, and, he hoped, protect the colony from collapse. Unfortunately for 
Stuyvesant few individuals and communities throughout New Netherland were interested 
in assisting the colonists in the Esopus. He did not have the authority to force residents 
of New Netherland to militarily support the people of the Esopus, and his requests for 
volunteers was able to raise only a small group from Long Island. Stuyvesant even 
reported that some, “even dared to say, that they were bound only to defend their own 
place.”80 The fractured nature of New Netherland remained quite evident as different 
communities continued to form their own cultural landscapes independent of one another 
and independent from the directives of the WIC authorities.
By the first week of October 1659, the Dutch village in the Esopus was “besieged 
by 500 to 600” Indians, and no one could go near the village, at least ten villagers were
O I
taken captive and at least four villagers were dead, including Jacob Jansen Stoll. Later 
in the month, while some Esopus Indians taunted the Dutch soldiers and settlers that they 
would come with 400 men to fight the Dutch, Highland Indians were informing Ensign 
Smith that the Esopus Indians were deliberating and needed more time. With these 
crossed signals, Smith found it safest to keep everyone in the village. Also, while Fort
80 Femow, DRCH NY  13: 123.
81 Ibid., 119. Lourensen sent the letter via an Indian messenger to Stuyvesant on October 3, but Stuyvesant 
did not receive it until nine days later. Stuyvesant was upset at the length o f  time the message took to reach 
him, but besides expressing anger, there was not much else he could do because o f  Dutch dependence on 
Indians for communication. The numbers o f  Indians remains questionable, unless they were joined by 
members o f  other tribes, which Stuyvesant suspected.
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Orange and Rensselaerswyck did not send any aid themselves, they did recruit the 
assistance o f two Mohawk sachems and a Mahican sachem to travel to the Esopus to help 
bring about an armistice.82 The Mohawks, Mahicans, and some Catskill Indians were 
able to negotiate an armistice between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch by the end of 
October.83
The Dutch were powerless to end the outbreak of hostilities, which could only be 
brought about by the intervention of the still powerful tribes of the Mohawks and 
Mahicans. These tribes had been establishing relations with Fort Orange for many years 
at this point. As they took the lead in the diplomatic relations between the Dutch and the 
Esopus Indians, they, especially the Mohawks, were able to insert themselves further into 
areas o f Dutch diplomacy with the Indians. At the same time, as will be discussed later, 
the Mohawks were gaining greater access to Dutch courts in Fort Orange. Through 
growing Mohawk influence in both areas, they were able to greatly influence the rise of 
Fort Orange as the new colonial center of Indian and European affairs, even though Fort 
Orange officials were trying to remain independent from the tensions between the Esopus 
settlers and the Esopus Indians.
The Esopus settlers and Dutch leaders in New Amsterdam, however much they 
may have wanted to retaliate and eliminate the Esopus Indians, were still not in a position 
to fight a truly offensive war and Stuyvesant continued to delay such an event until the 
Dutch were strong enough to fight. In November of 1659 Stuyvesant wrote to Jeremias 
van Rensselaer and remarked that any peace with the Esopus could hardly be lasting
82 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 123.
83 Ibid., 126; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 186.
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unless they were to leave the land and join another tribe altogether, a fate that the Esopus,
especially the Bareback faction, would rather avoid.84 Of course such action would
allow the spread of Dutch Christianity, give the Dutch productive farmland and increase
the Dutch influence between the settlements at Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.
Furthermore, the distractions from the fighting would help bring about a bread shortage
in the colony, which also threatened the colony.85
For the remainder of 1659, Stuyvesant urged extreme caution in dealings with the
Indians and gave instructions for limited contact between the Esopus Indians and the
Esopus settlers.86 It was not until February of 1660 that Stuyvesant offered the Directors
in Amsterdam a moral reasoning for military action. He stated that,
in consideration of the suffered injuries and the restoration o f the almost 
ruined Batavian reputation (as one savage considers himself now as good 
as two Dutchmen) and on account of the fertility of the lands (directly 
ready for the plough without ridding of trees or brushes and settled with 
two or three villages each of 20-24 families, which according to the 
convenience o f the place are able and capable each to produce every year 
as much grain as all the Dutch and English villages of New Netherland 
together are as yet able to produce) that it is necessary to make war on the 
Esopus Indians.87
Throughout 1659, Stuyvesant remained focused on the Esopus region although he still 
recognized that the Dutch were not strong enough to fight a full-scale war with the 
Esopus Indians without leaving the southern settlements open to attack from Maryland 
and their northern settlements vulnerable to New England. He also knew that at that
84 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 106; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 186.
85 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 187-189.
86 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 128.
87 Ibid., 136.
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point, both the bad winter weather and the lack of bread kept the Dutch from waging war,
88while they were sure the Esopus Indians were preparing for war themselves.
Stuyvesant knew that without stabilizing the interior of the colony, New
Netherland could be split in two. The Dutch could not afford to ignore such a fate and
needed to establish an agricultural presence and to prevent the total isolation of Fort
Orange. Stuyvesant and the Council, recalling the Peach War, decided that a new war
was necessary, but opted to wait until the fall of 1660 to carry out their offensive war in
the Esopus, the protection of which was deemed necessary for the survival of the
colony.89 In the meantime, Stuyvesant proclaimed March 24, 1660 as a day of fasting
and prayer to prepare for the military action. He explained that,
with rumors o f war and its immediate consequences, murder and arson by 
the savage barbarous natives committed here as well as principally on our 
friends, countrymen and fellow-inhabitants of the Esopus, which though 
the righteous but not less merciful God has mitigated and so directed that 
it did not happen, against our expectation, in the worst manner and 
according to the evil intentions of the barbarians and has made it cease for 
the present desiring doubtless our penitence and turning away from our 
crying and God irritating sins, as the abominable desecration of His 
Sabbath and his name.90
As Stuyvesant saw it, while the residents apparently forgot the lessons taught to them
through their sufferings in the Peach War, God was giving them a reprieve to turn away
88 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 130, 132. All sharing o f  information during the winter o f  1659-1660 was based 
on both Indian sources and Indian messengers, primarily Mohawks although Catskills were also mentioned, 
as well. The use o f  Mohawk information and messengers illustrated further the Dutch dependence on the 
Indians for their correspondence in the winter especially. Furthermore, the Dutch trusted, although 
possibly not fully, Mohawk messengers not to give false information or provide the Esopus with 
information against the Dutch. In January 1660, Ensign Smith was unable to get any information out o f  the 
Esopus because no Indian would agree to carry the message due to the weather.
89 Ibid., 135, 137-138, 142; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 179-180. With 
such a small population, Stuyvesant was faced with the problem o f  raising enough troops to fight such a 
war. In response he requested that several slaves be sent from Curacao to assist in the fight against the 
Esopus.
90 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 145.
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from their continued evil and God irritating ways. In this light, the Esopus War was seen 
as a continuation of the Peach War, brought about by the sins of the community.
Not only did Stuyvesant call for a day of prayer to avoid God’s punishment for 
the sins of the colony, as they had been punished in 1655, Stuyvesant also worked to 
maintain the peace made with Indians after the Peach War. In his negotiations with the 
Indians who signed a peace with the Dutch in 1655, Stuyvesant was making sure that 
they did not try to assist their former allies, the Esopus Indians, who fought with them 
during the Peach War, but who never participated in the peace negotiations. On March 6, 
1660, Stuyvesant and sachems from the Hackensack, Nyack, Tappan and Long Island 
tribes met at Fort Amsterdam to renew their peace from the Peach War. One of their first 
orders o f business was for the southern Indians to pledge to have nothing to do with the 
Esopus Indians.91
Another concern the Dutch voiced to the Indians was their desire to end wars for 
the purpose o f avenging murders and to cooperate in bringing murderers to justice. This, 
as mentioned above, was one of the events that led to hostilities between the Esopus 
Indians and the settlers and threatened other areas in New Netherland as well. A week 
after this meeting, the non-Bareback faction o f Esopus Indians requested a meeting with 
Stuyvesant at Fort Amsterdam through Coetheas, chief of the Wappinger Indians, to 
discuss a permanent peace. The Bareback faction of the Esopus were the young 
warriors who were always willing to meet a challenge from the Dutch. However, the 
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wished it to come to an end. Since the Wappingers already had a treaty with the Dutch, 
the Esopus were able to utilize the Wappingers as mediators between themselves and the 
Dutch in New Amsterdam.
Unfortunately, before a peace could be brought about, hostilities once again broke 
out in the Esopus and the armistice was broken. Furthermore, Stuyvesant did not want to 
establish a peace with the Esopus Indians unless it included both the Bareback and non- 
Bareback factions of the tribe. Otherwise, he would not trust that a peace could be 
maintained and that the Esopus would vacate the lands that Stuyvesant wished to acquire. 
In March 1660, Ensign Smith went out into the countryside on an expedition to locate the 
Esopus Indians, and about three miles inland from the river came across a camp with 
about sixty Indians who fled upon seeing the Ensign and his men. The Dutch force killed 
at least three Indians and captured twelve, the rest were able to flee to the security of the 
woods.93 With this event Stuyvesant and the Council declared war “after having suffered 
many massacres, affronts and unbearable injuries from time to time by the Esopus 
Indians.”94 Apparently God could not stay his wrath any longer, and the colony was 
again placed under alert.
In an attempt to bring about an end to the fighting, it was once again the 
Mohawks and Mahicans from the Fort Orange area who traveled to the Esopus and dealt 
directly with the Indians there. However, this was the extent of Fort Orange’s
93 Ibid., 151, 152. Furthermore, the river was opened enough at this point to allow Smith to utilize Dutch 
water travel to inform Stuyvesant, instead o f  having to depend on an Indian messenger.
94 Ibid., 152. The Dutch actually experienced much difficulty trying to execute the war due to bad spring 
weather and due to their lack o f  knowledge o f  the inland area. They had to cut o ff  pursuit o f  Esopus 
Indians because they were unable to cross streams and travel through the woods. They did, however, 
manage to keep the Esopus Indians from being able to remain in one spot very long. Femow, DRCHNY  13: 
170.
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involvement in the war and peace proceedings. Although the Esopus was actually under 
the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, all negotiations occurred either in the Esopus itself or in 
Fort Amsterdam. As stated above, in many ways Stuyvesant saw this conflict as an 
extension of the Peach War. The Esopus Indians had fought in that war, but never 
participated in the negotiations to end it. Stuyvesant also feared that old alliances would 
be rekindled and those tribes who had agreed to terms with the Dutch would join the 
Esopus. Therefore, Stuyvesant took charge o f the negotiations and it was Fort 
Amsterdam that served as the location of the negotiations. Stuyvesant would not travel to 
the Esopus to treat with the Esopus Indians, especially after his earlier experiences there.
In May 1660, several Sachems of tribes who had surrendered to the Dutch at the 
end of the Peach War appeared at Fort Amsterdam and declared that the Wappingers, 
who had also not participated in the Peach War negotiations, would “not injure the Dutch 
to the extent o f a straw.”95 With this meeting and others at Fort Amsterdam, the tribes of 
the southern Hudson River Valley pledged to either maintain their neutrality or try to 
bring about a peace with the Esopus. Later in May, three Mahican leaders came to Fort 
Amsterdam on behalf of the Esopus sachems who wished for peace. The Mahicans were 
told that if  the Esopus Indians wanted peace, they would have to come to Fort 
Amsterdam, or at least Fort Orange to do so. It was clear that while Stuyvesant would 
accept the use of Fort Orange to conclude a peace, any negotiations would have to be in 
Dutch territory. He would not accept anything less than an actual appearance by the 
Esopus sachems in a Dutch fort. Authorities in Fort Orange, however, showed little
95 Ibid., 166, 171, 172.
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inclination to become too involved in the Esopus troubles, and the negotiations continued 
to occur at Fort Amsterdam.96
In July 1660 a peace was negotiated between the Esopus and the Dutch in Fort 
Amsterdam. Present at the proceedings were representatives of the Mohawks, Mahicans, 
Catskills, Susquehannocks, Wappingers, and Hackensacks. The Esopus sachems Calcop, 
Seewackemamo, Neskahewan and Paniyruways agreed to end all hostilities, give up their 
land and move away never to return, not to kill livestock, and “whereas the last war was 
caused by Drunken people, no savage shall be allowed to drink brandy or strong liquor in 
or near the Dutch plantation houses or settlements, but he must go with it to his land or to
07some distant place in the woods.” The Esopus Indians were also forbidden to enter 
Dutch houses armed, and lastly, eleven Esopus warriors were sent to Curacao to work as 
slaves as an example to others. While the Dutch won this particular war and were able to 
dictate the terms within the confines of their own fort, the Mohawk sachems 
Onderishoghque and Adoghwatque admonished the Dutch for starting the war at the 
same time they warned the Esopus to avoid war with the Dutch.
The next chapter will further explore how the Mohawks were able to use the 
Dutch base of power in the forts to advance their own authority among both the 
Europeans and other Indians. After the peace negotiations in Fort Amsterdam, the 
Mohawks would concentrate their efforts at Fort Orange, thus increasing the significance 
of that fort in relations between Indians and Europeans. Stuyvesant and the Mohawks 
utilized Fort Amsterdam in this instance because of Fort Orange’s lack o f interest in
96 See Gehring, Correspondence, 1654-1658, 205, 227. This will be explored more in chapter 4.
97 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 179-181.
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events in the Esopus, again illustrating the lack of cohesion among the WIC settlements 
along the Hudson River. Soon after this event, however, Fort Orange would be unable to 
avoid dealing with Esopus affairs, and furthermore, the continued admonishments of the 
Mohawks would leave Fort Orange authorities with little choice but to get involved in the 
Esopus.
The Mohawk admonishment aside, the Dutch were able to secure, at least for the 
moment, the strategic Esopus region and shorten the gap between Fort Orange and Fort 
Amsterdam. The Dutch settlers returned to the land and farming recommenced, much to 
the pleasure of Stuyvesant, the Council and the Amsterdam Directors. The community’s 
importance grew and they would also be granted their own court in 1661, thus releasing it 
from the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. However, they would soon learn that their troubles 
were far from over.
When war would break out again in the Esopus, the region would actually serve 
to further separate the Dutch settlements at Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. This 
separation and Fort Orange’s continued isolation would increase Fort Orange’s reliance 
on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers. This would, in turn, provide a significant 
opportunity for the Mohawks, who provided the majority of the intelligence, to establish 
their presence in the Fort Orange court.
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CHAPTER 3
ST R U G G LES INSID E TO W NS
In 1653, Dutch settlers Volkert Jansen, Willem Brouwer and Jan van Aken were 
brought into court at Beverwyck for violating New Netherland laws that forbade Dutch 
settlers from entering Indian lands to conduct trade and from inviting Indians into private 
homes and taverns for trade. Each man was accused both of entering Indian space and of 
allowing Indians into private Dutch space. They were all convicted and forced to pay a 
fine for violating regulations on access to particular spaces that the Dutch WIC had 
deemed off limits for trade. The actions o f these men caused Dutch officials to declare 
that, “God the Lord would punish such a place.” Such a declaration reflected their 
Calvinist sensibilities that dictated that God would not stand for the continual violations 
o f regulations on access to particular spaces by Christians and non-Christians alike. 
However, the convictions and declarations of the New Netherland court did not deter 
others from violating regulations against entering certain spaces.
As seen in the preceding chapter, European movements outside of their 
established communities was highly restricted. Their limited ability to move on the lands 
outside of their towns was the result of their lack of knowledge of these lands. This was 
in direct opposition to the Indians who controlled knowledge and access to the lands 
outside of European settlements. Furthermore, as a result of events outside of Dutch 
control, such as the tensions in the Esopus region and Mohawk wars with Algonquian 
tribes in New England, the Mohawks would also manage to gain more knowledge and
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access to the spaces within Fort Orange. The most significant space that the Mohawks 
would penetrate was the use o f the fort, but not just for trade purposes. Through the 
1650s and 1660s, the Mohawks were able to gain greater access to the fort and its use by 
the Dutch court. In this way, the actions of the Mohawks increased the significance of 
Fort Orange as a new political center for both Dutch and Indians.
Focus on the Fort
Stuyvesant’s arrival in New Netherland in 1647 was followed by the arrival of 
Brant van Slichtenhorst the following year. Whereas Stuyvesant was the Director- 
General o f all o f New Netherland, and was the primary representative o f the WIC in 
North America, Slichtenhorst came as the director o f the patroonship of 
Rensselaerswyck. Soon after Slichtenhorst took up his post in Rensselaerswyck, he 
quickly found himself in conflict with Stuyvesant and the WIC as he began issuing 
building lots just north of Fort Orange to the residents of the patroonship. Slichtenhorst’s 
instructions as director of the patroonship no longer exist. However, his actions trying to 
bring order to construction along the river as well as his attempts at consolidation of the 
dwellings of non-farmers near the fort, was an extension of overall Dutch policy of trying 
to form compact and less vulnerable settlements. Stuyvesant vigorously pursued such a 
policy throughout the colony to increase the safety of the settlements and, in turn, 
increase the stability of the colony as a whole. In Slichtenhorst’s case, he already had the 
advantage o f a fort in the midst of his patroonship, and it made sense to utilize that 
advantage and consolidate his settlers under his direction in the shadow o f the fort.1
1 Much o f  this information can be found in Charles Gehring’s introduction to his edited volume, Fort 
Orange Court Minutes 1652-1660.
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However, the fort stood as the symbol of the WIC’s authority in the land, and 
while Stuyvesant would encourage other communities to settle close together and to build 
fortification for their protection, he did not view Slichtenhorst’s activities as beneficial to 
the WIC. In fact, Stuyvesant saw Slichtenhorst as an interloper trespassing on WIC land 
and authority. As Charles T. Gehring observed, this event touched off a controversy 
lasting thirty-five years.2 It also illustrated the ever-present competition and separation 
between Dutch settlements. In this case, the tensions were between the WIC settlement 
at Fort Orange and Beverwyck and the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. The 
competition between the two Dutch colonies would end in favor of the WIC and would 
continue to strengthen Fort Orange’s power in the region. In response to Slichtenhorst’s 
restructuring Rensselaerswyck’s settlements, Stuyvesant ordered that no structures could 
be built within a cannon shot of the fort, or about 3000 feet. This provision, if enforced, 
would allow for the growth of Fort Orange’s influence beyond its walls.
To make matters worse, Slichtenhorst further polarized Fort Orange and 
Rensselaerswyck by refusing to assist in repairs to the fort by forbidding WIC laborers to 
freely quarry stone and cut wood on patroonship land. In the ensuing years as 
Stuyvesant’s attention was drawn to the threats coming from outside the colony, 
particularly from New England, Slichtenhorst continued consolidating his own hold on 
the land around the fort. He granted new building lots within cannon shot of the fort and 
actually guaranteed settlers against their losses if the WIC were to tear down their 
property.
2 Gehring, FOCM, xxi.
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Also during the time of Slichtenhorst’s tenure as director o f Rensselaerswyck, 
there was no separate court in Fort Orange representing the rule o f the WIC and all 
direction had to come from Fort Amsterdam. This continued to put Slichtenhorst and 
Stuyvesant in direct conflict with one another. Furthermore, since weather closed down 
river access to Fort Orange in the winter and lack of authority outside of towns and lack 
of ability to move effectively over land greatly limited land access between the two 
settlements, the colonists of Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were left to their own 
devices a good part o f the time. When the WIC and Stuyvesant attempted to assert their 
authority over the land, Slichtenhorst openly resisted. He refused to allow the company 
to post their ordinances within Rensselaerswyck jurisdiction. He also threatened 
retribution against patroonship farmers who assisted in the repairs to the fort by helping 
to haul logs or stone.
By the time Stuyvesant had negotiated the Treaty of Hartford in 1650, thereby 
securing the colony’s eastern boundary, he had also received permission from the 
directors in Amsterdam to exert his authority over the entire colony, including the area 
around Fort Orange. Even so, Slichtenhorst continued to grant lots in the disputed area 
and continued to refuse the WIC the right to post ordinances in the patroonship. The 
rivalry turned violent when on New Years Eve 1651, soldiers from the fort fired burning 
fuses onto Slichtenhorst’s home, which was located within cannon shot and north of the 
fort. The house was set on fire, but the family escaped without injury. Slichtenhorst’s 
son Gerritt was not so lucky the next day when he ventured a bit too close to the fort and
3 Charles Gehring also explained that Slichtenhorst had little support from the owners o f  the patroonship o f  
Rensselaerswyck back in the Netherlands. They were well aware that the survival o f  the patroonship 
depended on good relations with the colony, and such heavy-handed tactics by Slichtenhorst did not help 
their cause, or their bottom line.
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was beaten by the same soldiers who fired on his family’s home. This beating was 
witnessed by Fort Orange commissary Johannes Dijckman, who was soon to become the 
first president o f the Fort Orange court. Dijckman refused to interfere and actually 
threatened swift action with his sword against anyone who tried to intervene.
The last straw in this power struggle, which was threatening to descend into utter 
chaos, came in the spring with the breaking of the ice in the river, which then opened the 
line of communication between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam. Stuyvesant sent 
orders up river proclaiming the WIC’s authority over the land surrounding the fort and 
gave instructions to erect boundary markers displaying the company’s territory. 
Slichtenhorst refused to post the ordinance and went further by tearing down the 
boundary markers. In response, Dijckman arrived at Slichtenhorst’s home accompanied 
by eight armed soldiers. The group took down the patroons’s flag, announced the 
authority of the newly formed Fort Orange Court, arrested Slichtenhorst and sent him to 
Fort Amsterdam where he served out the remainder of his directorship under arrest. 
Those people who were granted lots within 3000 feet of the fort were then required to 
swear allegiance to the WIC thereby renouncing their allegiance and obligations to the 
patroonship. Moreover, this move once again established authority o f the WIC along the 
northern reaches o f the Hudson and established Fort Orange as the foremost symbol of 
that authority.
Once the court’s authority was established in 1652, its members quickly began 
working to try to impose the authority of the WIC on the settlement and its inhabitants. 
The opening meeting of the court on April 15, 1652, immediately took into consideration 
issues surrounding the land around the fort. Abraham Pietersz Vosburgh had begun
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erecting a house within the 3000-foot radius of the fort and requested permission to 
continue to do so. The court granted their approval because they deemed the house’s 
location behind the once targeted home of Brant van Slichtenhorst to be far enough so it 
did “not greatly crowd or obstruct the fort.”4 The court also did not want to contribute to 
the financial ruin of Vosburgh by forcing him to relocate a house he had already begun to 
build. The court then appointed Dirrick Jansz and Vosburgh to make a survey of other 
lots where people had requested permission to build. It must have given Dijckman much 
pleasure to allow continuation of home construction begun under Slichtenhorst, then 
under the authority of the WIC.5
The WIC continued to assert its authority over the land once dominated by 
Slichtenhorst. In April 1653 the court held an extraordinary session to announce that the 
appointed surveyors would lay out an additional eight lots of forty Rhineland feet wide 
on Beverwyck land, “for the accommodation of the good inhabitants here.” The court 
strengthened the influence o f the WIC on this land by giving the first lot to Commissary 
Dijckman, the second to the Domine Gideon Schaets, and the third to Abraham Staets, 
Captain of the burgher guard, all WIC officials.6
Along with taking charge of the land that Slichtenhorst tried to consolidate under 
the authority of the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, the WIC also commenced with 
repairs to the fort, another past point of contention between Slichtenhorst and the WIC.
4 Gehring, FOCM, 3.
5 The controversy over who controlled the land, the WIC or the Patroonship o f  Rensselaerswyck would 
continue for years, and the van Rensselaer’s authority over their land would not be reinstated until after the 
English took over N ew  Netherland and formed N ew York. While the van Rensselaers would not have the 
authority o f  their own colony, they were deemed rightful owners o f  the land.
6 Gehring, FOCM, 49.
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Repairs to the fort would strengthen both the community’s defenses and the WIC’s 
physical presence on the land. The Company then had access to Rensselaerswyck’s 
quarries, woodlands and livestock to assist in the repairs. The WIC made the community 
responsible for the finances of the repairs by instituting a tax on homeowners, renters and 
landowners.7
Regulations on Morals and Movements
Part of the WIC asserting control of the lands and the people on it included laws 
and ordinances regulating movements of individuals and their access to particular places 
and spaces. Furthermore, it is important to note that even after the establishment of the 
court at Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652, laws that came from the Council in 
Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony unless specifically designed for 
particular communities. However, because of Fort Orange’s distance from New 
Amsterdam and the presence of an independent court, all laws were not enforced the 
same way in Fort Orange as they may have been in New Amsterdam.
With Stuyvesant’s arrival in 1647, he worked very hard to centralize the WIC’s 
authority over the people o f New Netherland. In doing so, Stuyvesant and the Council 
established laws and ordinances that regulated business and trade, which of course was 
the central activity of the colony. However, they also issued laws and ordinances 
regulating social morality, religious observances, as well as the physical movements of, 
both Europeans and Indians.
According to Petrus Stuyvesant’s Dutch Reformed perspective, social morality 
and religious observance were intricately intertwined. As was illustrated in chapter two
7 Ibid., 96.
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how well a community adhered to the prescribed social morality and/or the religious 
observances was seen as directly related to events, either good or bad, that took place in 
the colony. Therefore, one of the first ordinances issued by Stuyvesant upon his arrival
n
in the colony was one against “tapping and brawling during divine service.”
He opened the ordinance by preaching against the colonists’ general habit to 
“indulge in excessive drinking, quarreling, fighting and brawling even on the Lord’s day 
of rest... to the disparagement, indeed contempt of God’s divine laws and ordinances, 
which command us to sanctify this His Sabbath and day o f rest.”9 While indulging in 
excessive drinking and fighting was bad enough, the issue was that these events were 
occurring contrary to God’s own laws and ordinances concerning the Sabbath, and 
thereby brought a greater chance of incurring God’s wrath. In order “to prevent the curse 
instead of the blessing o f God from falling” on the colony, the ordinance forbade the 
tapping and serving of alcohol of any kind before two o’clock on Sundays with no 
sermon and four o ’clock on Sundays that included a sermon on the word of God. 
Furthermore, all tapping and serving was to cease every day of the week at the ringing of 
the bell, which took place around nine o’clock at night.10 It was hoped that controlling 
alcohol consumption would lead to an increase in the community’s morals, which of 
course would lead to God’s blessing and prosperity, instead of God’s curse and suffering. 
The fact that the Council at Fort Amsterdam renewed these ordinances at least two more
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times, in 1656 and 1657, illustrated that not everyone in the colony was necessarily 
concerned about such divine consequences.
In fact, it was not even a year later when Stuyvesant and the Council promulgated 
another ordinance concerning Sabbath observation. Again, it stated that, “in order to 
avert, as much as possible, from themselves and their subjects, God’s wrath and 
punishment, which is to be feared from these and other misdeeds, do hereby renew and 
amplify their previous proclamations and ordinances.”11 As part of the renewal and 
amplification, the ordinance called for, but did not explicitly require, attendance at both 
morning and afternoon prayers on Sundays. The restrictions on alcohol remained and 
other restrictions were added on such activities as “fishing, hunting and other avocations, 
crafts and trades, whether it be in houses, cellars, shops, ships, yachts or on the streets 
and in markets.”12 It appears that people made some interesting excuses as to why they 
failed to observe the Sabbath to Stuyvesant’s standards.
Problems arising from Sabbath day drunkards were not restricted to the southern 
reaches of the Hudson River. The ordinance was binding for the entire colony, and Fort 
Orange had its share o f problems. In January 1653, Pieter Adriaensen was brought into 
the Fort Orange Court for having tapped after the nine o’clock bell. And while this 
incident did not lead to violence in the way the ordinance related the two, Adriaensen was 
further cited for using abusive language when he was fined. Such was another sign of 
moral decline related to breaking alcohol regulations.13
“ Ibid., 18.
12 Ibid.
13 Gehring, FOCM, 39. See Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America. In 
chapter one he discusses the pervasiveness o f  alcohol in the early modem period, including colonial North 
America. Although he concentrates on the eighteenth century, he also displayed a seventeenth century map
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Violence and alcohol continued to be a problem in Fort Orange. In February of 
1654 an inquiry was begun regarding the actions of Jacob Jansen Stoll from the previous 
summer. Stoll had apparently approached the town guards when “drunk, intoxicated, or 
at least quite befuddled,” he drew his sword and threatened the members of the guard, 
especially Adriaen Jansen van Ilpendam, who was singled out. On another drunken or 
befuddled occasion, Stoll also apparently approached the guardhouse with a loaded gun, 
which he discharged.14
Religion in New Netherland
The presence o f the officially sanctioned Dutch Reformed Church and other 
religions in the daily life of New Netherland, including Fort Orange, was not limited to 
ordinances enforcing Christian morality. Four years prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in 1647, 
Father Isaac Jogues spent time in New Netherland after having escaped his Mohawk 
captors. He wrote down his experiences in the colony in 1646 while awaiting to depart 
for a winter mission among the Hurons. He also wrote a description of his captivity and 
escape soon after his safe delivery in 1643.
Jogues’ original account of his time in Fort Orange gives very little information 
on the settlement. He noted that prior to his escape he met with the Dutch Governor in 
the colony who instructed the crew of a ship to carry the missionary to Europe once he 
made his escape from the Mohawks. Jogues went on to tell that once he made his escape
from Maryland that depicts the town tavern next to the courthouse. See also William J. Rorabaugh, The 
Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Mark Lender 
and James K. Martin, Drinking in America: A H istory (New York: Collier Macmillian, 1987).
14 Gehring, FOCM, 88-96. Stoll was also involved in altercations when apparently sober. He fought with 
Lourens Jansz at the house o f  Hendrick Jochems. In February 1656 he was brought to court and confessed 
to beating and drawing blood from his wife Geertryt Andriessen, although, in this case, because it occurred 
in a domestic and not a public situation, the court found it could not punish Stoll.
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he spent two days concealed in the hold of the ship. After those two days he traveled by 
night to the Governor’s home where he continued to hide from his Mohawk captors who 
continued to look for him. With his limited movements in town, and in addition to the 
fact that his movements actually took place at night, it is interesting that he was able to 
give a description of the town at all.
However, the description he gave seems to reflect his overall experience in the 
community. Jogues found two features in the community of Rensselaerswyck worth 
noting. “First is a wretched little fort, named Fort Orange which the Company of the 
West Indies has reserved for itself, and which it maintains.”15 In 1643, at least in the case 
of Jogues, the appearance of forts on maps was much more impressive than the 
appearance of the forts on the land. The second feature Jogues found worth mentioning 
consisted of the homes themselves. He described, “24 or 30 houses built along the River, 
as each has found convenient.”16 He pointed out that the houses lacked masonry, except 
the chimneys, and were made of no more than boards and thatch. His impressions of the 
town do seem to reflect his limited and less than pleasant stay in the settlement. He also 
seems to confirm the disorganized situation that Slichtenhorst would try to change in 
1648, when he would try to bring order to the patroonship and develop a concentrated 
settlement. Another part o f Jogues’ account noted that while “there is no exercise of 
Religion except the Calvinist and orders declare that none but Calvinists be admitted;
15 Gehring, et al., In Mohawk Country, 31.
16 Ibid., 32.
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nevertheless, that point is not observed, for besides the Calvinists, there are in this
• • 17settlement Catholics, English Puritans, Lutherans, Anabaptists, etc.”
This was the same diverse population that Father Joseph Poncet found during his 
own stay in Fort Orange as a captive of the Mohawks in 1653. Poncet’s experience 
greatly differed from Jogues’ because Poncet was actually being escorted back to Three 
Rivers when he arrived in Fort Orange. Elis Mohawk escort took him there so he could 
get clothing for his return trip to New France. Because his situation was not that of an 
escaped captive, but of a man who had actually been adopted by the Mohawks and was 
being returned to a French settlement, he had much more freedom of movement in the 
town than Jogues had.
While Poncet did not receive much hospitality from Dijckman, he did receive 
much kindness from a variety of other residents. Dijckman, as the official representative 
of the WIC court in Fort Orange may have been threatened by Poncet's presence because 
he was both French and Catholic and taking away resources from the Dutch colony. He 
was treated so poorly by the Dutch representative that Poncet’s Mohawk escort removed 
him from Dijckman’s home to another where the French priest received much better 
treatment. Poncet also encountered a young Frenchman who served as an Indian 
interpreter in the colony. The young man sought Poncet out to hear his confession. 
Poncet also received welcome from a Scots woman “who has shown herself on all 
occasions very charitable toward the French,” and a “Brussels Merchant, a good 
Catholic.”18 The Dutch Reformed WIC officials in New Netherland frowned upon what
17 Ibid., 31.
18 Ibid., 99-100: Ecclesiastical Records 1:315.
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they saw as Catholic behavior. For example, Abraham Stevensen was fined by the court 
for having walked the streets of Beverwyck on Shrove Tuesday, the day before the 
beginning of Lent, in women’s clothes. He escaped harsher punishment because it was 
the first time he did it and he did not believe he was doing anything wrong.19 The 
practice was a holdover of pre-Lenten revelry in Europe and seen as yet another 
challenge to the Dutch Reformed authority o f the town.
Except for the occasional pre-Lenten celebration, the Catholic presence in Fort 
Orange tended to remain fairly quiet and out o f conflict with the Calvinist WIC officials. 
Lutherans, however, were a source of much more contention in the town, and the colony 
as a whole. Until 1653, there was very little discussion of Lutherans in the colony. Their 
presence was known, but like the Catholics, they generally kept their religious matters to 
themselves. This way they were able to blend into and contribute to the evolving cross- 
cultural landscape of Fort Orange. The Lutherans’ standing in the community was 
challenged in the years after Stuyvesant’s arrival.
In October 1653, Lutherans in New Netherland presented Stuyvesant with a
request to allow them to send for a Lutheran minister and “to organize separately and
0 (\publicly a congregation and church.” At this time the Lutheran community claimed 150 
families in the colony and wanted the church to flourish in New Netherland as they said it 
did in the Netherlands. The m iters of the petition also pledged their loyalty to the
19 Gehring, FOCM, 101; Merwick, Possessing Albany, 74. See Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Reason o f  
Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth-Century France,” Past and Present 50, no. February 
(1971): 41-75. Davis discusses the accepted practice o f  otherwise deviant behavior on certain occasions 
usually surrounding Catholic rituals and holidays.
20 Corwin, E cclesiastical Records 1:317.
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WIC.21 The Dutch Reformed ministers Drisius and Megapolensis saw the haughty 
behavior of the Lutherans as leading to “the injury of our church, the diminution of 
hearers of the Word of God, and the increase of dissension, of which we have had 
sufficiency for years past. It would also pave the way for other sects, so that in time our 
place would become a receptacle for all sorts of heretics and fanatics.”22 The colony was 
already home for other sects, whether heretical or not. It was truly the idea of a public 
congregation that was much more scandalous in the eyes of the ministers and Stuyvesant, 
than merely the idea of a separate congregation that already existed. In other words, this 
was yet another battle of who would control the development of the cultural identity of 
the colony. In this instance, although the Lutherans were Dutch, they still remained 
outside WIC norms to the extent that Stuyvesant tried to exclude them from the public 
life of the community.
When the Dutch Lutherans finally succeeded in bringing a minister to New 
Netherland, one Johannes Emestus Goetwasser in 1657, he arrived without a certificate 
of approval from the WIC Directors and was therefore denied permission to preach. At 
this point the matter was a highly public religious conflict that Domine Drisius, Domine 
Megapolensis and Stuyvesant wanted to avoid. Even if Goetwasser preached in a private 
setting, it was not going to be tolerated. Therefore, the Lutherans in New Amsterdam 
spirited him out of Manhattan to a settlement “six or eight miles away, under the 
jurisdiction o f the English.”23 Truly this was seen as a double offence to not only run
21 Arnold J. H. Van Laer, trans, The Lutheran Church in New York, 1649-1772: Records in the Lutheran 
Church Archives in Amsterdam, Holland, New York: N ew  York Public Library, 1946, 14.
22 Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records 1:317.
23 Ibid., 343-344; and Van Laer, Records o f  the Lutheran Church, 32.
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from the authority of the WIC, but to run to the protection of the English who were a 
threat in and of themselves. Goetwasser finally departed the colony in 1659 and through 
this time period the Lutheran Consistory of Amsterdam continued to advocate “that if the 
friends would keep quiet and be moderate, the exercise of their religion would no doubt 
by connivance be allowed.”24 Although the Consistory continued to point out that it was 
the same quietness and moderation that allowed them to continue to practice their 
religion in the Netherlands, the New Netherland Lutherans would have none of it.
Fort Orange apparently had a larger Lutheran population than New Amsterdam, 
but the majority of the drama occurred in the area around Manhattan. Fort Orange’s legal 
actions proceeded much differently. On February 1, 1656 Tierck Claesen was brought 
before the court for fighting with Willem Teller on a Sunday, a definite violation of the 
ordinance against brawling on Sundays. Teller had been brought in the week earlier for 
the same offence. Yet, after Claesen was fined for fighting on the Sabbath, he was 
charged with, confessed to and was fined for, “having been found last Sunday in the 
company of Lutherans performing divine service, contrary to the ordinance issued against 
it.”25 In connection with this same unlawful assembly of Lutherans, Aelbert Andriesssen, 
also known as Aelbert de Noorman, was fined for attending the same separate Lutheran 
service that Tierck Claesen was fined for attending.
Although there were supposedly seventy to eighty Lutheran families living in Fort 
Orange Claesen and Andriessen were the only two who were brought in front of the court
24 Van Laer, Records o f  the Lutheran Church, 36
25 Gehring, FOCM, 214 ,216 .
26 Ibid., 220.
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for partaking in illegal Lutheran liturgies. Furthermore, it seems that the only reason 
either man was fined was because he was brought into court for other violations, Claesen 
for fighting and Andriessen for a real estate case. It did not appear to be worth the effort 
of bringing the other Lutherans into court. From this limited action against the Fort 
Orange Lutherans, it appears that distance from the more vehemently anti-Lutheran 
voices in Manhattan helped prevent the drama and dissension that Manhattan experienced 
over this issue. Fort Orange continued to develop separately from New Amsterdam. 
Whereas the latter worked to suppress Lutherans from participating in the community’s 
growth, the former maintained few barriers to Lutherans in the community.
Even the Dutch Reformed ministers were known to rock the boat and challenge 
the authority of the WIC. The Dutch Reformed Minister Gideon Schaets was appointed 
minister for the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck in May of 1652. At this same time 
Johan van Rensselaer issued instruction for the Patroonship concerning religious 
activities. They generally fell in line with those of the WIC, calling for attendance of 
divine services and preventing labor on the Sabbath. He was also particularly concerned 
with preventing scandal when “Christians should mingle themselves unlawfully with the 
wives and daughters o f Heathens” and established an ordinance against such unseemly 
behavior. Furthermore, van Rensselaer wanted his minister Schaets to “use all Christian
97zeal there to bring up both Heathen and their children in the Christian Religion.” 
However, there is no evidence illustrating Schaets’ Christian zeal with Indians or against 
Dutch who mingled unlawfully with Indian women.
27 Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records 1: 309-310.
142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Schaets did however insert himself into the controversy between Dijckman and 
Slichtenhorst, at least after the arrest of Slichtenhorst in 1652. This intervention served 
as yet another example of the tension between the different settlements in New 
Netherland. On January 25, 1654 Domine Gideon Schaets announced from the pulpit to 
his Rensselaerswyck congregation that if anyone had any charges to bring against Brant 
van Slichtenhorst before he was returned to the Netherlands, he or she should come 
forward to the court of Rensselaerswyck or forever keep his or her silence.28
No one actually came forward to the court of Rensselaerswyck, much to the relief 
of the van Rensselaers. However, the action created such a stir with Joannes Dijckman 
that he called an extraordinary session of the Fort Orange court on that same day, which 
was, in fact a Sunday. He apparently believed Schaet’s affront was serious enough to call 
court on the Sabbath. Furthermore, the court actually convened in the church itself in 
order to draw up a protest against Domine Schaets’ announcements. Although Schaets 
viewed this announcement as an inner matter of the Patroonship, as both he and 
Slichtenhorst were in the employ of the van Rensselaers, Dijckman saw this as an 
example of usurpation o f WIC authority to say who could bring a complaint against 
Slichtenhorst and placing a time limit on such actions. Not only did Schaets challenge 
WIC authority, but according to Dijckman, “such means also tend to make the good 
inhabitants disobedient and rebellious to their lawful superiors.”29 Dijckman used this 
event to build up the authority o f the Fort Orange court, while further reducing the
28 Gehring, F O C M ,84; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 19.
29 Gehring, FOCM, 86.
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30authority of Rensselaerswyck. The tensions between Schaets and the WIC officials in
Fort Orange were short-lived however. In 1657, Schaets became the minister for Fort
1 1
Orange, leaving the patroonship without a spiritual leader. This event is yet another 
example of the fractured nature o f the Dutch settlements in North America. It also serves 
as an example of how Fort Orange continued to develop its own significance as a center 
of power within New Netherland.
Indians Inside Towns
Along with trying to control how other Europeans moved through and lived in 
towns, Dutch authorities also worked to try to control how Europeans and Indians dealt 
with one another, and to control Indian access to towns. While the ultimate goal in 
regulating the relations between Indians and Europeans was to control the Indian 
populations, it was often the Europeans who faced the consequences of breaking those 
regulations, thereby further illustrating the relative power and freedom of Indians within 
the Dutch communities. As discussed in chapter two, the alcohol trade with Indians 
proved particularly difficult to keep track of outside of towns. It was no less of a problem 
within towns. Excessive alcohol consumption among Europeans was feared as a moral 
problem. Drunkenness led to unacceptable behavior, which, according to Stuyvesant and 
the Council, led to God’s wrath and punishment for the offenders. Alcohol consumption 
among Indians was viewed as dangerous, but instead o f being the cause of God’s wrath it
30 Gehring,FOCM , 106-107.
31 While letters between members o f  the van Rensselaer family indicate their commitment to upholding the 
Dutch Reformed Church in their Patroonship, they also illustrate that the matriarch o f  the family was not 
heartbroken with Schaets moving from their jurisdiction to that o f  Fort Orange. She was actually quite 
pleased at the money the Patroonship would save with his absence.
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could instead be viewed as an instrument of it. Therefore, curtailing the alcohol trade 
with Indians was of vital importance to the safety of the colony.
Prohibitions on the sale o f alcohol to Indians were issued as early as 1643 then 
again in 1645. Stuyvesant reissued an ordinance against the selling o f alcohol to Indians 
in July 1647. The wording of the 1647 ordinance illustrated that this regulation was not 
one of morality, but one o f safety. It noted that alcohol was sold daily to Indians, thereby 
causing “serious difficulties” within the colony. Furthermore, those found guilty of 
selling alcohol to Indians would be fined and were “to be responsible for the calamities 
that might arise therefrom.” However, Stuyvesant was forced, less than a year later, to 
reissue the ordinance with the additional deterrent of “arbitrary corporal punishment, 
because it is better that such ill-willed people be punished than that a whole country and 
community should suffer through their deeds.” He also warned that from the alcohol 
trade, “new misfortunes and wars are to be feared.”
By 1654 the problem persisted to the point that the WIC took new steps. In order 
to catch the individuals selling alcohol to the Indians, officers o f the court would arrest 
intoxicated Indians and keep them confined until, in a sober state, they could inform 
authorities of their supplier’s identity. The ordinance stated further that “such 
confessions and declarations of theirs shall... be accepted and believed on that point, and 
the violators here of shall, on the declaration of the Indians, be punished according to the 
ordinance.” Of course, in order to prevent a supposedly respected member o f the 
community from being punished in case he or she was named, the ordinance also made it
32 Gehring, Laws & Writs o f  Appeal, 3, 9.
33 Ibid., 18-19.
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clear that the accusations would be accepted, “according to the circumstances of the case 
and the person.”34 Nevertheless, Indian voices were given significant legal weight in this 
instance in matters involving Europeans as their words would be taken as a sworn legal 
statement. However, at the same time, their movements were greatly curtailed, given that 
they could be arrested for being drunk, although it was not illegal for Indians to consume 
alcohol. Moreover, New Netherland officials actually did not have much ability to stop 
Indians from drinking. The illicit alcohol trade outside of town walls was difficult to 
stop, especially when there were so many buyers and sellers willing to make deals.
Fort Orange did have its own problems with Indians and alcohol, and as noted 
earlier, all ordinances passed in Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony. 
However, Fort Orange did not appear to go so far as to try to arrest intoxicated Indians in 
order to learn the identity o f European alcohol peddlers. The Fort Orange community 
was dependent on the trade of Indians who would come into town, and the act of 
arresting a visiting Mohawk, no matter how intoxicated, would have had repercussions 
with Dutch and Indian relations that outweighed the urgency of apprehending alcohol 
peddlers. The first time the Fort Orange court dealt with the matter o f intoxicated Indians 
inside the town was in May 1654. This court hearing also happened to coincide with a 
visit to the community from Director-General Stuyvesant. The evening before 
Stuyvesant was scheduled to arrive, a group o f intoxicated Indians was in the home of Jan 
van Hoesem after obtaining beer from the house of Willem Bout.35
34 Ibid., 48.
35 Gehring, FOCM, 122-123.
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A month after the court action concerning van Hoesem and Bout, which 
apparently brought with it no legal action, Jochem Becker was brought before the court to 
testify against Elmerheysen Kleyn and Gerritt van Slichtenhorst concerning the latter two 
selling brandy to Indians in their house. Becker testified that not only did he see 
intoxicated Indians emerge from the house, but that he witnessed Kleyn and Slichtenhorst 
giving “a sound thrashing” to a Mahican named Pimp, who had been drinking brandy 
sold by the two Dutchmen. Like with Bout and van Hoesem, there was no record of 
action taken against Kleyn and Slichtenhorst, but one cannot help but wonder if 
Commissary Dijckman’s actions were personal and an extension o f allowing Gerritt van
•5 7
Slichtenhorst to be beaten by WIC solders on New Years Day 1652.
The next court action against anyone for selling alcohol to Indians in Fort Orange 
came over two years later in October 1656. Again, this legal action coincided with a visit 
by Director-General Stuyvesant, who was present at the session, and had the memories of 
the Peach War from the preceding year still with him. In this court proceeding Willem 
Hofmeyer was caught selling alcohol to Indians and admitting intoxicated Indians into his 
residence. In this case as in the two noted above, although the court was trying to restrict 
the presence o f intoxicated Indians in town, it was not the Indians who were prosecuted, 
but the Europeans who provided them with alcohol or with shelter. Furthermore, in the 
first 1654 case, the violation occurred the day before a visit from Stuyvesant, but he was 
not present for the interrogation. The fact that there appeared to be no punishment for the 
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Orange magistrates. However, when Stuyvesant was present at the court hearing, the 
transgressor was not only found guilty, and charged a fine, but was declared banished
•5 0
from the country for three years.
On the same day Hofmeyer was brought into court, Dirckie Hermense and 
Egbertjen Egberts, female innkeepers in Beverwyck, both admitted to selling Indians beer 
in their establishments. In both instances the women avoided banishment and corporal 
punishment. Each was fined, less than Hofmeyer was, and placed under civil detention. 
The women were established members of the Beverwyck community and may have 
received less punishment than Hofmeyer for that reason. Furthermore, Hofmeyer had 
been in front o f the court before for selling alcohol out of his boat, making him a more 
significant threat, especially since he, unlike the tavern keepers, traveled outside of the 
borders of the towns, and therefore, outside o f WIC authority.
Throughout the rest of the 1650s, Dutch authorities in Fort Orange continued to 
bring legal action against Europeans for violating laws concerning the prohibition of 
alcohol for Indians, but with limited zeal. The lack of enthusiasm in prosecuting alcohol 
peddlers continued to illustrate the separation between the WIC settlements of Fort 
Orange and New Amsterdam. The laws and ordinances came from the High Council in 
New Amsterdam, who were motivated to prevent another attack such as the Peach War 
and believed that halting the flow of alcohol to the Indians was one way of doing that. 
However, authorities in Fort Orange, who had not experienced such Indian troubles, were 
less concerned with stopping a lucrative trade.
38 Gehring, FOCM, 253.
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In January 1658, Jan Teunissen, Jan Anderiessen and Pieter Jacobsen Bosboom 
were all charged at Fort Orange with selling alcohol to Indians; all denied the charges and
39demanded proof against them. Proof was provided four days later and presented in an
extraordinary session of court. The proof came in the form of “three irreproachable” but 
unnamed witnesses. Three days later the three men were found guilty, ordered to pay a 
fine and declared banished for three years.40 Furthermore, in the 1658 cases, there was 
the inclusion of Indian testimony against a Dutchman, although there was no indication 
that this Indian was ever arrested and held for his testimony. It was a 1654 ordinance, 
mentioned earlier, that allowed the use of Indian testimony against sellers of alcohol, but 
this was the first time it occurred in Fort Orange. In the case against Gijsbert van 
Loenen, an unnamed Mohawk Indian “declared in the presence of three credible 
witnesses” that he had bought brandy from the defendant, “which declaration, according 
to the ordinance, must be accepted as complete evidence.”41
Although there was no indication that alcohol played any part in initiating the 
Peach War, the war itself served as a significant turning point in the issue of Indians in 
towns. Prior to the Peach War, the most significant regulation on Indians in towns 
revolved around the issue of alcohol, as discussed above. Even that regulation was of 
greater concern outside of the main settlements where the Dutch had significantly less 
control over any population, Indian or European. In fact, prior to 1655 in Fort Orange,
39 At this point, there was more concern and accusation about intoxicated Indians in the Esopus region.
With greater fear o f  tragedy occurring as a result, more interest was taken as to the source o f  alcohol for 
Indians. O f course, later in 1658, Jacob Jansen Stoll and his companions would attack a group o f  
intoxicated Esopus Indians, thereby sparking the first Esopus War.
40 Gehring, FOCM, 345-348, 349-351.
41 Ibid., 347-348.
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the only discussion surrounding Indians in towns actually stressed the idea o f freedom of 
movement for trade purposes. Fort Orange’s goals continued to develop separately from 
that of the rest of New Netherland, and they would not enforce laws that would be 
detrimental to their fur trade enterprise. Moreover, it was this freedom of movement for 
trade purposes that would allow the Mohawks to eventually move into the Dutch legal 
system and begin to utilize the Dutch, and then English, court systems for their own 
diplomatic purposes.
Only three months prior to the Peach War, the Council in New Amsterdam sent 
directions to officials in Fort Orange for the opening of that year’s trading season. The 
Council was very supportive of restricting settlers’ movements in the woods or outside of 
town, even o f not allowing Dutch traders to stand on the hill and call to the approaching 
Indians. Authorities seemed to believe that as long as activities occurred in the town, 
then they had a certain amount of control over events. However, once activities passed 
beyond that border, almost all control was lost. So while the Council agreed to restrict 
the Dutch movements out of town, Indians were actually able to “go freely where they 
want.”42 Accommodating trading Indians and keeping them happy took precedence over 
issues such as concern for safety.
After the Peach War, instead of permitting Indians to go freely where they 
wished, Stuyvesant recommended that Indians be forbidden entirely from the island of 
Manhattan, but in particular, “the city and especially the fort and all inhabitants must be 
interdicted to give them lodging and, by penalty o f the gallows, to sell or give them 
brandy, but that a trading place should be appointed for them, the Indians outside or in
42 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 58.
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the outskirts of the city, where it may be considered more suitable.”43 While Stuyvesant 
would back off from banishing Indians from the entire island and from demanding the 
gallows for those who sold Indians brandy, it was with the Peach War that he became 
much more concerned about the construction of homes. At that point he then ordered that 
houses not be covered with straw or reed in order to prevent the easy burning by nature or 
an Indian torch.44 Again, he shifted responsibility for control o f Indians in towns to the 
European settlers, not the Indians.
After he retreated from his call for the gallows for those who sold alcohol to 
Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council established their new regulations on Indian relations 
in tow n.' They deemed it “advisable and necessary, that no Indians shall be allowed to 
come to any bouwery or plantation, except three or four sachems without arms and that 
nobody shall give them lodgings for the night, nor carry on any trade, neither directly nor 
indirectly, with them except upon certain specified places.”45
These restrictions were greeted with varying degrees o f enthusiasm throughout 
New Netherland. Residents of New Amsterdam supported a stricter enforcement of laws 
prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to a designated place or unless they 
were chiefs.46 After the “suffering by murder and mayhem” the residents of New 
Amsterdam were willing to suffer, “a loss of ordinary freedom,” if  “our nation shall live 
in more security; provided always good watch be kept, especially on Sunday during
43 Femow, DRCHNY  13:54.
44 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 186.
45 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 59.
46 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 256.
151
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
divine service.”47 It appears that New Amsterdam residents did agree with Stuyvesant 
that “general sins are the cause of general punishments” and that not following the laws 
led to God’s wrath in the form of the Peach War. Immediately after the new restrictions 
were agreed to Sander Toursen and his wife were banished from the colony to return to 
Europe for selling alcohol to some Indians.48
The new restrictions were not greeted with uniform enthusiasm. At Fort Orange, 
which was not immediately affected by the “murder and mayhem” of the Peach War, 
colonists did not appear to be willing to suffer a loss o f ordinary freedoms as their New 
Amsterdam counterparts vowed. Officials at Fort Orange continued to accommodate 
Indians and tolerate otherwise questionable behavior to maintain their trade. This 
accommodation in trade would then lead to greater Indian influence in other areas of Fort 
Orange life, particularly the court.
Indians’ Use of the Fort and Court 
The first real example of Indians having access to the Dutch court in Fort Orange 
was in an extraordinary session held on December 24, 1653, a year after the court was 
established as a separate jurisdiction. After disposing of a financial dispute, the court 
turned to a Mohawk proposition requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with 
French Canada. Although this appears to be the Mohawks’ first actual foray into Fort 
Orange’s judicial process, the propositions were made by one Stig Stiggery, “and others 
in the name and on the part of the Maquas.”49 The Mohawks’ propositions did not call
47 Ibid., 256.
48 Ibid.
49 Gehring, FOCM, 77.
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for any new negotiations concerning themselves or any other party. The Mohawks and 
the French had previously concluded a peace between themselves so no new negotiations 
were necessary. What the Mohawks were requesting was Dutch acknowledgment of this 
peace and, in so doing, Dutch expression of support of the Mohawks’ position with the 
French. The Mohawks proposed that the Fort Orange court write to the French governor 
declaring Dutch approval of the peace between the French and Mohawks. The Mohawks 
also requested that the Dutch court at Fort Orange write to the French governor asking 
that the French remain neutral in any future hostilities between the Mohawks and “the 
French Indians.”
Joannes Dijckman and the court wrote letters to both the French governor Jean de 
Lausen and Pierre Boucher, commander of the fort at Three Rivers. The letters stated 
what the Mohawks requested even if the language did not emphasize Dutch support of 
the Mohawks. Dijckman referred to the Mohawks as “cruel savages” while still 
connecting the Dutch to the French under the banner of Christianity. However, in taking 
on the role o f intermediary on behalf of the Mohawks, the court o f Fort Orange set the 
precedent of being the Dutch authority in dealings with the Mohawks. The Fort Orange 
court heard the Mohawks’ propositions and acted on them without the consent of 
Stuyvesant in Fort Amsterdam. In fact, Dijckman told both the Mohawks’ representative 
and the French governor that he would inform the Director General o f these proceedings 
after they were concluded. This was truly a new form of interaction taking place within 
Fort Orange. By the Mohawks asking the Dutch to intervene on their behalf with the 
French, the Mohawks introduced a new diplomatic dimension in their dealings with 
Europeans, even though they were speaking through a mediator.
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The next time Indians appeared in the Fort Orange court records they were not so 
much participants as the subject of discussion. On July 17, 1654 the commissaries of the 
court called an extraordinary session to discuss what the court perceived as the necessary 
disbursement o f gifts to the Mohawks. While the Mohawks were not actually present 
during these proceedings, the court declared that in order to maintain the Mohawks’ 
friendship, to compensate for the high price of scarce Dutch goods and to prevent the 
Mohawks from killing Dutch cattle, it was necessary to make a gift to the Mohawks. As 
a result, eleven of “the most favorable disposed citizens” donated a total of four kettles, 
eleven axes, nine pounds of powder and forty-four fathoms o f sewant, or wampum, to 
present to the Mohawks.50
A month later, on August 11, 1654, a group of Mohawks and “Sinneken” made a 
present to the court.51 In return the members of the court thought it proper and prudent to 
give the Indians twenty-five pounds of powder, among other things, from the WIC’s 
powder supply. Again, while the Mohawks and other Iroquois did not have full access to 
the Dutch court at Fort Orange, they were gaining access and a certain amount of 
acceptance in the Dutch legal process. Moreover, the Mohawks, in particular, would 
continue to cultivate and expand this access to serve their owns ends and work to their 
advantage. And by focusing their efforts in the judicial system in Fort Orange, the 
Mohawks truly began to establish Fort Orange as the center o f European/Indian relations.
According to Fort Orange court minutes, Indians did not appear in the court 
during or immediately following the Peach War of 1655. It was not until June 16,1657
50 Ibid., 146-147.
51 In this instance, it appears that the term “Sinneken” does not apply to the Seneca tribe but to one o f the 
other non-Mohawk members o f  the Iroquois.
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that Indians, and again it was the Mohawks, were present in the court at Fort Orange. At 
this time the sachems of the three Mohawk villages sent a chief named Sasiadego to vice­
director La Montagne to request a meeting. The latter convened the court, where three 
Mohawk sachems representing the three villages came to make some propositions to the 
Dutch. Now the Mohawks were not speaking through a third party, but were directly 
representing themselves within the judicial system of Fort Orange.
At this meeting, the Mohawks were asking for more direct intervention and 
assistance from the Dutch in possible hostilities between themselves and the “Sinnekens”, 
in this case the western tribe of the Five Nations, the Senecas, with whom they were at 
war. The Mohawks were becoming more adept at their use of the Dutch court at Fort 
Orange. They sent a messenger ahead to request a meeting prior to the sachems’ arrival 
in the court. Their influence within the community o f Fort Orange was reflected in the 
fact that this request was honored immediately, and the meeting was arranged. In this 
meeting they asked directly for aid from the Dutch in the form o f horses to haul logs to 
repair the Mohawks’ fortresses, and a cannon for each village to be used as a warning 
signal between the villages. They also requested that the Dutch “should protect their 
wives and children here in the village in case they should be involved in a war with the 
Sinnekes.” This appears to be the first instance of the Mohawks doing two things in the 
Dutch court. First, they were requesting protection for Mohawk women and children in 
Fort Orange, and second they were setting themselves up against another member of the 
Five Nations. However, while both instances represented a first, neither would be the 
last.
52 Gehring, FOCM, 304.
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Unfortunately, no record seems to have survived describing the Dutch response to 
these requests, although it would be safe to assume that the Mohawks did not receive any 
cannons. But in the period after the Peach War, the Mohawks were working diligently to 
increase their power among both Indians and Europeans in the Hudson and Mohawk 
Valleys, and they were beginning to adeptly utilize the Dutch judicial system at Fort 
Orange to achieve those ends.
The Mohawks did not return to the Fort Orange court in an official or proactive 
capacity for over a year. On August 13, 1658 the Fort Orange court held an extraordinary 
session for the arrival of fifteen Mohawk sachems.53 This meeting between the Mohawk 
sachems and the court was similar to the first in 1653 in the respect that the Mohawks 
were requesting Dutch assistance in their dealings with the French. However, instead of 
having the Dutch show support of a peace between the French and Mohawks, the 
Mohawks now requested that the Dutch help in a prisoner exchange between the French 
and Mohawks by sending a resident of Fort Orange who could speak French with the 
Mohawks to Montreal. The Mohawks were told that there might not be any Dutchman in 
the region willing to take such a journey. The Mohawks’ response was to remind the 
Dutch that since the Mohawks had traveled to Fort Amsterdam to help end the Peach 
War, it was now New Netherland’s responsibility to help the Mohawks bring peace to 
their nation.
Here we see how the Mohawks were able to create the shift from Fort Amsterdam 
as the center o f Indian and Dutch relations during the Peach War to using Fort Orange for 
such purposes. The Indian tribes around Manhattan no longer serving a threat, New
53 Ibid., 400-402; Femow, DRCHNY  13: 88.
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Amsterdam was no longer a site for Indian and Dutch negotiation, beyond the occasional 
renewal of the peace made after the Peach War. Furthermore, since New Amsterdam was 
not dependent on the direct trade with the Indians, they were able to maintain more 
restrictions on Indian access to Manhattan Island. Fort Orange p a resented a very 
different situation. The Mohawks retained their independence and, in fact, the Dutch at 
Fort Orange were dependent on the Mohawks for the fur trade. This allowed the 
Mohawks to have much more influence over the workings of Fort Orange, including the 
judicial system.
Moreover, the Mohawks were utilizing the Dutch courts in order to force the 
Dutch to assist them in an issue that the Dutch had no significant interest in. The 
Mohawks were able to wield enough authority, and had the ability to back up their 
authoritative statements, to get the Dutch to respond to the Mohawks’ request. Since 
their problem was with the French in Montreal, it made much more sense to deal with the 
Dutch in Fort Orange instead of going down river to Fort Amsterdam, where the fighting 
during the Peach War took place. Although the Dutch in and around Fort Orange did not 
necessarily see the Peach War as their problem, the Mohawks recognized the Dutch as a 
single entity, although, the different Dutch communities worked to achieve their own best 
ends, similar to the Mohawks working against the “Sinnekens.” The Mohawks also 
stated that they promised, “in the future to do their best between us and other Indians.”54 
With this statement, “the court immediately summoned the public crier and had him
54 Gehring, FOCM, 400. Jeremias van Rensselaer, in particular, expressed that the people o f  Fort Orange 
and Rensselaerswyck were not a part o f  this war because they had no relations with the Indians o f  the lower 
Hudson River Valley. Residents o f  the upper reaches o f  the river also gave no aid to those affected by the 
war on Manhattan or Staten Island. Their good relations with the Mohawks allowed the Dutch in Fort 
Orange to consider themselves as being separate from the Indian troubles to their south.
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announce that if anyone cared to undertake such a journey, he would receive one hundred 
guilders for his trouble.”55
It was another full year before the Mohawks once again came to Fort Orange for a 
meeting with the court. On September 6, 1659 some Mohawks arrived at Fort Orange for 
a meeting, and upon their entrance into the town, they were led to the fort. The members 
of the courts of both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were likewise summoned to the 
fort.55 In this meeting the Mohawks came to make very specific demands of the Dutch, 
who, the Mohawks pointed out, called the Mohawks brothers, “but that lasts only as long 
as we have beavers. After that we are no longer thought of.”57 There was a definite shift 
in the way the Mohawks approached the Dutch officials in the Fort Orange court with 
this particular meeting. Prior to this session, the Mohawks had been somewhat pleading 
in their requests of the Dutch. At this point, they became much more demanding of the 
Dutch. It is difficult to ascertain if this shift was due to a change in Mohawks’ attitudes 
or if  it was due to a change in Dutch perceptions and translations. With the inclusion of 
officials from both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck it appears that as the Mohawks’ 
approach to the Dutch had changed, so too did the Dutch approach to the Mohawks.
For example, during the June 1657 meeting between three Mohawk sachems and 
the court at Fort Orange the Mohawks are recorded as saying “as old friends that we [the 
Dutch] should accommodate them with some horses to haul logs out of the woods.”58 
However, in the 1659 meeting that language changed from declaring the Dutch “old
55 Ibid.
56 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 217.
57 Gehring, FOCM, 453.
58 Ibid., 304.
158
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
friends” to accusing the Dutch of abandoning that friendship when the Mohawks no 
longer meet the needs of the Dutch. Also in the 1659 meeting the Mohawks’ request for 
men and horses changed from asking for accommodation as old friends to stating, “Look 
at the French and see what they do for their Indians when they need them. Do the same 
for us and help us repair our castles.”59 The conciliatory tone o f 1657 was abandoned by 
summer o f 1659. With the Mohawks’ active involvement in mediating an end to the 
Dutch hostilities with the Esopus, they were arguing from a new position of power. 
Furthermore, the Mohawks were no longer looking for Dutch assistance in their dealings 
with the French, but were using the French to strengthen their position with the Dutch by 
showing the Dutch what accommodating friends the French were.
In the record of the 1659 meeting the Mohawks also made demands that the 
Dutch smiths repair the Mohawks’ guns regardless of whether or not the Mohawks were 
able to pay for the repairs. The Mohawks also made the argument that guns were 
worthless without powder, so the Dutch should also provide the Mohawks with powder 
as well. Another example that illustrates shifting Dutch perceptions of Mohawks’ 
motives was the record of the Mohawks’ request for men and horses to haul wood to help 
them repair their fortifications, “for they are too lazy to work.”60 It is hard to believe that 
the Mohawks used such an argument to persuade the Dutch to render assistance, but it is 
less of a stretch to see how the Dutch could interpret the Mohawks’ growing demands as 
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served as a sign of the Mohawks’ understanding o f their own position of power among 
the Dutch o f Fort Orange.
With the Mohawks making so many material demands of the Dutch in this 1659 
meeting, the Dutch answered that they continued in their feelings of brotherly union with 
the Mohawks. However, they also informed the Mohawks that any specific answer to 
their demands would have to wait for the arrival of Petrus Stuyvesant. But Stuyvesant 
was not able to come to Fort Orange, and on September 24 seventeen representatives 
from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck traveled to the Mohawks’ easternmost settlement 
called Kaghnuwage to answer their propositions. The actual answers the Dutch gave 
stressed the ideas of brotherhood and friendship between the two peoples, but they also 
emphasized Dutch inability to grant the Mohawks their material demands such as free 
gunsmith services and use of Dutch livestock. They did, however, bring gifts of axes, 
powder and lead for the Mohawks.61
More significant than the gifts the Dutch brought to the Mohawks was the fact 
that the Dutch went to the Mohawks at all in order to conduct official business. The trip 
appears to have been for the purpose of a good will gesture. In a letter written a year 
later, Jeremias van Rensselaer told his brother that the Mohawks asked the Dutchmen to 
come to their country to make their response to previous Mohawk proposals. He wrote 
that they “unanimously resolved to make a little trip, with the help of God, we did.”62 
The Dutch officials, including Jeremias van Rensselaer, informed the Mohawks that they
61 Gehring, FOCM, 456-458; and Femow, DRCHNY  13: 112.
62 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 217.
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came, “only to renew our old friendship and brotherhood.” From the description of 
the proceedings at Kaghnuwage, the Dutch representatives were uncomfortable in their 
surroundings. While they did bring gifts, they also informed the Mohawks that they 
brought no cloth for them, “for we could not get men to carry it.”64 Additionally, the 
Dutch representatives expressed their discomfort in the area outside of their own 
settlement by telling the Mohawks that “we cannot come here every day, as the roads are 
so bad to travel over.” In response to the Mohawks’ request for horses and men to help 
them repair their fortifications, the Dutch declared, “that is not feasible for horses 
because the hills are so high and steep, and the Dutch cannot carry it out as they become 
sick merely from marching to this place, as you may see by looking at our people; how 
then could they in addition carry palisades?”65
While probably not the best way to earn the respect of the Mohawks, the Dutch 
statements clearly pointed out their discomfort in the woods. Therefore, instead of 
offering horses and men, they gave the Mohawks fifteen axes. They also helped solidify 
the use of Fort Orange court as the official setting of meetings and negotiations between 
the Dutch and Mohawks by making it clear that they did not like to go to the Mohawks’ 
villages to conduct business. The Dutch court members would not again venture into the 
woods for a meeting with the Mohawks. The woods were definitely a wilderness or 
foreign landscape for the Dutch representatives. However, at the same time, the 
Mohawks were becoming much more adept at utilizing Fort Orange and its court to their
63 Gehring, FOCM, 456.
64 Gehring, FOCM, 457.
65 Ibid., 458.
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advantage. In this manner, the Mohawks were protecting the inner relations of the Five 
Nations, except when revealing such matters worked to their advantage. They were also 
actively constructing a new diplomatic landscape centered at Fort Orange.
In September 1659 war broke out in the Esopus region. This war was the reason 
for the Mohawks’ next visit to the Fort Orange court, and the court called an 
extraordinary session to hear the Mohawks speak. In this meeting, a mere month after 
the meeting at Kaghnuwage, two Mohawk Sachems spoke for not only the Mohawks, but 
also for the Mahicans and Catskill Indians. They spoke out against the Esopus Indians, 
but said the Dutch should live as brothers with the Mohawks, Mahicans and Catskills.
The Mohawks also expressed impatience and dismay with the Dutch and actually 
reprimanded the Dutch in their own court. The Mohawks deferred to the Dutch on 
whether they should go to war with the Esopus Indians and gave a string o f sewant. 
However, in their next point the record states “ ‘You say you are not at war and that you 
do not wish to go to war against any Indians.’ About which the Indians were very angry 
and [asked] why we said that, [saying], ‘For you and the Manhatans are one. Suppose the 
Esopus Indians came now or in the spring to kill the country people, what would you do 
then? You make no sense.’ ”66 At that point the Mohawks demanded the return of the 
sewant that they gave as negotiation gifts, and dispatched a Mahican sachem to the 
Esopus to attain the release of Dutch prisoners.
With this meeting the Mohawks illustrated several points. First, they had become 
much more emboldened and comfortable with the Dutch in the court at Fort Orange, by
66 Ibid., 463.
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f t  7openly criticizing the position of the Dutch at Fort Orange. Secondly, they exposed the 
general lack of unity of the separate Dutch settlements. The Mohawks believed that since 
the Dutch were o f one nation, they would come to each other’s aide. The idea of mutual 
aide was one that the Mohawks espoused when, in 1657, they requested cannons in order 
to warn the different Mohawk villages in case of an attack. Their request stated, “as all 
three castles belong to the same nation and they are bound to help each other in time of 
need.”68 Fort Orange’s lack of assistance to the Dutch in Esopus truly made no sense to 
the Mohawks, and at the same time it also revealed the fractured nature of the Hudson 
River settlements. The third point illustrated in this meeting was the growing authority of 
the Mohawks over other Indians. The Mohawk sachems spoke for all the Mohawk 
villages as well as the Catskill Indians and the Mahicans.
Although the Mohawks were quite active in mediating an end to the fighting 
between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians, they did not return to the Fort Orange court 
until June 26, 1660. This meeting, however, did not deal with Indian wars or issues with 
the French. The Mohawks approached the court at this time to request that the Dutch 
officials gain greater control over the Dutch traders during the trading season.69 The 
Mohawks requested the members of the court “to forbid the Dutch to molest the Indians 
as heretofore by kicking, beating, and assaulting them, in order that we may not break the 
old friendship, which we have enjoyed for more than thirty years, and if it is not
67 O f course, the Dutch probably did not help their own position by referring to themselves as too weak to 
assist the Mohawks in moving palisades or by their complaint o f  the harshness o f  their travels to the 
Mohawk villages.
68 Gehring FOCM, 304.
69 See in particular Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, chapter 2 where she discusses the importance o f  
the trading season in Fort Orange. She deals with the 1660 trading season specifically in pages 88-99.
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70prevented they will go away and not be seen by us anymore.” In reply, the Dutch court 
officials promised the Mohawks that they would forbid Dutch traders from entering the 
woods to seek out Indians who traveled to Fort Orange to trade their beaver skins.71
The Mohawks’ complaint in court set off a summer of the Dutch authorities 
bringing before the court traders who traveled into the woods or were accused of so 
doing. Moreover, the Mohawks’ course of action was again a first and quite unique. One 
may ask why did not the Mohawks merely retaliate against offending Dutchmen while 
the alleged abuse was occurring? It has been established that the Indians were in firm 
control of activities outside of European settlements, and it would seem hard to believe 
that the Mohawks merely stood helplessly by while Dutchmen “beat them severely with
79fists and drive them out of the woods.” It would be unlikely that the Dutch would be 
able to retrieve and bring to justice an Indian who retaliated against an abusive Dutch 
trader and then retreated into the woods. Yet, the Mohawks also understood that any 
retaliation against the Dutch, no matter how justified, could lead to greater violence in the 
region. However, the Mohawks did make another statement in this meeting before the 
court, “that it might develop into the same trouble as between the Dutch and the Indians
79in the Esopus.” Not a particularly veiled threat, but an effective one.
70 Gehring, FOCM, 503.
71 O f course this activity was already forbidden and eleven days prior to the Mohawks appearance in the 
court, Jan Harmsen, Volkert Jansen, Willem Brouwer, Jan van Aken, Daniel Jansen, Jurriaen Jansen, Jan 
Thomassen, and Jacob Thijsen were all brought before the court to face chargers o f  going themselves or 
sending others into the woods to conduct trade for them. All but Harmsen “purged themselves under oath.” 
Harmsen was fined three hundred guilders and his trading rights were suspended for two months.
72 Gehring, FOCM, 503.
73 Ibid.
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With this meeting, the Mohawks were now able to utilize the Dutch courts in 
order to try to gain greater control over Dutch traders. The residents of Fort Orange 
could ill afford either the loss of Mohawk trade or large scale Mohawk retaliation against 
the Dutch due to a few offending traders. As a result of this single court appearance by 
the Mohawks, all members o f the court advised to forbid the Dutch from going into the 
woods in search of Mohawk traders. On July 15, 1660, an extraordinary session was held 
in Fort Orange to deal with individuals who violated the law by entering the woods.
Poulis Jansen admitted to entering the woods, but claimed he did so to collect blueberries, 
while Cornells Fijnhoudt claimed to be in the woods to look for hogs. Rutger Jacobsen 
was accused of sending his servant into the woods to attract Indians; he denied the 
charge. Philip Pietersen was also accused of sending his servant into the woods to trade 
with the Indians, but he denied to the court that “he sent his servant into the woods for 
such a purpose, but [says that he sent him] only to see what sort o f Dutchmen were in the 
woods and what they did there.”74 All together there were ten men who were either 
accused o f traveling into the woods or sending a servant into the woods to trade with the 
arriving Mohawks.
In response to these denials, creative or otherwise, the court issued the following 
statement. “The honorable director general o f New Netherland and the magistrates, 
having heard and examined the complaints respecting going into the woods and outrages 
resulting there from, have been as yet unable to discover any better expedient than to 
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minutes give no indication if the defendants were in any way punished. Nor is there any 
indication o f any Mohawk traders bringing specific accusations against individual Dutch 
traders. It also is not known if the Mohawks who brought these issues to the attention of 
the court were satisfied with the proceedings against the Dutchmen or if they were even 
present for or aware of them. However, the court’s response did at least show the 
influence the Mohawks had in the court system as the Fort Orange authorities attempted 
to respond to the Dutch actions against the Mohawks. This incident also exposed the 
continued weakness o f WIC authority outside of the walls of the community. Once 
people entered the woods, even if their activities were expressly forbidden, they 
continued to remain outside the control of the WIC. As the Mohawks retained their 
authority outside of the walls of Fort Orange, their authority within the town and the 
court system continued to increase. With this, the importance of Fort Orange, not just as 
an economic center, but as the center of Indian and Dutch legal and diplomatic relations, 
also grew.
While the controversy surrounding Dutch traders in the woods was being played 
out in the countryside and in the court, the next group of Indians to speak in front of the 
court, were the Sinnekens.76 On July 25, 1660 the Sinnekens presented several 
propositions covering their displeasure with their treatment in matters o f trade and 
diplomacy with both the Dutch and other Indian groups. Some o f their propositions 
included pleas to keep the Dutch from beating the Indians, and also keeping the Dutch
76 In this particular meeting it appears that the term Sinnekens does indeed refer to the Senecas, who were at 
this time at war with the Susquehannocks. This war complicated events in N ew Netherland because while 
both the Senecas and Mohawks were members o f  the Five Nations, the Mohawks were actually 
sympathetic with and assisting the Susquehannocks. This war would also have greater consequences in the 
1670s when the Susquehannocks fall under the influence o f  the Mohawks.
166
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
brokers out of the woods, much like the Mohawks’ propositions from a month earlier. 
The Sinnekens opened their statements by reminding the Dutch officials who were 
present, which included Petrus Stuyvesant, that several years earlier they had traveled to 
Manhattan to conduct trade and to establish their own trading house closer to Fort 
Amsterdam, thereby circumventing Fort Orange as the main trading post. This 
proposition was ultimately rejected by the WIC. This move established Fort Orange as 
the center o f the fur trade for New Netherland, thereby requiring Indians who wished to 
participate in trade with the Dutch to travel to Fort Orange as well.77
More significantly in this meeting was the Dutch response to the Sinnekens ’ 
propositions in matters o f diplomacy between the Sinnekens and other Indian groups.
The Sinnekens requested powder and lead for “their difficult war.” Although the 
Sinnekens did not state whom exactly they were at war with, the reference was most 
likely of their war with the Susquehannocks and possibly their war with the French 
Indians.78 They also expressed their pleasure in the end of the Esopus War and requested 
a return of the captured Esopus Indians to their people.79 Finally, they warned that, “The 
French Indians will visit the Mahikanders at the Cahous [Cohoes Falls, north of Fort 
Orange on the Mohawk River], They greatly bewail this. And as you are bound to them
on
with a chain, you ought to be sad also.”
77 Gehring, FOCM, 515-518.
78 See Charles Gehring’s note on pg. 516, FOCM.
79 As a form o f  deterrence for future aggressive acts, Stuyvesant sent eleven Esopus Indian captives to work 
on the Dutch plantations in Curacao. Two o f  the Indians would eventually be returned as a sign o f  good 
will.
80 Gehring, FOCM, 517.
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In answer to these propositions the Dutch responded that since they made peace 
with the Esopus, “we now, in turn, request them to make and keep peace with the 
Maquas.”81 They then gave the Sinnekens a keg of powder, but admonished them that 
“they must not use it against our brothers, the Maquaes, but against their enemies, who 
dwell far away, where they must fetch their beavers.”82 The western Iroquois tribes were 
not at war with the Mohawks, but the Mohawks did support the Susquehannocks in their 
war with the Sinnekens. The Dutch statements made it very clear that their favor was 
with the Mohawks, and they again expressed this in an official setting within the fort.
The lack o f an official Dutch statement concerning the Sinnekens ’ warning of a meeting 
between the French Indians and the Mahicans at the Cohoes Falls also speaks of their 
favor of the Mahicans to the point that they would not discuss such matters with the 
visiting Sinnekens. The Mohawks may have been able to get away with chastising the 
Dutch within the confines of the Dutch court, but the other Iroquois tribes could not.
By the end of a fairly tumultuous trading season, matters between the Indians and 
Dutch at Fort Orange turned again to diplomatic matters. In early November 1660, 
Stuyvesant met with some Mohawk sachems in Fort Orange, in an attempt to dissuade 
them from traveling to New England in an expedition against the Kennebec Indians. 
Stuyvesant held this meeting with the Mohawks at the request o f the English Governor in 
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courts that they would be traveling to the Delaware River in order to bring about a peace 
between the Sinnekens and the Susquehannocks.
While the Mohawks continued to develop their utilization of Fort Orange for 
purposes of negotiations between themselves and the Dutch and English, they very much 
continued to avoid the fort for their direct negotiations with other Indian groups. In July 
1662, Governor Endicott of Massachusetts and Governor Bredon of Nova Scotia both 
wrote to Dutch authorities protesting a Mohawk attack on an English trading house in 
May of that year. In the attack several Indians who were allied with the English were 
killed. According to the English governors this attack was “contrary to the treaty of
84peace made between the maquas and the Northern savages at Fort Orange last year.”
Yet according to the Mohawks, they did not make a peace with the Northern Indians at 
Fort Orange in 1661 as the English claimed. The Mohawks asserted that they made a
85peace only with the English.
This controversy carried over into the next year, when, in the summer of 1663, 
English officers in Nova Scotia wrote to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam 
to request their intervention to stop Mohawk attacks on “Northern savages.” They 
requested that New Netherland authorities bring about a “permanent peace” between the 
Mohawks and the Northern Algonquians. The Dutch council in New Amsterdam then 
contacted the court in Fort Orange and stated, “should your honors see any hopes to bring 
about a desirable result, then we leave it to your Honors’ own deliberation.”86 Dutch
83 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 189, 191.
84 Ibid., 224; and Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 297.
85 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 225.
86 Ibid.
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officials recognized the role of Fort Orange in dealings with the Mohawks, but they did 
not recognize that the Mohawks did not utilize Fort Orange in their relations with other 
Indian groups.
A week later, the letter was read to the Mohawks at Fort Orange. The Mohawk 
representative in the court replied for “Col. Temple to leave him and his people alone and 
not trouble himself about the war between them and the Northern Indians.”87 The 
Mohawks continued to make it clear that while they would remain at peace with the 
English, their dealings with the so-called “English Indians” remained their own business. 
Actually, the Mohawks worked to keep their direct dealings with other Indians groups 
outside o f the realm o f the European courts almost all the way to the end of the colony of 
New Netherland. With this statement, the Mohawks appear to be protecting their 
negotiation with other tribes from European influence. In this light the Mohawks 
avoidance o f Fort Orange and insistence of New England to stay out of these matters can 
be seen as a continuation o f the Mohawks protecting their inner workings as was 
discussed in chapter two with the Iroquois trying to keep both Dutch and French from 
traveling to Onondaga, the center of the Five Nations, without proper authorization.
In their relations with the “English Indians” in New England, the Mohawks were 
particularly incensed by the English request, because the Mohawks saw themselves as 
victims of attacks by New England tribes. In fact, a month after the meeting where the 
Mohawks expressed their desire for the English to stay out of their business, a message 
from several Connecticut River tribes was read at Fort Orange. The tribes who sent the 
message denied that they continued hostilities toward the Mohawks and singled out the
87 Ibid., 298.
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Sowaquackicks as the aggressors that the Mohawks had mentioned to the Dutch. The 
message read that, “The Sowquackicks live at the head of the river of Canticot and they 
are the ones, who fell upon the maquaas and the Indians beyond them to the North and 
Northeast, but the Southern Indians of Pacomuck and Agawam and farther South assure, 
that they will remain friends with the maquaas and hope, that they will live in peace with 
them.”88
The Connecticut River Indians were not actually present at this meeting but spoke 
through a Mohawk interpreter. Adogodquo answered for the Mohawks and was pleased 
with the Agawam and Pacomtuck Indians. The 1663 meetings was really one of the first 
instances o f Fort Orange being used as a site to negotiate between different Indian 
groups. However, the Connecticut Algonquians were not in attendance and no settlement 
was actually made. Yet the Mohawks were still able to use the meeting at Fort Orange to 
advance their own ends. With this action, the Mohawks’ use o f Fort Orange evolved 
from economic purposes, to diplomacy between the Dutch and other Indians, to 
diplomacy between the Mohawks and the French, and then to diplomacy between Indian 
groups and mediated by the Mohawks. The Dutch really had little say in how the 
Mohawks utilized the court in Fort Orange once the Mohawks began to assert their 
authority over both the surrounding lands and the town itself.
At the same time that the Mohawks were dealing with the New England Indians, 
the Second Esopus War had begun. At this point, the village o f Wiltwyck in the Esopus 
was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Fort Orange court. Therefore, there was little 
activity in Fort Orange concerning the Esopus War. Since at this point, the Mohawks
88 Ibid., 308.
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continued to utilize the Fort Orange court primarily for their relations with Europeans and 
not necessarily for other Indians, there was little activity recorded as having taken place 
in Fort Orange. Furthermore, since the residents of Fort Orange did not want to be 
involved in the first Esopus war, there was no reason to believe that they wanted to be 
involved in the second, even if the Mohawks continued to chastise them. The town 
received word on activities in the war, but most of the official proceedings occurred in 
the Esopus or at Fort Amsterdam.
A couple of weeks after the outbreak of the second war with the Esopus Indians, 
vice-director La Montagne wrote a letter to Stuyvesant concerning a meeting he had with 
several Mohawks and Mahicans. The courts of Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck were 
meeting to figure out a way to procure the release of several Dutch prisoners from the 
Esopus, when “there appeared suddenly Smits Jan, a chief of the said Maquas, with three
• 89others o f his people and two Mahicans.” While this meeting did not appear planned, it 
was timely. The Mohawks and Mahicans were dispatched to recover the prisoners. The 
letter also informed Stuyvesant that the Mohawks kept an Esopus captive in a 
Dutchman’s house in Beverwyck and that they had cut off two of his fingers.90
After this initial event concerning the Esopus War, the remainder of Mohawk 
activity in Fort Orange dealt primarily with their relations with the Kennebec and 
Connecticut River Indians as described above. Since the Mohawks were not directly 
involved in the Esopus War, their attention was devoted to their own conflicts, and they
89 Ibid., 264.
90 The fact that the Mohawks moved the very ritualistic event o f  torture o f  a captive outside o f  their village 
and into a Dutch man’s private home is quite interesting. Descriptions o f  Mohawk torture o f  captives 
usually stresses the communal nature o f  the event, whereas this incident seems to have occurred for the 
benefit o f  the Dutch, instead o f  as a part o f  ritualistic torture.
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concentrated their use of Fort Orange for their immediate needs. The next time there was 
discussion of the Esopus War in the Fort Orange court records was in October 1663, less 
than two weeks after the Connecticut River Indians’ message was read to the Mohawks in 
the same court. This meeting was called in response to a rumor that within two or three 
days the Esopus were going to attack the people in the area surrounding Fort Orange.
The members of the court asked some Mahicans about the rumor, again showing Dutch 
reliance on Indian intelligence. Their reply was that they thought the Dutch had known 
the information. They then informed the Dutch that more than two weeks earlier, some 
Esopus had been among the Catskill Indians and wanted to attack Fort Orange, but “had 
been prevented at this time.”91 The Dutch officials then sent some Indians to bring some 
Catskill leaders to Fort Orange to give additional information.
The minutes do not specify if the Mahicans who gave the initial information were 
actually in the presence of the court, or if their message was relayed. However, we see 
that the Mahicans who gave the information, whether true or a false rumor, were still 
very much in control of the spread of information. Furthermore, the Dutch requested 
three specific Catskill Indians, Macsachnimanau, Safpagood and Keesien Wey to come to 
Fort Orange to give additional information unavailable to the Dutch in hopes of clarifying 
the situation.
A month later on November 22, 1663 the court at Fort Orange held an 
extraordinary session. At this session the Catskill Indians Macsachnimanau, Sacsamoes, 
Keesien Wey and Sechano, and the Mahican Aepje were present. Eldert Gerbertsen 
Cruuf said that he had sent word several times requesting that the Catskills come to Fort
91 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 309.
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Orange to appear in court. However, the Catskills countered that they “excused 
themselves” from appearing because they had to go out hunting. The court obviously 
held little power over the movements of the Catskills. Commissary Jan Thomassen then 
asked the leader Keesien Wey about the Esopus Indians. He replied, “that he has 
prevented the Esopus five times, who wanted to do harm at Katskil and further up to the 
bouweries dissuading them every time and making them presents of wampum.” Kessien 
Wey also protested that “when he comes here, the Dutch pull him by the ears and call
92him an Esopus rascal.”
With the Catskills in control of the dissemination of information in this particular 
court meeting, Keesien Wey and his companions took full advantage of the situation. 
When the rumor first surfaced in October that the Esopus would attack to the north at 
Fort Orange, the Dutch were told that the Catskills had prevented it “this time” with the 
implication o f a solitary event. Yet in the November meeting, in the presence of both 
courts Keesien Wey made it known that he had prevented such an attack on five separate 
occasions. Whether true or not such information in such a setting should at least have 
illustrated to the court that preventing the Dutch from verbally and physically abusing the 
Catskills was the least the Dutch could do in appreciation of preventing an Esopus attack 
on them.
In the next extraordinary session held a few days later, the members of the 
combined court replied to Keesien Wey, in the presence of two chiefs of the Mohawks 
and Mahicans that the Catskills should call the Dutch “brothers.” Keesien Wey appeared 
quite satisfied with the Dutch response and expressed his gladness that the Catskills could
Ibid.
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come to Fort Orange without fear. He then turned to the Mohawks and Mahicans who 
were present and gave ten strings of wampum to representatives o f each tribe in 
testimony o f the proceedings. There was no report of an exchange of gifts between the 
Catskills and Dutch however. The Mohawk representative Adogodquo then answered, “I 
shall bring this present to the Maquas, my brothers, and inform them of what has been 
concluded and confirmed here by handshaking.”93 So while the meeting took place in the 
Dutch court, the Catskills, Mohawks and Mahicans also utilized the court proceedings for 
their own negotiations and exchange of gifts. In this particular instance, the Dutch were 
not even actors, but passive observers. The Indian groups had taken over Fort Orange’s 
court strictly for their own purposes. Furthermore, the fact that only the Mohawk 
sachem, Adogodquo spoke in the meetings while the Mahican who were present 
remained silent, or at least their words were not recorded, continues to illustrate the 
growing power o f the Mohawks within the setting o f the Dutch court.
Although the Mohawks actually utilized the Dutch court meeting to strengthen 
their relationship with the Catskills, their main focus remained on their war with the 
Kennebecs. In a letter from La Montagne to Stuyvesant in January 1664, the former 
described the news from an Iroquois war party returning from raids on the Kennebecs. 
They reported that the Kennebecs and Mohawks had attempted to make a separate peace 
without the knowledge or consent of the other Iroquois involved, the Onondagas and 
Sinnekens. Although the Onondagas and Sinnekens persuaded the Mohawks to rejoin 
them in their fight with the Kennebecs, this even provided yet another example of the
93 Ibid., 310.
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Mohawks acting independently from the other Iroquois tribes, an independence that 
would only continue to grow.94
By May of 1664 as the Esopus War continued the Mohawks again exhibited their 
desire to end their war with the Northern Indians. In yet another extraordinary court 
session at Fort Orange, the Mohawks for the first time asked for direct Dutch assistance 
in bringing about a peace between them and another Indian tribe.95 O f course, the Dutch 
had been hoping for peace between the Iroquois and Northern Indians, who were allied 
with the New England colonies, in order to retain peace with the New Englanders. The 
Mohawks warned the English, who tried to intervene on behalf of their allied Indians, to 
basically stay out of it. But at this point, the Mohawks declared, “war is now 
inconvenient to them and they prefer to live in peace.”96 In response the Dutch court 
dispatched Jacob Leckermans and interpreter Jan Dareth as mediators between the 
Indians, although the negotiations did not occur in Fort Orange. Regardless of the 
location o f the negotiations, this event does illustrate the Mohawks’ ever increasing 
influence over the Dutch at Fort Orange. Furthermore, because an end to the hostilities 
between the Northern Indians and the Mohawks worked to Dutch advantage, they were 
willing to bring about its end by whatever means possible.
The last extraordinary meeting between the Dutch and Mohawks in Fort Orange 
occurred on July 12, 1664. The information that came out of this meeting provided quite
94 Ibid., 355. Furthermore, the Iroquois war party reported that they lost twenty warriors in their attack on 
the Kennebecs. However, Stuyvesant replied to the report, in a letter from January 26, 1664, that he had 
heard a rumor that the Iroquois had actually lost two or three hundred. He advised that La Montagne find 
out the truth. Either way, this stands as another example o f  how the American Indians were able to control 
information passed on to Europeans.
95 While there are records o f  this session, much o f  the information is missing.
96 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 378.
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a taste o f things to come. The Pocumtuck Indians were recorded as having said that the 
English had ordered them to carry on their war with the Mohawks and told them to fight 
and kill the Dutch as well. They also warned that the English had informed them that, 
“forty ships shall come across the sea to make war here and ask for the surrender of this 
country.”97
By 1664 the Mohawks had firmly established their authority within the court at 
Fort Orange. They were able to do this through their previously important role in the 
town’s fur trade, and also because of the fractured nature o f New Netherland that allowed 
Fort Orange to develop independently of the center of power at New Amsterdam. These 
factors created an atmosphere that allowed for the creation of new cultural landscapes as 
many groups, Indians, French, Catholics, and Lutherans as well as supporters of the 
Dutch WIC were able to negotiate their influence and presence in the community. 
Furthermore, after the Peach War o f 1655, Indian influence along the lower reaches of 
the Hudson River had come to an end. The Mohawks, however, retained their 
independence with the Dutch and began to speak for many more Indian nations in the 
region. With the continued troubles in the Esopus region, the Mohawks were able to 
increase their authority among the Dutch and other Indian groups, and continued to 
utilize Fort Orange’s legal system to assert their power among their neighbors.
97 Ibid., 389.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ESOPUS REGION IN BETWEEN THE CENTERS
While the Mohawks would continue to establish their authority in Fort Orange, it 
was the Esopus region that proved to be the continual battleground over the creation of 
new cultural landscapes. The Esopus Indians conceded the land for the town of 
Wiltwyck in the Esopus region. However, as the Dutch continued to expand their 
influence out of Wiltwyck and into the surrounding “wilderness,” the Esopus Indians 
fought to bring this to an end. The ensuing violence would negate the role of the Esopus 
settlement as a way to connect the political and economic centers of Fort Orange and 
New Amsterdam and thereby strengthen the colony as a whole. Instead the violence 
drove a deeper wedge between the Dutch centers on either end o f the Hudson River. 
Furthermore, the violence in the Esopus region provided an opening for other Indian 
tribes, such as the Catskills, to assert their own influence in the court at Fort Orange.
This was possible because the Catskills were under the protection of the Mohawks, and 
instead of the Mohawks speaking for the Catskills in court, the Mohawks had to deal with 
their own wars with Indians in New England. With the addition of other Indian groups to 
the Fort Orange legal system during the time of the Second Esopus War, Indian groups 
were able to assert more influence within the Fort Orange court. As a result o f  this Indian 
influence, the court’s role as a new diplomatic center in America Indian and European 
relations continued to grow.
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As with the end of the Peach War, after the peace was negotiated at the end of the 
First Esopus War in 1660, a sense of normality quickly descended on the Esopus region. 
As more people returned to or moved into the area, the more they helped strengthen the 
colony as a whole. Now the Dutch were able to lay claim to a larger area of land, thereby 
extending their authority further out from the river alone. Of course, the Dutch had 
claimed this land for decades prior to the 1660 treaty. However, now they believed they 
held claim by right of conquest and by a growing proper use o f the land.
In the spring of 1661 more and more people were moving into the newly named 
town of Wiltwyck. In response, Stuyvesant traveled to Wiltwyck in April and May in 
order to distribute parcels of land in the enlarged settlement. The lots were distributed 
under the agreement that all land would be surveyed and marked within six months. 
Furthermore, to protect against the possibility of future Indian attack, the expanded 
settlement had to be pallisaded.1 Also due to the increased population, Stuyvesant 
established a court in Wiltwyck in May o f 1661. Prior to this time the community fell 
under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. The new court was mandated to administer justice 
in civil suits dealing with less than fifty guilders. Criminal cases, however, were to be 
referred to Stuyvesant and the Council. Court was to be held in Wiltwyck every two 
weeks, except during harvest time. The presence of a court at Wiltwyck was a truly 
significant event in extending control of the WIC. In November 1661 several ordinances 
were passed in Wiltwyck further expanding the WIC’s authority over daily life including 
a new land tax to defray the cost o f constructing the minister’s house, and an ordinance
1 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 195.
2 Ibid., 196. This exception illustrates the agricultural importance o f  the Esopus region.
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• 3 •for observing the Sabbath. In this way, the WIC under the authority o f Stuyvesant 
continued to assert its influence over the much-coveted land of the Esopus.
Growth in the area continued. However, in the summer of 1661 Stuyvesant 
lamented to the Directors in Holland that, “your Honors’ colonies in New Netherland are 
only gradually and slowly peopled by the scrapings of all sorts of nationalities (few 
excepted) who consequently have the least interest in the welfare and maintenance of the 
commonwealth.”4 He was especially concerned with the colony’s reliance on its 
inhabitants for military support, particularly in light of the lack of assistance offered to 
the Esopus community during the first war. Even with Stuyvesant’s concern of the pace 
and make-up of the growth of New Netherland, it was indeed growing, especially in the 
Esopus region.5
At this point, the Esopus region could have taken after Fort Orange in its 
development as a new cross-cultural landscape of Indian and European diplomacy. 
However, Dutch desire that the Esopus serve as an agricultural center instead of a trading 
center, like Fort Orange, would prevent a stable new landscape from being formed. 
Whereas Fort Orange residents depended on trade and therefore Indians, they had to be 
more open to allowing Indians into Dutch space. However, the Dutch at Esopus needed 
land and wished to spread further into the woods, thereby creating a predominantly Dutch 
agricultural landscape. The Dutch authorities at Fort Orange wished to remain in town
3 Ibid., 211.
4 Ibid., 205.
5 While the community was growing and many considered this region to be potentially profitable, expenses 
continued to outpace income, see Femow, DRCHNY  13: 229.
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and out o f the woods. This created the need for the presence of Indians in Fort Orange, 
followed by the creation of a new cultural landscape.
In April 1662, five residents of Beverwyck submitted a petition to Stuyvesant and 
the Council to establish a new village in the Esopus. They argued that, “it was evident 
that the prosperity of this province o f New Netherland rests principally on agriculture and 
commerce” and that many people wished to establish farms on the uncultivated lands of 
the “Great Esopus.”6 The petition was granted and the WIC was quick to begin the 
establishment of the new town. Likewise in 1662, thirty-one new lots were laid out to 
add to the original sixteen. One of the new lots was to be reserved for the new church, 
which would be another addition of the physical representation of the authority of the 
WIC on the land. The presence of the church along with the presence of Harmanus 
Blom, who arrived in September 1660 as the permanent pastor o f the local Dutch 
Reformed congregation, were not only symbols o f the authority of the WIC, but symbols 
of the presence o f Christianity on what was considered a wild landscape. With these 
changes, the Esopus Dutch were attempting to build a new Dutch landscape out of the 
Esopus Indians’ “wilderness.”
Even with the growing presence of Dutch authority on the land with the 
establishment of the court, the plans for a new church and a new minister, the new 
settlement was not without its problems. Where Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck 
clashed over authority as discussed in the preceding chapter, Wiltwyck’s court, although 
established by the WIC, was also challenged. In the winter of 1662-1663 a small conflict 
developed between the court magistrates under Everet Pels and the militia under Thomas
6 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 219.
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Chambers. Chambers wrote to Stuyvesant to complain that the court magistrates tore 
down an ordinance posted by the militia. The ordinance was a plan of action devised in 
response to repeated gatherings o f Indians in the area. Even after a meeting between the 
court magistrates and the militia officers, the former refused to post the ordinance. 
Whereas the court believed that its authority was threatened by the militia’s act,
Chambers believed the court’s action weakened the security of Wiltwyck.7 The incident 
was relatively small in light of the events the region recently experienced, but it still 
represented an illustration of the increasing power of the court, as a representative of the 
WIC, over the landscape along the Hudson. It also shows the continued tensions between 
the WIC authority and the Dutch colonists who lived and worked the land.
Indian Relations
For almost a year after the peace was settled with the Esopus Indians at Fort 
Amsterdam, relations between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch in the area remained 
relatively quiet. Although the Esopus Indians agreed to the terms o f the treaty to remove 
far from the settlements and cede their land to the Dutch, they remained close by and the 
Dutch were powerless to really do anything about it. While the Dutch expanded their 
authority over some territory, that area was still limited to lands adjacent to the Hudson 
River. In April 1661, to show his pleasure with the peaceful situation in the Esopus, 
Stuyvesant honored a request from the Esopus Indians. With the support of other area 
tribes, the Esopus requested a return of their eleven tribesmen who were sent to Curacao 
as punishment for their hostility against New Netherland. Stuyvesant sent to Curacao for 
the return o f two Esopus Indians who had been exiled into slavery on the island.
7 Ibid., 235, 237. Chambers became a court magistrate in April o f  1663 thereby consolidating his influence 
in both the court and militia.
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Stuyvesant hoped that this gesture would show the Esopus Indians and the Indians who 
supported them, that good behavior could win the release of other Esopus Indians from 
the island. If all worked out, it would also prevent any future hostilities between the
o
Esopus and the Dutch.
By June of that year, Dutch officials were becoming more anxious concerning 
Esopus behavior. Claes Jansen Ruyter reported to Stuyvesant that although he had been 
sent to the Esopus village to ascertain how they were living and their behavior, he was 
denied access to the Esopus village. Instead of allowing him to enter their community, 
some left the village in order to meet with him in the open.9 The Esopus Indians were not 
overtly aggressive in this meeting, and they informed the Dutch that they wanted their 
freed compatriots to be delivered to the Hackensack chief Oratam upon their arrival from 
Curacao. Although this was not an aggressive act on the part o f the Esopus, refusing 
Ruyter access to the town continued to show Indians’ desire and ability to restrict Dutch 
movements in Indian territory. It was also consistent with Iroquois’ actions that restricted 
the movements o f Europeans within their towns, and which forbade Dutch and French 
entry into the center o f Five Nations’ authority at Onondaga.
In the summer of 1661 Stuyvesant’s anxiety concerning the safety of the colony 
had continued to grow. He was fully aware of New Netherlands weak military position. 
In an attempt to get more support from the WIC Directors and States-General he warned 
them that, “although the aforesaid Esopus, as well as the Raritan and Nevesink savages 
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when they see an opportunity they will take advantage of it to strike a blow and revenge 
themselves.”10 Even more telling of Stuyvesant’s desire for military help from Holland 
was his plea that “the gracious God may grant, that the maquas will not begin with us 
after they have destroyed and finished with the French.”11 By painting a picture of 
France’s imminent defeat by the Mohawks due to the formers’ military weakness, 
Stuyvesant was able to lay the future of the colony in the hands of both a gracious God 
and the Company Directors who could provide the colony with more military assistance. 
Being an ocean away also allowed Stuyvesant to make this point, although there was 
never any indication that the Mohawks intended to attack the Dutch settlements.
By the end o f the summer of 1661, more information was reaching Dutch 
authorities in New Netherland to cause concern. The Mohawks continued to be the 
greatest source of information for the Dutch. A Mohawk companion apparently traveled 
with Claes Jansen Ruyter to the Esopus on at least one occasion. This Mohawk 
individual then traveled to the Esopus village on his own in order to gather additional
information. It was during this solitary trip that he reported having heard of aggressive
• 1 2 *words and action from a Catskill Indian who referred to the Dutch as dogs. Nothing
specific came o f this issue except the continued wariness of the Dutch, and the continued 
influence of the Mohawks. However, this example provides additional evidence of the 
importance of the Mohawks to retrieve and report information valuable to the Dutch.
10 Ibid, 204.
11 Ibid, 205.
12 Ibid, 207. This information implied a relationship between the Catskills and Esopus. The Catskill man 
was married to an Esopus woman. While the Dutch suspected the Catskills o f  aggression toward them, or 
at least sympathy for the Esopus, the Mohawks always worked to protect the Catskills. After this incident, 
the Catskill leaders would work to show how they held the Esopus back from attacking the Dutch.
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Continued evidence of Dutch lack of control outside of their expanding area of
influence, particularly with the continued trade in alcohol, exposed concerns in relations
between the Dutch and the Indians. In the spring of 1662, the Dutch council gave
Oratam, sachem of the Hackensack Indians, permission to seize alcohol brought into his
land. He was also given permission to arrest those who were selling the alcohol and
11bring them to Fort Amsterdam for punishment. The Dutch gave Oratam greater powers 
over certain Europeans in his own lands, but the Dutch still claimed the authority to 
punish them in Fort Amsterdam within a Dutch court.14 The situation in the Esopus was 
a bit more tenuous. The community schout, or sheriff, Roloff Swartout wrote to 
Stuyvesant in September 1662 that, “the situation here is such that if  no precautions are 
taken we are in great danger of drawing upon us a new war. The cause will be the selling 
o f liquor to the savages, which, God better it! begins to increase.”15 Apparently the main 
culprits were the soldiers stationed to protect the village. One particular individual, Jonas 
Ranstou, traveled to the newly formed Esopus Indian village accompanied by an Indian 
and was admitted to the village. However, this event did not end with a transaction over 
alcohol but o f accusations o f spying and inflamed tensions.16 The Esopus Indians refused 
to tolerate European interlopers in their village.
13 Ibid., 218.
14 The Hackensacks under Oratam were weakened and held under Dutch influence after the Peach War o f  
1655. However, Oratam continued to play an influential role in relations between the Dutch and other 
Indian groups, including the Esopus. He was a respected leader in the eyes o f  both the Dutch and the 
Indians o f  the lower Hudson River.
15 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 228.
16 The Indians allowed Ranstou into their village merely to interrogate him as to his purpose there and to 
accuse him o f  spying. He was then expelled from the Esopus village.
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The Esopus, expecting an attack from the Dutch, strengthened their own town 
walls and sent out messengers to the Highland Indians, the Minisinck Indians and the 
Catskills supposedly to inform them that “they had put more reliance into the 
negotiations, which the savages had had with the Director-General at the house of Dom. 
Blom, when the peace was renewed and a present promised to them to be given next 
year.”17 The last meeting that took place between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch 
outside of Fort Amsterdam was at the home of Jacob Jansen Stoll, as discussed in chapter 
two. The fact that he was one o f the leaders of the Esopus community also meant that his 
home was probably quite large in comparison to his neighbors, thereby giving it a more 
impressive presence on the landscape.
The 1661 meeting to renew the peace was then moved further into the village, 
away from the edge o f the woods and into the seat of Dutch civility, the pastor’s home. 
Regardless of the growing presence o f Dutch authority on the land of the Esopus, they 
were unable to control the flow of information among the Indian tribes of the Hudson 
River valley. Indeed, they remained at the mercy of Indian messengers to both retrieve 
and deliver information between Dutch settlements. Moreover, the Dutch blamed the fact 
that bad information was spreading at all on the “contraband traders who swallow up this
i  n
place and sell a pint of brandy for a schepel of wheat.” With this declaration, Dutch 
authorities revealed the double threat of smugglers. The first threat was the illicit alcohol 
trade, and the second was their role in the spreading of rumors.
Femow, DRCHNY  13: 229.
18 Ibid.
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The magistrates of Wiltwyck continued to observe a deterioration of their 
situation due to the sale of alcohol to the Indians. While in September 1662 the 
complaint dealt with soldiers from Wiltwyck traveling into the woods to the Indian 
villages to sell their alcohol, by January of 1663 the problem was identified as residents 
of the newly created town in the Esopus region. They particularly mentioned Louis 
Dubois, a Walloon, who possessed alcohol that he had not reported to the Wiltwyck 
authorities.19
The new village quickly became the source of more problems for the Wiltwyck 
magistrates and the WIC. Stuyvesant and other Europeans truly wanted to continue to 
expand their authority on the land and bring what they perceived as order and prosperity 
to a “wilderness.” Furthermore, they believed that their peace negotiations at Fort 
Amsterdam, and their subsequent renewal at the home of Domine Blom at Wiltwyck, 
which produced a surrender o f the Esopus land, gave the Dutch the legal right to build 
upon the land. The Esopus Indians, however, saw it otherwise. In the spring of 1663, as 
building in the new Esopus settlement continued, the Esopus Indians spoke out against 
aspects o f the Dutch activity. They informed the Dutch that they could erect buildings on 
the land, but that they could not build a fortification, “which, if  it should be done, would 
show that [the Dutch] had evil intentions.”20 The Esopus Indians further told the 
Wiltwyck residents that a second piece of land the Dutch claimed near the new town was 
not a part o f the 1660 Fort Amsterdam treaty and that the Dutch should not plough it or 
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expansion of Dutch ways o f life into their territory, but also the expansion o f Dutch 
families into their territory. Moreover, the Esopus Indians saw as the real threat the key 
symbols o f Dutch control of the landscape: a fort and agriculture.
In order to placate the Esopus Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council decided to
1offer them the gifts they were owed a year earlier. These gifts were to include cloth, 
muskets and lead. According to a report of the magistrates at Wiltwyck, Thomas 
Chambers traveled to the Esopus village on June 5th to tell the Esopus Indians that 
Stuyvesant would soon be arriving in Wiltwyck to give gifts and renew the peace. The 
Esopus Indians replied to this that, if  the Director-General wished to renew the peace, he 
“should with some unarmed persons, sit with them in the open field without the gate, as it 
was their own custom to meet unarmed when renewing peace or in other negotiations.”22 
Apparently there was much distrust on both sides. Stuyvesant had no intention of having 
any negotiations outside of the Dutch community. The last renewal of the peace was at 
Domine Blom’s house and allowed the Dutch to negotiate, not only as victors, but 
surrounded by the symbols o f their power, as limited as it was. The Esopus Indians did 
not want to allow the Dutch into their village, but wanted to make sure that the site was at 
the least away from the very symbols o f Dutch power that Stuyvesant worked within. In 
the meantime, authorities in Fort Orange did not want to jeopardize their own peaceful 
situations and continued to try to stay out of the fray.
However, the gifts and the peace were not the issue, and apparently the gifts were 
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Dutch villages of the Esopus region. The attack began in the new village. The Esopus 
Indians were particularly upset about Dutch activities in this area and it was the new 
village where the Esopus Indians had warned the Dutch against building any 
fortifications. When the Indians attacked Wiltwyck later in the morning, the Indians first 
entered the town under the claim that they were selling food. Soon after the Esoups 
Indians arrival in Wiltwyck, the alarm was issued about the attack on the new village, and 
the attack on the older town began. Most of the damages were inflicted in the new 
village and most of the captives were also taken from the new village, which was situated 
on contested land between Dutch and Esopus Indian territory. The new village had 
become such a point o f contention because while it expanded Dutch authority over a 
larger expanse o f land, it directly challenged Esopus authority over land that they still 
claimed as their own. The Second Esopus War broke out because o f the tension created 
as both groups tried to assert their authority over this particular landscape.
Fighting the War in the Country 
The Dutch were immediately faced with difficulties in pursuing the Esopus 
because o f their lack of knowledge of the area. They did not know where the Esopus had 
fled or what to expect if they were to find the Indians. The Dutch authorities received 
their first break through information from Rachel La Montagne, the wife of Gysbert van 
Imborgh o f Esopus, and daughter of WIC vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange. 
Rachel La Montagne had been taken captive and was released with the intervention of 
Mohawks. With her release from captivity she informed the Dutch military officials that 
the Esopus Indians had retreated to a place about eight hours march south of Wiltwyck on 
a footpath. The Dutch believed they could reach the Esopus village by wagon in one or
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two hours, although there were “one or two bad hills” and “three or four little creeks” 
along the road. Through the information of La Montagne, the Dutch also learned that the 
Esopus village was palisaded and defended by about thirty men. The Esopus women and 
children did not remain in the village but continued to utilize the relative safety of the 
surrounding woods, where they stayed with the Dutch prisoners.23
In fact, Stuyvesant learned “by good authority” that the Esopus were living near 
and among the Catskill Indians, which continued to complicate matters for the Dutch.
The Mohawks and the Catskills continued to assert that the Catskills were friends of the 
Dutch. However, Stuyvesant saw the Catskills “if not our declared enemies, at least as 
protectors of our enemies.”24 Captain Creiger, who was in charge of the military forces 
in Wiltwyck, understood that the fight against the Esopus was centered in the woods. He 
knew that taking the Esopus village would accomplish nothing since the Indians would 
escape to the woods upon first sight of the Dutch soldiers. He recommended allowing the 
Mohawks to intervene for the release of the forty captives held by the Esopus. In the 
meantime, he vowed to take his fight into the Esopus territory o f the woods to inflict as 
much injury as he could.
The Esopus Indians continued to stand by their assertion that the reason for the 
attack was the additional land they claimed the Dutch confiscated without treaty or 
payment. The Mohawks informed the Dutch that the Esopus Indians did not care so 
much about securing the release o f the captured Indians as they did about the large tract
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of land of the new village. According to the Mohawks, Dutch payment for this land 
would bring about the “release of the prisoners in a sensible manner.” In response to the 
Mohawk proposition, Thomas Chambers, member of the court of Wiltwyck, “engaged 
himself, to refute promptly all the propositions which the Esopus have made to the 
Maquaes and Mahicanders, if  it should be required by any court.” Instead of working 
out a payment for the land claimed by both the Dutch and the Esopus, Stuyvesant also 
vowed to pursue the Esopus in the woods, although in late July 1663, the Dutch still did 
not know the location of the Esopus Indians or if  the Esopus fort was still occupied.
When the Dutch were able to get to the Esopus village to mount an attack, in the 
words of Captain Crieger, it “has not had the result, which we wished and hoped for, but
97it was God’s pleasure, that it should be so.” In this expedition against the Esopus, the 
Dutch also tried to enlist the assistance of the Marsepingh Indians, with little success.
The problem supposedly arose due to the Indians’ lack o f cooperation and wanting “to 
have everything their own way” despite the reported Dutch efforts to have “humored 
them.” The Dutch were also hampered by the landscape itself, which came as a surprise 
to them because the conditions contradicted earlier intelligence. They were slowed by 
rocky land and hills. They were forced to spend long amounts of time trying to figure out 
ways to get through swamps and over creeks that were thought to be dry. They 
encountered some hills so steep that they had to haul the wagons and cannons up and 
down them with ropes. Within a mile of the Esopus village the way was so impassable 
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9 8wagon. However, by having to rely on information from other sources, in this case 
Rachel La Montagne, the soldiers were unable to have the proper information to plan 
adequately. While this may have been an easier trip by foot, the same did not apply for 
men with wagons and cannons.
In the meantime, the Esopus continued to scatter among the various Indian tribes 
of the Hudson River Valley. With the Esopus increasingly moving into the territory and 
protection o f other tribes, the efforts against them became more difficult for the Dutch, 
who did not want to attack other tribes and bring more nations into the war against them. 
Although the Dutch were particularly concerned with the role o f the Catskills in 
protecting the Esopus Indians, the Mohawks continued to speak for the Catskills as their 
friends and that they should do no harm to the Dutch and the Dutch should do no harm to
9 0them. This action by the Mohawks tied the hands o f the Dutch who recognized the 
power o f the Mohawks and their reliance on the Mohawks to try to win the release of the 
captives.
In response to this dilemma, the “council of war” at Wiltwyck decided to dispatch 
several men into the woods in order to attain any information that may be useful in their 
fight against the Esopus. However, since most of the soldiers did not have any 
knowledge of the surrounding lands in which they would be searching for information, 
the council decided to send for Christoffel Davits to serve as a guide in the territory. 
Davits was known to have been “well acquainted with the localities of the Esopus 
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his illegal alcohol trade with the Indians. Nevertheless, the military knew that “without
30him little or nothing could be accomplished.”
The need for action against the Esopus Indians was becoming more imperative as 
the harvest approached.31 By the end of August, Stuyvesant gave thanks, honor and 
praise to the Lord God when he received a report o f the Dutch troops’ surprise attack on a 
newly constructed village o f the Esopus Indians. In the attack they were able to free 
twenty-two European captives, while taking nineteen Indians captive and killing another 
twenty-seven. Yet the Dutch were still desperate for information. Stuyvesant sent out 
instructions for the military to go to the Wappinger and Highland Indians to “make every 
effort to get information” from Indians there. At the same time he was using his 
influence with the Indians in the lower Hudson Valley to acquire information regarding 
the Esopus Indians from them as well. Stuyvesant also established a patrol of the river to 
prevent Indians from descending the river as well as to question any Indians they
• T9encounter about the Esopus Indians. The Dutch really only had some control over the 
river and decided to utilize that control to gain the information they lacked.
Yet the Dutch, who continued to actively pursue information, also continued to 
fall prey to rumors and false information. In November 1663 Stuyvesant wrote to 
Captain Creiger to give him the latest intelligence. Stuyvesant had been informed that Lt. 
Pieter Wophertsen van Couwenhoven was captured, with his yacht, when traveling to the
30 ibid.
31 Ibid., 287; and Van Laer, Correspondence ofJerem ias Van Rensselaer, 329, 336.
32 Femow, DRCHNY  13:301. The Indians o f  the lower Hudson River Valley who had negotiated a peace 
with the Dutch after the Peach War generally stayed out o f  the conflict. In order to maintain good relations 
with some o f  these Indians, the Dutch gave out cards with the seal o f  the WIC to show to the Dutch as 
proof that they were not Esopus Indians. These cards were given to Indians specifically who were moving 
and working on the water near N ew  Haerlem.
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Wappingers for a prearranged prisoner exchange, which was scheduled a week after the 
Wappingers and the Dutch had renewed their peace. According to the report, the 
Wappingers surprised the Dutch party, captured and burned the yacht, murdered the six 
or eight men with Couwenhoven who was held prisoner in the Wappingers’ village.
The Dutch were then hoping for “a chance in consequence o f good information, to gain 
an advantage over the said Wappings.” This event was seen as a true blow to the 
strength of the Dutch military forces, which held an advantage on the water. In the next 
days and weeks the only “good information” regarding the incident with the Wappingers 
was that it was completely false. Stuyvesant had to quickly inform Creiger before the 
latter attacked the Wappingers and escalated the war by directly involving other Indian 
tribes.
By the spring o f 1664 both the Dutch and the Esopus were experiencing losses in 
their war with one another. The winter brought a very heavy snowfall that created heavy 
spring flooding. Since water in creeks impaired Dutch movements in July, the flooding 
caused by spring run-off proved to be an insurmountable obstacle in pursuing the Indians 
in the woods. Small groups of soldiers went out into the woods in pursuit of the Esopus 
Indians or for information to lead them to the Esopus, with no success. During this time 
as well, the Esopus Indians were apparently making overtures for peace through the 
Mohawks and the Mahicans, although the Dutch tended to discount them. The war was 
also costing the colony in revenues from the beaver trade. Even more damaging was the 
growing conflict between the Iroquois and the Canadian Algonquians. The fur traders 
were upset because the Iroquois were off fighting instead of hunting, but diplomatically,
33 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 302.
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with the Mohawks becoming more involved in issues to the north, they had less time and 
resources to deal with issues to their south, such as the Esopus War. In response to all 
these events, Harmanus Blom called for June 7th of every year to be set aside and 
observed as a day of prayer and remembrance.34 This time, however, the day of prayer 
was not to be one of repentance, as Stuyvesant established nine years earlier with the 
Peach War. Instead this call for a day of prayer and remembrance was to serve as a day 
of thanksgiving to praise God for leading the survivors through the death and suffering.
Shifting Geography in Dutch-Indian Relations 
As with the first Esopus War, most of the diplomatic and military efforts to end 
the war came out of Fort Amsterdam, even though, during the first war, the Esopus was 
considered part o f Fort Orange’s jurisdiction. As the reports o f the Esopus’ attack on 
Wiltwyck and the new town became known, it was once again Fort Amsterdam that took 
the initial steps. While Fort Orange would benefit in the long run from a stable Esopus 
region dominated by the Dutch, its officials still considered themselves outside of the 
fight. Mostly they feared the immediate destabilization of their trade and relations with 
the Mohawks.
The High Council sent out warnings to other towns around New Amsterdam of 
the attack and also tried to assure those settlers that the neighboring Indians had nothing 
to do with the attacks. These were the same Indians who negotiated a peace settlement 
after the Peach War and who either maintained their neutrality or worked as mediators 
during the first Esopus War. Also similar to the first war, Stuyvesant traveled to 
Wiltwyck to deal with the issue first hand. However, whereas during the earlier crisis,
34 Ibid., 373.
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Stuyvesant came ashore with a show of force, met with the Esopus Indians on the edge of 
the woods and challenged them to a fight on the spot, during this trip, Stuyvesant did not 
leave the safety of his boat. When he arrived in Wiltwyck, the boat that was to precede 
him to the town was not there, so he took refuge on the river until he could assess the 
situation. Also unlike the first war, Stuyvesant immediately called on Fort Orange for
i f
action and assistance. Along with turning to Fort Orange, the Dutch turned 
immediately to the Mohawks for their assistance. Stuyvesant’s goal was to eliminate the 
Esopus Indians and he knew this could not be accomplished without greater cooperation 
throughout the colony. Furthermore, he knew the Dutch would need the assistance of 
people who had knowledge o f the woods and could travel efficiently within the woods.
Days after the attack of the Esopus Indians on Wiltwyck the New Netherland 
authorities decided on a plan to attain the release of the captives that would be run out of 
Fort Orange. The main focus o f that plan was to induce the Iroquois, and particularly the 
Mohawks, to travel into the woods and liberate the Dutch captives. The Dutch, at this 
point, were not interested in establishing a new peace with the Esopus. They clearly 
stated that they did not want the Mohawks to mediate a peace, but either to get the release 
o f the Dutch captives, or at least take a few Esopus as captives to make a prisoner 
exchange. The Dutch were again relying on the Iroquois, and again they turned to the 
Mohawks to acquire information on the Esopus Indians’ strength, location, and condition 
of the prisoners. Moreover, the Council also wanted, but failed to persuade, twelve 
Mohawks to enter into the service of the WIC for up to three months to participate in
35 Ibid., 250, 251. O f course the fact that Vice-Director LaMontagne’s daughter was taken captive during 
this war gave the authorities at Fort Orange greater incentive to get involved.
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expeditions against the Esopus Indians.35 By June 26,1663 a few Mohawks and a 
Mahican traveled to the Esopus Indians with Jan Dirck to see about getting the prisoners 
back. Another Mohawk Indian was sent to the Mohawk villages to call the sachems to 
Fort Orange to enlist their help.
While the Dutch called on the assistance of the Mohawks and Mahicans in Fort 
Orange, the Hackensacks, led by the sachem Oratam, and Staten Island Indians were 
called to Fort Amsterdam. However, instead of immediately asking for assistance from 
these tribes, the Dutch authorities asked if they wished to maintain the peace with the 
Dutch and if  so to stay away from the Esopus Indians and to forbid any Esopus Indian 
from seeking refuge with them. At the end of these talks at Fort Amsterdam, the Dutch 
finally asked for some assistance in releasing the captives from the Esopus.38 However, 
the main goal of this meeting was to get assurances of the non-interference of the tribes 
who had settled a peace with New Netherland after the Peach War. Approximately two 
weeks after this meeting, Oratam summoned other sachems from neighboring tribes to 
appear at Fort Amsterdam to agree to neither aid nor shelter the Esopus Indians. The 
Indians present agreed, but were not able to give any significant information or further
1 • 39assistance at that time.
The Dutch would have to continually turn to their Mohawk allies for information. 
Although the tribes of the southern Hudson valley had been subdued, they were not able 
to provide the same type of significant assistance as the independent Mohawks to the
36 Ibid., 254-255.
37 Ibid., 2 6 1.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 275, 280.
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north, who were not beholden to the Dutch for any reason. This is especially true since 
Stuyvesant was not interested in negotiating a peace as much as he wanted the military 
defeat of the Esopus in order to force them from their land. While the southern tribes 
could help with the former, the independent strength of the Mohawks could, in the eyes 
of Stuyvesant, help bring about the latter.
Oratam continued to be the spokesman for the tribes south of the Esopus, 
although during the time of the war the southern tribes did not lend much aid. In late July 
1663, Oratam returned to Fort Amsterdam and informed the Council that the Esopus 
Indians had been unsuccessful in bringing other tribes into the fight against the Dutch. In 
August he appeared again in Fort Amsterdam and spoke for the Menissinck Indians who 
continued to claim that they had no connection with the Esopus Indians and wished to 
live in peace with the Dutch. The Dutch were pleased with this news, and what they 
really wanted next from the Indians was information. Oratam told the Council that the 
Menissincks were not in possession of any prisoners. In fact, the Menissincks would not 
give any information to the Dutch as to the whereabouts of the Esopus and the prisoners, 
but said that they would first try to ransom the captives with kindness or gifts. If they 
were not successful, they would then give the Dutch information as to the whereabouts of 
the Esopus.40 The Menissincks did not appear in the records again until March 1664.
However, Oratam remained active by appearing at Fort Amsterdam. He served as 
a trusted source of information, and was really the only Indian leader south of the Esopus 
who was treated in such a manner. He sent messengers out from his own tribe, and other 
tribes for whom he spoke, to gain information and bring it back to the authorities at Fort
40 Ibid., 289.
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Amsterdam. He also sent representatives out to relay messages for the Dutch. In 
December 1663, he sent messengers out to the Esopus Indians to discuss terms of an 
armistice between the Dutch and the Esopus. Later that month he spoke for the Esopus 
sachem Seweckenamo who had gone to speak to Oratam. According to Oratam’s report, 
Seweckenamo did not want to appear in Fort Amsterdam because he was unable to bring 
any Dutch prisoners to the meeting because they were scattered among hunting parties. 
Oratam then requested an extension o f an armistice in order to allow Seweckenamo to 
bring in some of the Dutch prisoners. The Dutch authorities respected Oratam’s efforts, 
but informed him that if Seweckenamo wished for peace, he would have to come to Fort 
Amsterdam in person.41 His efforts continued throughout the winter of 1663-1664 and 
right up until the peace negotiations in May 1664.
While Oratam served as a negotiator and the main intermediary for all the Indians 
in the lower Hudson River Valley, separate negotiations were occurring in Fort Orange 
involving the Esopus Indians and the Mohawks. The Mohawks, like Oratam, sent 
delegates into the woods to talk with the Esopus Indians to try to gain the release of the 
prisoners, although Stuyvesant continued to insist that no peace be made in those first 
few months after the June attack. The Mohawk delegates who first traveled to the Esopus 
in July 1663 reported that the Esopus “were willing to keep at peace with the people of 
Catskill, of Fort Orange and the Mahicanders and Maquas, but not by any means with the 
Esopus people.”42 The Esopus Indians told the Mohawks that if the Dutch did not
Ibid., 314, 320, 321 ,361 . 
: Ibid., 273.
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abandon the new town they would spread out over the land with the captives, thereby 
using their natural advantage of living in small groups in the woods.
At this point the Mohawk known as Smits Jan proposed taking forty-four 
Mohawks into the Esopus and having each take one of the then forty-four prisoners by 
the hand and bring them back to Fort Orange. Stuyvesant was excited about this idea, but 
soon expressed his displeasure on the Mohawks’ delay in the plan. Vice-Director 
LaMontagne in Fort Orange finally informed Stuyvesant that the plan to send Smits Jan 
to the Esopus with the forty-four Mohawks was abandoned because they saw it as too 
dangerous. First, Smits Jan was “tipsy” at the time he made the proposition, and second, 
he made the proposition without the knowledge of the older Mohawk sachems with 
whom they usually dealt.43 Indian relations in Fort Orange had developed so 
independently from New Amsterdam that Stuyvesant had little knowledge of their inner 
workings.
As discussed in the last chapter, after these initial meetings, the Mohawks 
primarily were concerned with their dealings with their enemies to the north and did not 
want to spend so much time on the Esopus. Nonetheless, with the second Esopus War 
there was much more involvement on the part o f Fort Orange as a whole, both from the 
Dutch and the Mohawk and Mahican residents o f the area, than occurred in the first 
Esopus War. In August 1663 there was even discussion that the Esopus would be willing 
to make a peace with representatives from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck, including 
Vice-Director LaMontagne, Arent van Curler and Jeremias van Rensselaer 44 However,
43 Ibid., 278, 283.
44 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 326-328.
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Stuyvesant was adamant that no one, Indian and Dutch alike, pursue a peace with the 
Esopus.
With the final surrender of the Esopus Indians at Fort Amsterdam in May 1664, 
came the last major diplomatic event between Indians and Europeans on Manhattan. The 
final negotiation happened at Fort Amsterdam in May of 1664. After Stuyvesant’s 
frustrating experience of trying to negotiate with the Esopus in their own territory, he 
wanted to assure his own dominance in the final negotiation. The Esopus could no longer 
use the woods to their advantage. Although the Mahicans and Mohawks played 
important roles in keeping other nations out of the war and containing the war in general, 
representatives of neither group were present during the final negotiations at Fort 
Amsterdam. Their attentions were turned to what they perceived were the real threats to 
their power, northern Indians who were allied with the English. With the Mohawks’ 
focus beyond Esopus, they held little interest in the peace talks. Furthermore, since 
Stuyvesant had been so adamant about eliminating the Esopus Indians, he wanted 
negotiations in his center of power at New Amsterdam to be able to fully direct the terms 
of peace.
Representatives of tribes defeated in the Peach War, Oratam of the Hackensack 
and Tappan Indians, and Matteno chief of the Nayacks were present. The Mohawks did 
not travel to Fort Amsterdam for treaty negotiations, but later the same month, they 
requested that the authorities at Fort Orange help them arrange a peace with the 
Pacamtekocks who lived on the Connecticut River. Such moves on the part of the 
Mohawks continued to illustrate the importance of Fort Orange as the site of legitimate 
negotiations for their people. Furthermore, after the treaty was negotiated in Fort
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Amsterdam, whenever the peace was renewed, the Esopus representative returned to Fort 
Orange to do so.
Only a few months after the peace between the Esopus and the Dutch was 
negotiated, the Dutch surrendered the colony of New Netherland to the English.
However, during the Esopus War there was much discussion of intrigues outside the 
colony especially with the English and non-allied Indians. Jeremias van Rensselaer gave 
voice to the confusion in the colony in an August 1663 letter to his brother. He wrote 
that,
everything looks so bad here that I see little chance of getting together as 
much as I owe you, for the trade ceases so suddenly that one hardly sees a 
single Indian and this because the path is not safe for Indians, for one says 
that the French Indians are coming and another that the English are 
coming with the Indians so that the Maquas are quite in a pinch. The 
Sinnekes are hard at war with the Minquas, so that they do not come 
except in troops, like one troop which has been here, which was so large 
that we had to keep watch night and day... as many as eighteen families 
had fled to my house.45
The threat coming from New England and the English dominated communities within 
New Netherland was actually the deciding factor in Stuyvesant agreeing to an armistice 
with the Esopus Indians in late 1663 and the eventual peace in 1664. He was particularly 
concerned with the English forming alliances with the Esopus and other non-allied Indian 
groups. By the beginning of 1664, the English, both in New England and within New 
Netherland, were growing bolder in their advances to gain control o f Dutch lands, 
particularly along the Hudson River.
In July 1664, the pressure from the English grew even more intense. The 
Mahicans came to Fort Orange and announced that the English on the Connecticut River
45 Ibid., 324-326.
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had requested to buy some Mahcian land on the Hudson River. The Mahicans first 
offered to sell the land to the Dutch if they wanted it, before they dealt with the English. 
At this point, the WIC Council in New Amsterdam approved this purchase of land along 
with several other purchases in order to claim proper right to the land and keep the 
English away from New Netherland, and the Hudson River in particular.46 Later that 
month a Dutch farmer’s house was burned near Catskill with him inside, and his wife and 
son were taken captive. According to two Mohawks who knew the unnamed Indians 
responsible for the act, the order came from the English to rid the area of the Dutch.47
More information came in from Mohawk and Hackensack Indian sources, the two 
generally most trusted sources of information, linking the English with Indian attacks on 
New Netherland. The Mohawks claimed that the English attacked and killed some of 
their messengers. A Hackensack Indian, although not Oratam the leader o f the tribe, told 
the WIC Council that he heard from a Mohawk who was on the west side of the Hudson 
River that some Englishmen went to the Esopus Indians and said “as the Dutch have so 
beaten you, what will you give us, if  we kill the Dutch. Thereupon the savages handed to
a h
the English a bag with wampum and promised the land of the Esopus.” Stuyvesant 
discounted this intelligence as a ploy on the part of the Mohawks to bring the Dutch into 
a war with their northern Indian enemies. He also wanted to avoid such a confrontation 
because it would be detrimental to the fur trade, which was already suffering due to the 
various Indian conflicts about which Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote. Stuyvesant also
46 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 387.
47 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 356.
48 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 392.
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continued to hold to the idea that well established boundaries, which would have to be
renegotiated, between New Netherland and New England would bring an end to such
stories. He wrote to the Directors in Holland that,
The daily quarrels, bickerings, jealousies and claims shall be avoided from 
either side and a good understanding and correspondence established; 
these pernicious wars between the Maquaes and the Northern savages 
would then soon be settled and brought to an end and all the savages could 
be made to submit or at least to deliberate, when they see the Christians 
united and drawing a line, to keep the barbarians in submission or at least 
quiet. 49
Unfortunately for Stuyvesant, his dream of a unified Christian front against the power of 
the Indians would come to an end only weeks after he wrote these words, when an 
English fleet appeared in the Hudson River demanding the surrender of the colony.
After the Esopus Indians were defeated and they scattered to live among other 
groups of Indians in the area, the English were able to walk into a relatively easy 
situation in the Esopus region, at least in regards to their relations with the Esopus 
Indians. Furthermore, the English already had a foothold in the Hudson River Valley 
from the English settlements in Westchester. In October 1665, a year after the English 
takeover, Gov. Richard Nicolls, with Dutch leaders such as Peter Schuyler and Jeremias 
van Rensselaer present, and the Sachems of the Esopus Indians signed an agreement.
This agreement included bringing murderers to justice instead o f seeking revenge, a 
concession Stuyvesant was not able to achieve prior to the war. The agreement also 
called for the creation of a “convenient house” for Indians to lodge in and leave their 
weapons when they came to the town. The Esopus Indians also agreed, yet again, to cede 
their land in the region to the Europeans, this time to the English instead of the Dutch.
49 Ibid., 390.
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Finally, all acts of animosity between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians were to be 
forgotten, and the English were able to reap the benefit.50
Unfortunately for the English, it would not be so easy to reap the benefits of the 
ill-fated Dutch victory over the Esopus Indians. The next obstacles in settling this land 
were the relations between the English soldiers sent to protect the newly acquired 
territory and some of the Dutch and French settlers. In particular the difficulty came 
between a handful of Dutch colonists and a few English soldiers. The Esopus continued 
to prove to be a difficult area in which to develop new cross-cultural landscapes. After 
the physical and legal controversies surrounding the soldiers’ treatment o f the Dutch 
colonists, the situation was solved by segregating the population as much as possible 
according to ethnicity. The Dutch dominated the villages of Kingston and Hurley (the 
newly renamed communities of Wiltwyck and New Dorp, or the new village). The 
English soldiers were then given grants to land in the newly formed community of 
Marbleton.51
However, once the issues between the soldiers and settlers were dealt with, the 
English were able to eventually accomplish what Petrus Stuyvesant desired to do in 1658, 
which was to create a few concentrated settlements in the Esopus region and then to 
exploit the land for its agricultural potential. Throughout the fall and early winter of 
1668, Gov. Francis Lovelace focused on establishing these settlements and he spent a 
considerable amount of time in the region at the estate of Thomas Chambers doing just 
that. Furthermore, on September 23, 1668, Gov. Lovelace met with three of the Esopus
50 Peter R. Christoph, ed., Administrative Papers o f  Governors Richard Nicolls and Francis Lovelace, 
1664-1673 (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. co., 1980), 3-4.
51 Ibid., 40-50.
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Sachems who established a peace agreement with Gov. Nicolls in 1665. This agreement 
was endorsed yet again in April o f 1670 between the Esopus Sachem Calcop and Gov. 
Lovelace. The sachems were accompanied by “diverse other Indians.. .desiring to 
Continue Friendship.” With this continued peace between the Esopus Indians and the 
English, the English government was able to establish the towns o f Kingston, Hurley and 
Marbleton.
Furthermore, the peace with the Esopus Indians allowed the English to continue 
negotiations with the Mohawks, Senecas and Mahicans who occupied the land on the 
fringes of English settlement. This was especially true when the Mohawks made peace 
with the Esopus Indians in July 1669 thereby placing the remnants o f the Esopus tribe 
under the control of the Mohawks, a fate the Esopus Indians, especially the Bareback 
factions, fought to avoid. From that time, there were no significant conflicts between the 
New York colonial government, the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians.52 Moreover, 
the Iroquois remained the only independent Indian group near the claimed boundaries of 
the now English colony of New York. Therefore, the remainder of Indian and English 
relations, whether diplomatic, military or economic, took place in the fort in the renamed 
town of Albany, the old Dutch outpost of Fort Orange.
The switch from a Dutch colony to an English one did not matter all that much for 
the Mohawks and the other Indians of the Hudson River Valley. They continued to work 
toward their own advantages, and they continued to do so in the same way they had under 
the Dutch at Fort Orange, now Albany. Furthermore, they continued to deal with many 
of the same people in Fort Albany. They were still counted on for information, although
52 Ibid., 128; and Peter R. Christoph and Florence A. Christoph, eds., Books o f  General Entries o f  the 
Colony o f  New York, 1664-1688, 2 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. Co., 1982), 1: 304.
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the English responded to Indian intelligence with much more skepticism than the Dutch 
had. Moreover, now that the Mohawks stood as the dominant Indian power in the 
Hudson and Mohawk Valleys after the Esopus were subdued by the Dutch, they were 
even more capable of asserting their authority among the Dutch at Fort Orange. In the 
years after New York was established, the Mohawks would speak for some Indian groups 
within the judicial system of Fort Albany, and would also work to eliminate the voices of 
others within Fort Albany.
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CHAPTER 5
A “VERRY DANGEROUS JUNCTURE OF TIME” ALBANY AT THE CENTER
In 1666 two French cartographers created a map depicting French holdings in 
northeast North America as well as along the coast of New England (Figure 5). What 
makes this map so noteworthy is that the cartographers prominently displayed the 
settlement at Albany and the nearby Iroquois settlements, while they failed even to note 
the location of any other English communities along the Atlantic seaboard.1 This 1666 
map is consistent with earlier French maps that also prominently displayed Albany while 
virtually ignoring the more often studied English settlements such as Boston and 
Jamestown. The French map depicted a view of a political and cultural landscape that 
would not be widely shared until the next decade. However, in the 1670s the effects of 
four major colonial wars combined to give Albany a much broader inter-cultural 
significance. By the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Metacom’s War, Bacon’s 
Rebellion, and the Five Nations war with the Susquehannocks, Albany became a new 
colonial center for both Europeans and Indians and dramatically altered the colonial 
landscape o f the Atlantic seaboard. As a result of this dramatic alteration, English 
understanding of the position of Albany came into line with the French perspective from 
decades earlier. Furthermore, as the English attempted to gain control of Albany and the
1 Cartre des grands Laca Ontario et autrea, et des Costes de la  nouvelle Angletter et des p a y  a treuerser 
p a r M  de Cracy et Courelles, National Archives o f  Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; National Map 
Collection, Map #1825. Albany was still identified as the Dutch village o f  Orange on this map.
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Figure 5 C a r tr e  d e s  g r a n d s  L a c a  O n ta r io  e t  d e  C o s te s  d e  la  n o u v e l le  A n g le t te r  e t  d e s  
paya treuerser par M  de Cracy et Courelles, Courtesy of the National Archives of 
Canada: National Map Collection, Map #1825
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surrounding regions, they were continually challenged by groups such as the Mohawks 
and Mahicans who also tried to establish their authority over the region and its people.
Many noted scholars have discussed the events o f the 1670s; however, what we 
have not focused on enough is how these events affected the landscape of colonial North 
America, including the movements of displaced peoples and the creation of new colonial 
centers of power. As a result of these events, which took place in the short span of five 
years, both English and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape of the East 
Coast of America with Albany at its center. Moreover, it must be stressed that Albany’s 
rise to prominence was not solely the result of the work of English officials such as 
Edmund Andros. On the contrary, events outside of English imperial control, such as the 
strategies o f the Iroquois and Algonquians, as well as the interests o f the French and 
Dutch, were crucial in creating this new colonial landscape.
Third-Anglo Dutch War
The first major, and often overlooked, event o f the 1670s was the Third Anglo-
Dutch War in which the Netherlands, however briefly, re-established control over New
Netherland in the summer o f 1673. The quick negotiations that returned New Netherland
to England illustrated that New Netherland was not a crucial part o f the States-General’s
imperial plan, which expanded in other parts of the world. As Jonathan Israel has noted,
despite the loss of Netherlands Brazil in 1654, Taiwan in 1662 and New 
Netherland in 1664, the Dutch colonial empire was at its height during the
2 See especially  W ebb, 1676: The End o f  American Independence', and also Francis Jennings, The 
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire ; Jennings, The Invasion o f  America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant o f  
Conquest; Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and North America, 1585-1685; Robert C. 
Ritchie, The D u k e’s Province: A Study o f  New York Politics and Society, 1664-1691, chap. 4; Richter, The 
O rdeal o f  the Longhouse: The Peoples o f  the Iroquois League in the Era o f  European Colonization, 
chapters 5 and 6. For discussions on the geographic importance o f  the area see B onom i, A Factious 
People, 17-18; D .W . M einig, The Shaping o f  America, 119-129; and D onna M erw ick, Possessing Albany, 
1630-1710.
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second half of the seventeenth century and first quarter o f the eighteenth.
During this period Dutch commerce and shipping expanded in both the 
eastern and western hemispheres and the contribution o f colonial 
enterprise to the functioning o f the Dutch trading system, as a whole, 
steadily increased.3
Although the States-General showed little interest in re-building New Netherland, 
Dutch settlers o f the Hudson Valley argued their case to maintain a Dutch North 
American empire. The Dutch inhabitants of the Hudson Valley asserted that families 
who were ruined by the French invasion of the Dutch Republic could come to New 
Netherland to make a fresh start and to help populate the area. They argued that the 
villages o f the Hudson Valley produced enough grain to provision the Dutch colonies at 
Curacao and Surinam with needed wheat, thereby illustrating their importance to the 
Dutch Empire. Furthermore, the burghers of New Orange recognized New Netherlands 
geographic advantage in intercepting and capturing English ships. However, the New 
Netherland burghers’ plea for reinforcements to protect their fragile colony from their 
French and English neighbors did not reach the States-General until March 5, 1674. By 
this time, the States-General already had negotiated for the return of the colony to 
England.4
3 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 936. Here he gives a 
larger discussion o f  the state o f  the Dutch empire in 1673.
4 For an explanation o f  England’s interest in acquiring New Netherland in 1664 see Ritchie, The Duke's 
Province, chapter 1. Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records I, 635-636; O ’Callaghan, DRCHNY  II: 526, 538, 538. 
It is doubtful that the pleas o f  the Dutch colonists would have done much good, even had they been 
delivered into the hands o f  the States-General any sooner. Through December and January o f  1673-1674 
the States-General skillfully used N ew  Netherland in their negotiations with the English crown. In a 
December 15 Secret Resolution, the States-General turned over the supervision o f  N ew  Netherland to the 
Board o f  Admiralty who were to send military forces to the colony and establish Joris Andringa, Secretary 
o f  the Provincial fleet as its Governor. However, on December 19, 1673, the States-General dispatched a 
letter to King Charles II in which they did “hereby also offer the restitution o f  N ew  Netherland and o f all 
other places and Colonies which have been won by our arms during the present war. Firmly convinced that 
your Majesty w ill be unwilling to refuse a reciprocal engagement to restore to us such lands and forts as 
your subjects may have taken from us.” O’Callaghan, DRCHNYW  530-532, 535-541.
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Although the States-General did not include New Netherland in its imperial 
scheme, the Third Anglo-Dutch war added a new dimension to local concerns over events 
with international significance. The frequent Dutch and English fears of a French attack 
on Albany illustrate how local tensions between nations remained independent of larger 
Atlantic world events and concerns. It is well known that Albany was Montreal’s 
greatest rival in the fur trade. A French takeover of Albany would provide the French 
with control over interior lands. A French-controlled Albany could possibly also provide 
the French with access to New York Harbor which, unlike the St. Lawrence, did not 
freeze. Due to Albany’s isolated position in the interior, local residents, both Dutch and 
English, feared a French attack on Albany, which was the subject o f many rumors 
throughout the 1660s. However, there was an increase in these rumors beginning with 
the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch War. The effect of these local rumors and the outcome 
of the Anglo-Dutch war are a particularly clear example o f Albany’s shift from an 
isolated settlement to a colonial center that played a significant role in international 
politics and conflicts.
Prior to Albany’s establishment as a colonial center in the 1670s, English 
authorities in New York City paid little heed to rumors o f French attack, thereby leaving 
the issue to be handled locally. In June 1671 a rumor surfaced that the French were 
preparing to attack Albany. In response, Albany magistrates sent a delegation into the 
Mohawks’ land “to remain there for seven or eight days and to make a diligent inspection 
of everything and with the consent of the sachems to send some Indians from there out on 
the roads to spy out all condition and designs.”5 The initial rumor came from a
5 A. J. F. Van Laer, Minutes o f  the Court o f  Albany, Rensselaerswyck and Schenectady, 1668-1685, volume 
1 (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York, 1928), 259.
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Frenchman living in Albany. Several Mohawk Indians who were also in Albany 
substantiated his story. In response to this threat, which Albany residents took quite 
seriously, the local magistrates ordered all free men in Albany, Rensselaerswyck and 
Schenectady to report to the Fort in Albany fully armed and ready to march.6
English Governor Francis Lovelace, however, upon hearing both the rumor and 
the Albany magistrates’ reaction to it, quickly expressed his disbelief concerning such 
French designs. Lovelace not only dismissed the rumor but also reprimanded the Albany 
officials, stating that the French would not attack Albany because “there is now peace 
between the two crownes, and the Concemes of those poore parts of the World cannot be 
an introduction to make a breach between either.”7 Although Lovelace seems to have had 
little regard for the safety and security of either the land or the people he governed over, 
his statement illustrates that he understood colonial events as mere extensions of relations 
in Europe. However, the reaction of the local residents suggests that they placed much 
more credence in information and intelligence gathered from the Mohawks than they did 
from European sources such as Lovelace. Lovelace’s lack of understanding of how 
international events often played out differently on a local level is similar to the States- 
General utilization of the newly recaptured New Netherland merely as a bargaining chip 
with no real importance in the larger Dutch imperial plan.
According to Lovelace’s reasoning concerning these local developments, as long 
as England and France remained on peaceful terms in Europe, it obviously would follow 
that those nations’ colonies also remained on peaceful terms. Residents o f the region,
6 Ibid., 255, 259
7 Peter Christoph, ed., The Andros Papers volume 1 (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1989), 430.
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however, viewed colonial relations on more local and regional levels. For colonists in the 
Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, the fact that the English and French crowns declared that 
the two nations were then at peace did not necessarily ease their concerns of a French 
attack. In fact, the increase in rumors indicates that the residents of the Hudson Valley 
saw the tensions between the English and the Dutch as primarily an opportunity for the 
French to pursue their interests in North America regardless o f whether it was an English 
or a Dutch colony at the time. While Lovelace was right in his belief that the French 
would not attack the English at Albany, he failed to win the residents of Albany over to 
his belief that the French would continue to stay away because o f the peace between the 
crowns. This incident also illustrates that Lovelace was not any more successful at 
ending the fractional nature o f the settlements within the colony than was Stuyvesant.
Eighteen months after the 1671 rumor of French attack on Albany, a Frenchman 
by the name o f Antony les Pinsard was arrested in Albany for writing a letter to the 
French Jesuit Father Bruyas. In this letter he stated that “peace has been concluded 
between the king of England and Holland and that the Dutch here are much afraid of the
o
French in Canada.” The residents of the Hudson River Valley continued to take these 
warnings and rumors much more to heart than did Governor Lovelace residing in New 
York City. The defendant’s words in this case were considered serious enough for the 
Albany court to call an extraordinary session, where they voiced Albany residents’
8 Van Laer, Minutes 1: 323. Father Bruyas’s activities continued to be perceived as suspicious and were 
monitored by the English authorities throughout the seventeenth century. In 1700 Earl o f  Bellomont wrote 
several times to the Lords o f  Trade in London complaining o f  Bruyas’s activities among the Mohawks and 
Onondagas. Later that year, Bellomont complained o f  New York’s position in maintaining good relations 
with the Mohawks while they hosted Bruyas. In this letter to the Lords o f  Trade he stated that “Jesuit 
Brouyas and De La Valliered that were sent to me last year on pretence o f  a complement by the Govemour 
o f  Canada, were rather intended as spies to look into the condition o f  our Forts and Garrisons.’’ 
O ’Callaghan, D R C H N Y4: 607, 645.
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concerns over such “plots and treason.” The court fined the defendant, released him into 
the custody of Jan Frees and Omy La Grand, and proceeded to keep both les Pisnard and 
his correspondence under close observation.9
The fear of French attack became worse for those who resided in the upper 
Hudson Valley when the area once again reverted to Dutch control in 1673. In November 
of 1673, Jeremias van Rensselaer expressed his concern of Rensselaerswyck’s fragile 
geographic location surrounded by its enemies, New France and New England. He wrote 
to his brother Jan Baptist van Rensselaer that “We have now and then tidings that the 
French from Canada intend to attack us. What there is o f it, time will show. We are 
surrounded by enemies, but hope that the Lord God will preserve us.”10 However, van 
Rensselaer’s concerns continued throughout the period o f Dutch control so that in July of 
1674 he again noted that the French were rumored to be on their way to the Hudson 
Valley. He saw the only way for this threat to end would be for the area to revert back to 
English rule and English protection. This was not because of the current Anglo-French 
alliance, but because o f England’s greater resources to ward off the French in America. 
Van Rensselaer believed that the danger was so real that he would not leave his wife 
alone in their home.11 This fear arose due to New Netherlands lack o f military
9 Van Laer, Minutes I: 323.
10 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 453. John Pynchon in Massachusetts also 
received word that the French were marching toward Albany to which he replied, “I suppose it is a mere 
story; and find no ground to credit it.” Being that he lived on the opposite side o f  Albany from the 
Mohawks and the French, Pynchon may have been less concerned with the possibility o f  a surprise French 
attack. Bridenbaugh, The Pynchon Papers, 120.
11 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 451, 488.
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resources. Once Albany was established as a new colonial center in 1677 under English
1")colonial authority, the rumors of French attack died down.
The rumors of French attack that circulated in the 1670s were often related to
larger international events, such as the opportunity presented to the French to attack a
vulnerable Albany during the Anglo-Dutch war. It is significant that the rumors that
caused the colonists to react with fear and sometimes arms were connected somehow to
the Mohawks. The rumor of French attack that resulted in a call to arms among the
residents o f Albany, Schenectady and Rensselaerswyck in 1671 was supported initially
by a Frenchmen residing in Albany, de la Rose. However it was not until several
Mohawks present in the area corroborated de la Rose’s story that the threat was taken
seriously. After several Frenchmen and Mohawks present in the area were interrogated,
the Albany magistrates decided to send a delegation to the Mohawks’ country in order to
11ascertain the veracity o f the information. Whether under Dutch of English authority,
the residents of Albany continued to rely heavily on Mohawk intelligence.
Not only did the Albany residents depend on the Mohawks to determine the truth 
behind the rumors, but the Mohawks also appear to be the source of many of these stories 
o f French attack. Records indicate that as early as 1666 Mohawk Sachems were warning 
the magistrates in Albany that the French were on the way.14 Even when the talk of
12 Most o f  these rumors seem to originate with the Mohawks. This appears to illustrate the Mohawks 
ability to gain accommodations from the Dutch and English in the form o f  arms and ammunition in order to 
help guard against the ever-present French threat. Once Albany was established as a colonial center, 
however, the Mohawks gain greater concessions from the English and do not have to use the French threat 
in order to achieve their ends. Brindenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 120
13 Van Laer, Minutes 1: 255, 259.
14 Leder, The Livingston Indian Records, 29-30. This exchange between the Mohawks and the Albany 
magistrates was in response to 200 troops which were actually sent out from Canada, but who were recalled 
before they made it down to New York or Mohawk territory. The Albany magistrates’ reply does, 
however, indicate a grave concern for their own safety at the report o f  the French troop movements and use
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French attack did not come directly from the mouths of Mohawks, they continued to play 
a central role in dissemination of the threat from the north. In his November 9, 1673 
letter to Oloff Stevensen van Cortlandt Jeremias van Rensselaer stated that the French 
Jesuit Bruyas brought the news “from the Maquas country” that the French had sent ships 
to Canada. He did not describe the French Jesuits’ tidings as news from Europe but was 
clear that the news came from the Mohawks’ country. Less than a week after this letter, 
van Rensselaer declared in another letter that, “the French from Canada intend to attack 
us.”15 This example depicts the importance of the Mohawks and the Mohawk territory to 
the north and west of Albany as being a crucial link in relations and communications, 
whether real or rumor, between the French and the English. The territory beyond Albany 
remained relatively unknown to the Dutch and now English residents of Albany.
Because the Mohawks were still in firm control of that area, they remained in full control 
of what information traveled through the region. They also controlled where and when 
information was delivered, keeping the Albany residents fully dependent on their 
services.
It is well known that Indians were quite adept at playing one European power off 
of another in order to gain advantages for themselves, and the Mohawks were no 
exception. However, the fact that the men and women of Albany looked to the Mohawks 
for accurate information concerning French movements in the 1670s is indicative o f the
this concern to limit the supply o f  lead and powder that the Albany residents supplied to the Mohawks. 
Shortly after the Mohawks met with the Albany magistrates to warn o f  the French movements, Gov. Tracy 
wrote the magistrates from Quebec telling them that he sent out and then recalled about 400 soldiers from 
N ew  France into Iroquois territory. The ensuing correspondence between Tracy and the English authorities 
is a back and forth o f  accusations and denials concerning alliances and enmity with the Mohawks. 
DRCHNYIII: 129-135.
15 Van Laer, Correspondence o f  Jeremias van Rensselaer, 451, 453.
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crucial role the Iroquois played in these international struggles beyond that of mere 
opportunists. The reality of the residents in the somewhat isolated town of Albany 
caused them to look north and west for information concerning both their livelihoods and 
their lives. While the attention of colonial officials in New York City focused on Europe 
during the early 1670s, the Mohawks continued to play a greater role in the dissemination 
of information and intelligence for European inhabitants of the Hudson and Mohawk 
River Valleys. These events were also indicative of growing complexity of relations 
between the French, Mohawks, English and Dutch in North America.
The rumored French attacks did not materialize. The constant threat of attacks, 
however, and the Albany residents’ concern over them, illustrated the vulnerability and 
the fear that the settlers in this outlying region of New Netherland and New York 
continued to face. Governor Lovelace’s lack of interest in the rumors prior to the 
retaking of the colony by the Netherlands added to the settlers’ sense of vulnerability, 
leading them to raise their own militia in order to fend off any attack. The Dutch 
takeover in 1673, as noted above, did nothing to alleviate the fears of the northern 
settlers, and in fact, added to those fears as the settlers knew very well the lack of 
resources available from New Amsterdam.16
Indian Affairs and the Second New Netherland
Rumors of French attack aside, the States-General was not interested in rebuilding 
their North American Empire. However, local New Netherland authorities, 
understanding the importance o f favorable relations with neighboring Indians, began to
16 For an analysis o f  the effect o f  rumor on frontier colonial societies see Dowd, “The Panic o f  1751: The 
Significance o f  Rumors on the South Carolina Frontier.”
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re-establish their former relationships with area Indian populations.17 Moreover, the
Indians who populated the Hudson River Valley also understood the changing power
relationships brought about by the Third Anglo-Dutch War and worked to strengthen
their own position in the region between Willemstadt (Albany) and Montreal. In the
spring o f 1674, a Mohawk delegation visited Governor Colve in Fort Willem Hendrick in
Manhattan to renew their relationship with the Dutch. During this meeting the Mohawks
made it clear that they would be willing to march against the French who, it was rumored,
1 8were prepared to move against the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys. The Mohawk 
delegation then requested that Governor Colve secure a yacht to transport them back to 
Willemstadt. The Mohawk delegation took its request one step further and requested that 
Colve also order the burghers of Willemstadt to lodge the delegation within the town 
walls overnight upon their arrival. Colve met the requests of the Mohawk sachems, and 
the officials up river were requested to lodge the sachems within the town walls and to 
treat them “with all possible favor.”19
The significance of Colve’s action lies in the fact that he conceded to the 
Mohawks’ desire to lodge overnight within Albany’s walls, when Albany’s official town 
policy forbade Indian presence within the town after a certain hour. This was the first 
example of colonial officials advocating the extended and overnight presence of any 
Indians within the town walls of Albany. This sudden change in policy represents a 
significant shift by accommodating the Mohawks, whose presence in between the
17 In the autumn o f 1673, the Hackensacks and other lower Hudson Valley Indian groups came to Fort 
Willem Hendrick in Manhattan to renew their peace with the Dutch, which was originally made in 1655.
18 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 476, 479. This rumor seems to have originated at this meeting.
19 Ibid., 480. C olve’s request for Albany’s authorities to show this delegation “all possible favor” may have 
included shot and lead, as the Mohawks requested, for their use against this new supposed French threat
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Hudson Valley and French Canada was much needed as a buffer. Even though the 
Mohawks’ presence served an important function in separating the Dutch and the French 
in North America, many colonists preferred that the Mohawks maintained lodgings away 
from Europeans. Previous colonial leaders, both Dutch and English, worked diligently to 
prevent Indians from being lodged within town walls.20 When England regained control 
of New York, the new governor, Edmund Andros, also began accommodating Indians 
within town walls in the Hudson Valley.
In September of 1675, Governor Andros issued a proclamation that called for the 
building of stockaded blockhouses, “in the most convenient place in each respective town 
for a Retreat to the women & children; Into which our Indyan women and children, to 
bee also received and Protected if they desire it; and that all our Indyans bee friendly 
treated, and have equal justice according to law.”21 While Indian women and children 
were offered protection within town walls prior to this date, this is the first statement that 
combined the idea o f protecting Indians both within walls and within the law. In regards 
to European-Indian relations in the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys, this combination 
occurred first in Albany as the English made accommodations for the protection of 
Indians not only within a military context, but also within a legal context. This new idea 
put forth by Andros would later be manifested on the physical landscape by moving 
Indian-European negotiations from the fort to the courthouse. Andros’s words expanded
20 This concern became particularly acute after the Esopus Wars between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch 
in the early 1660s. The second Esopus War began with Indians who were lodged in the town attacking 
settlers. Court Records o f  Albany, Renssalaerswyck and Schenectady show that up through May o f 1672 
the magistrates “expressly forbid every one to lodge hereafter any savages...” Although the directive was 
given, it is not known if  Albany officials acquiesced to C olve’s directive and allowed the Mohawks to 
lodge within the walls overnight.
21 Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 484.
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the role of Mohawks in the legal system by specifically including them, not just as 
witnesses against Europeans who broke laws against illegal fur and alcohol trade. 
Andros’s actions also went beyond how the Mohawks inserted themselves in the 
European legal process. Andros was now introducing the Mohawks as equal players in 
the courthouse, although the Mohawks’ actions over the past decades had been 
imbedding themselves deeper into the European legal system located at Fort Orange and 
then Fort Albany.
Metacom’s War. Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five Nations’ War with the 
Susquehannocks
With the end o f the Anglo-Dutch war and the re-establishment of the colony of 
New York, the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys would once again experience 
significant change as a result o f larger events outside of their borders and immediate 
control. This time, however, it was conflicts among and against various Indian 
populations and not European wars that created the significant changes. Beginning in 
1675, as Metacom’s War broke out in New England, and Bacon’s Rebellion began in 
Virginia, and as the fighting continued between the Susquehannocks and the Five 
Nations, Governor Andros began negotiations that would further affect the position of 
Albany in North America. Andros, however, did not create this environment on his own. 
He was responding to events outside o f his control. Moreover, he was also forced to deal 
with the widely diverse desires and motivations of the different Indian groups with whom 
he dealt.
Through late 1675 and early 1676, Andros met with numerous Indian groups from 
outlying regions in New England and the Chesapeake in order to offer them refuge in the
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Hudson Valley. These Indians included such groups as the Susquehannocks and New 
England Algonquians. For his plan to work however, Andros had first to negotiate with 
the Five Nations (primarily Mohawks) and the Mahicans. Both tribes remained the 
dominant Indian peoples in the Hudson River Valley at this time, in order to ensure the
99safety of the refugee Indians who would be coming into the area. These meetings 
occurred in various locations from Albany to New York City to the head of the 
Chesapeake Bay, but by the end of the hostilities it was Albany alone that served as the 
major theater o f Indian/English relations.
The immediate results of Metacom’s War, Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five 
Nations war with the Susquehannocks was the movement of defeated Indian populations 
from both New England and the Chesapeake into New York territory. Twenty New 
England Indians settled about twenty miles northeast of Albany, and these were followed 
by about two hundred more over the next two years, forming a new nation known as the 
Scaticook Indians, who fell under the authority of the Mahicans. As early as February 
1675 Mahican Indians illustrated the changes in both European and Indian relations in the 
Hudson River Valley. In a meeting between the Albany magistrates and the Chiefs of the 
Mahicans, the latter were recorded as stating “the English and the Dutch are now one and 
the Dutch are now English. Thus we Mahikanders, the Highland Indians, and the
99‘western corner’ Indians are now one also.” Although the outbreak of Metacom’s War
22 The Senecas’ were still opposed to the idea o f  ending the war with the Susquehannocks, although the 
Mohawks were receptive to the idea o f  the Susquehannocks moving into the area. The Susquehannock war 
with the Five Nations was primarily with the Senecas, Onnondagas and Cayugas. The Mohawks actually 
supported the Susquehannocks over the other members o f  the Five Nations in this war. For more 
information see Francis Jennings, “Glory, Death and Transfiguration,” Proceedings o f  the American  
Philosophical Society  112:1 (1968): 15-53.
23 Leder, The Livingston Indian Records, 37. These Highland Indians were N ew  England Algonquians who 
came under the authority o f  the Mahicans during early stages o f  Metacom’s War. Highland Indians was a
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and the destruction that it brought to the New England Indians was the primary cause of 
New England Algonquian migrations to the west, John Pynchon wrote to Governor John 
Winthrop in April o f 1674 that “our Indians at Woronoco and Pojassick are generall all of 
them removed to Albany; what the matter is they make so universal and general a remove 
I know not.”24 While the reasons for the Woronoco and Pojassick Indians’ migration 
were not known, their arrival in the Hudson River Valley added to the continuing shifts in 
peoples and power in the region.
The Susquehannocks, who were involved in Bacon’s Rebellion while also at war 
with the Five Nations, came under the authority of the Five Nations. With this large 
movement o f Indian populations to New York, Albany emerged as the center of Anglo- 
Indian relations. The migrations of New England Algonquian and Susquehannocks to 
New York occurred not only because Governor Andros offered them the protection o f the 
colony of New York, but also because the Mohawks and Mahicans were willing to take 
in these refugees. Without the consent of the Indians in the region, Andros’ offer would 
have been rendered irrelevant. Mohawks and Mahicans encouraged the migrations of 
Indian refugees for their own purposes. Iroquois and Algonquian populations between 
French Canada and English New York were reinforced by the influx of Indian refugees, 
which strengthened the position of the Mohawks and Mahicans. This was especially true
term used for two different groups, one from N ew  York and one from N ew England. The Mahicans’ 
statement goes on to say “Thus they pray that they will not be exiled or destroyed by the English, 
something they have never done to the Christians.” There is no other connection between these refugee 
Indians and Christianity.
24 Brindenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 120.
25 See Jennings, “Glory”; Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, chapters 7 & 8; and Jose Antonio 
Brandao, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No M ore”, 75-113.
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because many Iroquois were also leaving the region at this time to live in Canada.26 The 
growth of the Indian population in New York also helped to alleviate the threat of French 
attack as the buffer zone between the French and English was strengthened. Moreover, 
the influx o f Indians into New York not only altered relations between New France and 
New York, but from 1677 on, New England and Chesapeake authorities were forced to 
shift their negotiations with Indians to Albany.
John Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indian affairs offers a clear example 
of this geographical shift in Indian policy. Prior to Metacom’s War, Pynchon tried to 
establish his trade into the Hudson Valley from his home in Springfield, Massachusetts, 
but the majority of his correspondence concerning Indian relations was directed to 
Governor Winthrop in Hartford and to Governor John Leverett in Boston. However, in 
1677 Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indians shifted almost exclusively to 
Albany.27 Similarly, as New Englanders were forced to conduct their Indian relations 
west of their homes, Virginia and Maryland officials also had to shift their Indian policy 
to Albany. As they did so, they encountered the consequences of the shift in Indian 
populations and authority as well as Edmund Andros’s attempt to control interactions 
between Indians and Europeans.
Andros began his attempts to gain control over Indian populations during the 
colonial crises. He was in communication with Maryland and Virginia authorities as well 
as with Susquehannock sachems to negotiate the Susquehannocks’ move to New York. 
Similarly, he negotiated with New England Algonquians to offer them refuge as well. In
26 See Richter, O rdeal o f  the Longhouse, 116-136 where he describes the migration o f  “Francophile” 
Iroquois to Catholic settlements in Canada and the reaction o f  the “anglophiles” who remained in Iroquoia.
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both instances, he offended officials from the New England and Chesapeake colonies by 
meddling with “their Indians.”28 In doing so, Andros attempted to control other colonies’ 
access to the Iroquois and Mahicans. By establishing the Covenant Chain, under which 
the participating Indians were protected by the English crown, officials from the other 
colonies had to respect the position of the New York governor over the Indians of New 
York.
Although the colony of New York increased its power by controlling access to the 
new location for Indian/English meetings, this change did not occur solely as a result of 
New York’s planning. The change occurred primarily due to shifts in Indian populations 
as a result o f the conflicts o f the 1670s, and more importantly these shifts occurred 
through negotiations with the Five Nations and Mahicans who continued to pursue their 
own interests outside of those of New York. This process had begun under the Dutch as 
the Mohawks continued to introduce new issues that concerned them into the court at 
Fort Orange. John Pynchon’s letter to Governor John Winthrop in April prior to the 
outbreak o f Metacom’s War indicates that New England Indians were moving into 
Mahican and Mohawk land without prior consultation with any European authority. 
Furthermore, Edmund Andros, who is generally given credit as the architect of the 
Covenant Chain, had no hand in the movement because Albany was then known as 
Willemstadt and under the control of the Dutch.
While Andros did wield exceptional authority in Indian/English relations when he 
became governor o f New York in the summer of 1674, he was still forced to concede to
27 Bridenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 106-178; Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 39, 147, 148, 170.
28 Femow, DRCHNY  13: 497; and Christoph, Andros Papers, 1: 444.
225
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the will of the Indians in many instances. If Andros truly had power and authority over 
the Indians o f the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, it would have made more sense to 
establish New York City as the center for Indian/English relations. However, the 
Mohawks retained their authority in the region by dictating where meetings would take 
place. Their status as an independent and formidable power in the region forced the 
English to acquiesce to Mohawk demands of retaining Albany as their negotiating center 
with both Europeans and other Indians. Albany’s location north of New York City was 
crucial because it served as a buffer zone between the French in Montreal and New York 
City. Moreover, because the Iroquois and Mahicans still maintained their power, and 
since Albany had become the traditional place for Iroquois and Mahicans to pursue their 
negotiations with the Europeans, Indian motivations played a crucial role in Albany’s rise
• • I das the new center o f Anglo-Indian relations.
Furthermore, the colony o f New York still had to work in order to establish its 
power and authority over the other colonies. In order to accomplish this goal, New York 
officials changed the venue for meetings between Indians and colonial authorities. Until 
1677 meetings between Indians and New York authorities took place within the confines 
of the forts located in Albany and Manhattan. These locations reflected the military and 
contentious nature o f European and Indian affairs in the first half o f the 1670s. The use 
of forts as the site o f European negotiations with the Indians also illustrated a
29 The Mohawks were also able to dictate the location o f  negotiations in relations with New France in 1645. 
In this instance, the Mohawks were able to force a treaty meeting to be held at Three Rivers instead o f  
Montreal, thus making it further away from the Onondagas. By dictating the location o f  the treaty 
negotiations, the Mohawks were able not only to display their supremacy in their struggle for power with 
the Onondagas, but also to maintain their power in their relations with the French. Francis Jennings, 
“Multiple Intrigues, The Earliest Recorded Description: The Mohawk Treaty with N ew  France at Three 
Rivers, 1645,” in The H istory and Culture o f  Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary guide to the 
Treaties o f  the Six Nations and Their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, for D ’Arcy McNickle 
Center for the History o f  the American Indians, The Newberry Library, 1985), 131-132
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continuation of Dutch policy when the WIC maintained control over the forts as well as 
Indian negotiations. The use of the State House was reserved for resolving conflicts 
between colonists.30 The Dutch magistrates of Albany continued this practice throughout 
the English administrations of Governors Nicolls and Lovelace, as well as during the 
administration o f Governor Colve during the Dutch re-occupation in 1673-1674. 
However, by the spring o f 1677 with the end of the colonial crises all meetings between 
Indians, primarily Iroquois and Mahicans, and officials from any English colony were
31transferred to the Albany courthouse. This change was significant as the courthouse 
stood as a symbol o f English imperial authority on the colonial landscape of North 
America.32
By changing the venue for official interaction between colonial governments and 
Indian political representatives, New York authorities increased their own power in these 
affairs by controlling access to western Indians. However, at the same time the New 
York government offered the Iroquois and Mahicans who participated in these meetings 
greater political protection and increased ability to carry out their own policies. It is 
during these meetings at the courthouse where time and again, officials from other
30 See Merwick, Possessing Albany, 94,104-107, 143-147. Merwick also gives an in depth analysis o f  the 
significance o f  the town hall (stadhuis) to the Dutch residents o f  N ew  York during Leisler’s Rebellion.
31 Leder, Livingston Indian Records. Records indicated that the last meeting held at the Fort took place 
between the Albany officials and the Mahicans on February 14, 1675 (new style). The next meeting 
recorded in Livingston’s account was between Major John Pynchon and James Richards representing 
Massachusetts and Connecticut respectively and the Mahican and “other River Indians” whom the 
Mahicans now represented. This latter meeting took place in the courthouse at Albany, where both groups 
agreed on a continuation o f  friendship. At this meeting the Mahicans were recorded as promising to keep 
the rivers clear down to N ew  York. The two-year gap in the records reflects the fact that Andros met with 
Indian representatives primarily in Manhattan during the time o f  Metacom’s War and Bacon’s Rebellion.
32 It is also important to note that in using the courthouse as the symbol for English imperial power, the 
English were imposing their new meaning on a primarily Dutch landscape. For more on this see Bonomi, 
39-58 which discusses Albany’s existence as a “city-state” somewhat independent from central authority
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colonies, especially Virginia and Maryland, were forced to concede to Indians’ positions. 
The fact that these proceedings occurred in the courthouse at Albany reflected the idea 
that the Indians and English were participating in legally sanctioned negotiations and that 
the results o f these negotiations were legally binding. For example, in 1677 and 1679 
Virginia representatives traveled to the Albany courthouse in order to negotiate a peace 
with the Iroquois as well as demand punishment of Iroquois who were raiding English 
settlements in the Chesapeake. However, in these meetings they were forced to settle for 
Indians’ apologies for these incursions into Virginia. In fact, during the 1679 meeting, 
Virginia delegate Colonel William Kendall, after being forced to accept an apology from 
a group o f Oneidas, stated, “Thogh your Actions already done, are Sufficient Reasons to 
Induce us to a Violent war against you which might Engage all our confederatt English 
neighbours, subjects to our great king Charles, y e t ... we are therefore willing and have
l - i
and doe forgive all the Dammages you have done our People (though very great).” 
Although he believed the Oneidas’ raids into Virginia were grounds for war, he did not 
have the power to initiate revenge or demand stronger punishment. He lacked this power 
both because the Five Nations had the protection of New York, and because New York 
needed the Five Nations to help the colony economically and to serve as a buffer against 
the ever-present French threat to the north.
Moreover, this change in Indians’ legal standing among the English in New York 
occurred at the same time that Indians in New England and the Chesapeake Bay lost their 
political independence in their home regions. As Susquehannocks and New England
located in N ew  York City; Joyce Goodffiend, Before the Melting Pot, 103 where she discusses the 
adherence to Dutch cultural practices in Albany; and Merwick, Possessing Albany, 144.
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Algonquians moved into New York territory, English officials simultaneously legitimized 
Five Nations and Mahicans’ political and military authority within the established 
English legal structure in the courthouse. For example, in May o f 1678 Albany resident 
William Teller was on trial for killing a New England Algonquian refugee woman.34 The 
death was ruled accidental, but during the trial itself Mahican sachems were present in 
the court with the jury. The sachems served as representatives o f the Algonquian victim 
and three Algonquian witnesses to the shooting.35 This example illustrates two points. 
First, we can see the Mahicans’ new role over the Algonquian newcomers to the Hudson 
River Valley, and second, we can see the new role of Mahicans on the diplomatic 
landscape o f the colonial city as they gained greater access to English legal protection.36
While the Mahicans gained control over the refugee tribes o f New England, the 
Mohawks also utilized the meetings in the courthouse to gain authority within the Five 
Nations. During Coursy’s 1677 conference at the Albany courthouse, he proposed peace 
to all the Five Nations tribes. All five of the Iroquois tribes responded to Coursy over a 
period of one month. Onondaga and the Oneida Sachems were the first to speak, and both 
groups spoke in the courthouse on the same day, July 21, 1677. The first to speak was 
the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie. He agreed to peaceful relations between the 
Onondagas and the colonies o f Maryland and Virginia, as well as the Indians under the
33 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 53. In 1677 Col. Henry Coursy was forced to accept an Onnondaga 
apology for their forays into Virginia territory in 1677 after the Iroquois tribe promised to avoid English 
settlements while raiding their Indian enemies in the area.
34 The term used was actually “North Indian”. These Indians were New England Algonquians who, during 
Metacom’s War, fell under the authority o f  the Mahicans.
35 Court Records indicate that trials involving Indians before 1677 also took place in the fort instead o f  the 
courthouse.
36 Van Laer, Minutes 1:327; 2:324-325; and Christoph, General Entries, 523.
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protection o f those two colonies. However, he was also recorded as stating “Wee doe Let 
you Know that ther is of our four Castelles of the Senikars out a fighting aganst the 
Susquahannas you may therefor waren yor Indians That thar may be no Injuryes or 
damnages done hereafter and so to continue the peace and doe give two Beavers.”37 
While the Onondagas agreed to the peace, they also indicated that factions remained who 
were continuing their war with the Susquehannocks. After Carachkondie finished 
speaking, the Oneida sachems (who spoke for the Oneidas was not recorded) said that 
“wee doe absolutely approve of that wich the Onndagoes haith now Said.”38 The rest of 
their speech did, in fact, absolutely approve of what the Onondagas said earlier that day.
A month later, on August 22, 1677, the Senecas’ and the Cayugas’ representatives 
each gave a speech in the Albany courthouse concerning their relationship with Virginia 
and Maryland. Like the Onondagas and the Oneidas before them, the Senecas and 
Cayugas agreed to peace with the two colonies and the Indians under their protections, 
but also indicated that there are warriors currently down in the area continuing their 
hostilities with the Susquehannocks. They promised to end the hostilities when they 
returned to their homes. Their speeches were short, there was no indication of which 
individuals spoke for either tribe, and their recorded words were very similar to the 
Oneidas and Onondagas who spoke a month earlier.
The Mohawks, however, being the closest in proximity and with the strongest ties 
to Albany had a day all to themselves. They had already been able to keep meetings 
between the Iroquois and the English in Albany, they now managed to display their own
37 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 44.
38 Ibid.
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power within the Five Nations during those meetings.40 The Mohawks sent eight 
Sachems to the Albany courthouse. In comparison both the Onondagas and the Oneidas 
sent four apiece, and there was no record of how many representatives the Senecas and 
Cayugas sent to Albany. The Mohawks’ Sachem Cannondacgoo spoke to Coursy on 
August 6, 1677. In his speech he gave several indications of the Mohawks’ authority 
over the other members of the Five Nations and over the colonies of Maryland and 
Virginia. In his opening words, Cannondacgoo was recorded as saying to Coursy, 
“Thankes, Especially that his honnor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to 
Speak with us heir Seing that the Govr: Genii: & wee are one, and one hart and one 
head.”41 Cannondacgoo’s words indicated both the higher authority of Andros over 
Coursy as the former granted the latter the privilege of speaking with the Mohawks, and 
by tying the Mohawks to Andros, the Mohawks also established their dominance over 
Coursy and those he represented.
Cannondacgoo went on to speak against the Senecas also indicating the 
Mohawks’ dominance within the Five Nations, at least in the eyes o f the English. The 
Mohawk Sachem built up their authority over the Senecas by stating, “that the Seneks 
war upon thar Jorney to com hither with six hunderd Men Bot ffor fear Turned back 
agane Bot wee ware not affrayed to Com heir.”42 With these words Cannondacgoo
39 Ibid., 47-48.
40 As stated earlier, in the Five Nations 1645 treaty negotiations with the French, the Mohawks were able to 
dictate that the meeting be held in Three Rivers instead o f  Montreal in order to put more space between the 
Onondagas and the French officials. This move helped to isolate the Onondagas and increase the 
Mohawks’ power within the Five Nations.
41 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 45.
42 Ibid., 46.
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mocked the Senecas’ weakness. Even with six hundred men, the Senecas, according to
the Mohawks, were afraid to travel to Albany to meet with the English. Cannondacgoo
proceeded to further isolate the Senecas from the English. He admonished Coursy to:
be allwyes myndfull of what is done in ye house ordeined to that end by 
the gov: genii and if ye Senekes now or any time herefter, should appoynt 
any oyr place for to Speake wth you In ther own cuntry or else wher Wee 
desyre yt it may not be accepted off bot that this be & remane the only 
appoynted & preffixed place.... And if you have a mynd hereafter to 
Speak wth us, we desyre yt it may bee heir and no wher else. 43
The Mohawks gave no warning of their warriors moving against the Susquehannocks, as
the Mohawks were sympathetic to the Susquehannocks in their war with the other
members o f the Five Nations. With this speech and with his authority to dictate the
meeting place, Cannondacgoo was able to assert the Mohawks’ authority in relations
between the Five Nations and the English as well as in relations among the Five Nations
themselves. By the time the Senecas and Cayugas appeared in Albany on August 22, the
English authorities did not find it necessary to indicate the names o f the Sachems
representing the tribes, nor were the two tribes given separate days on which to speak.
The Mohawks had succeeded in marginalizing the authority of the other members of the
Five Nations in relations with the English.44
The Mohawks, however, did not merely align themselves with Andros and his
government. Andros wrote a letter to the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck and
Schenectady in June o f 1677 that expressed his displeasure with the Mohawks taking it
upon them selves to bring Indians under the protection o f  N ew  York into their land. He
43 Ibid., 46-47.
44 In September 1679, Col. William Kendell traveled from Virginia to the Albany courthouse to meet with 
the Mohawks because the Senecas broke the 1677 negotiated peace with Virginia. It appears that the 
Mohawks instructions for the Virginians to deal with the Senecas through the Mohawks and in Albany was 
well heeded. Ibid., 49.
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voiced his disapproval o f the Mohawks’ independent action, but Andros was forced to 
“consign this to oblivion” because there was not much he could do. Andros did, 
however, include a warning, that if  the Mohawks “or any others forget themselves and 
presume to receive any others who are in our district, I shall take it as if it were done to 
Christians and to myself and expect full satisfaction therefor.”45 With these strong words 
being read, there was no indication that any Mohawks were present to hear them.
Indians within the Town Walls
As the Mohawks in particular gained greater access and authority with their 
presence in the Albany courthouse, Indians were also gaining access to other spaces 
around the city. One o f the new alterations to the European/Indian landscape of Albany 
after 1677 was the approval and construction of Indian houses outside the gates of the 
city. As mentioned earlier both Dutch and English authorities worked to keep all Indians 
outside of European settlements during the night. In order to provide Indians acceptable 
overnight accommodations, a petition to build Indian housing outside of the city walls of 
Albany was put before the court magistrates in 1672. However, the actual construction of 
the houses was put off while a committee decided where best to build them.46 Like 
many tasks given to committees the work was not completed.
It was not until May 1676, as New England was experiencing the ravages of 
Metacom’s War, that the Albany magistrates ordered “the burghers and inhabitants of 
Albany to contribute, each pro rata, toward the erection o f the Indian or Hansioos house
45 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 245-246.
46 Van Laer, Minutes, 1:306; Minutes o f  the Executive Council 1:146-7.
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outside the gate.. .within the space of fourteen days.”47 The residents chosen to fund the 
house were the leading merchants in the town. A few weeks later the magistrates decided 
to build two more Indian houses. This time, the entire town was to be held responsible 
for financing, constructing and maintaining the houses. After Indians tore down and 
burned fences in January 1677, traders who resided in the city were also made 
responsible for supplying the Indian houses with firewood.48
Houses were built in two locations, outside the south gate and on the plain in an 
attempt to control both Indian movements and the area around the gates. With the Indian 
houses in these locations, their movements could be easily monitored because these areas 
were relatively cleared compared to the west and north sides o f the town, allowing for an 
unimpeded view of activities. Furthermore, by building the houses in these locations, the 
Indians would, it was hoped, enter the city through the south gate and the first thing they 
would see would be the courthouse, the new center o f all Indian/English negotiations 49
However, as the English authorities began to impose order and control over the 
residents of the area, both European and Indian, their efforts had mixed results, as Indians 
continued to gain increased access to the city and colonists ignored rules they did not 
necessarily like. Andros tried, like many before him, to end the presence of drunk 
Indians within the town walls by imposing heavy fines and suspending trading privileges
47 Van Laer, Minutes, 2:106-107. This order to build the Indian houses came six months after Andros 
ordered blockhouses to be built to protect both European as well as Indians. Femow, D R C H N Y 13: 464.
48 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 106-7; 2: 187.
49 There are several seventeenth-century maps o f  the layout o f  Albany including, Colonel Romer’s “Plan de 
la Ville d’Albanie, 1698” and the plan o f  “Albany” that appeared in John M iller’s New York Considered  
and Improved  (they are held by the Public Record Office and the British Museum respectively but can be 
seen in Merwick, Possessing Albany, 108-109). Both maps show several structures outside o f the south 
gate o f the city, but there is no indication o f  their function or identity.
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to any resident guilty of having drunk Indians in his or her home. An entire street would 
be punished if it could not be ascertained in whose house the Indians procured and 
consumed the alcohol. And like his predecessors, Andros’ attempt at curbing Indians’ 
consumption of alcohol failed.50 Many Albany residents also refused to do their part in 
maintaining the Indians’ houses, such as Gabriel Thomson, who was taken to court and 
ordered to pay his share for the Indian houses.51 The hoped for results of controlling 
Indian movements around Albany by building Indian houses outside of the gates was also 
less than a success. Indeed, Indian activities remained outside o f colonial control and 
colonists’ activities remained outside of the courts’ control. Indians continued to move 
throughout the city after the ringing of the bell, and to lodge in the houses of traders 
although such activities continued to be expressly forbidden.
However, it was not just the movements of the Indians that Andros and the 
English authorities hoped to control. In 1676, Governor Andros issued an ordinance in 
Albany forbidding any new streets to be laid out or houses to be built until all the vacant 
lots then in the city were built on and completely occupied. He took his ordinance further 
by demanding that no houses were to be built on a street until the comer lots were 
occupied. Andros also dictated the size of the house as well as the building material.
The houses were to be no less than two rooms deep and no less than eighteen feet wide, 
with the front fa9ade constructed with brick or quarry stone and covered with tiles. These 
restrictions were “to be strictly observed.”52 As Andros attempted to bring order to the 
city of Albany, English authorities also persisted in trying to bring order to the land
50 Van Laer, Minutes 2: 123, 244.
51 Ibid., 193,261.
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outside of the town by forbidding trade outside of Albany, as the Dutch had done before 
them.
The English, like the Dutch before them, often considered the land outside of the 
gates of the city to be a wild, disordered landscape. Donna Merwick has shown that the 
area outside o f the town walls was becoming more attractive in the 1670s as fewer people 
were able to make a living at the fur trade. However, as Merwick also noted, English 
visitors and residents of the area viewed Dutch agricultural land use patterns as 
disorderly, with ill defined lots and lands left unimproved.53 After 1677, the English 
colonial government tried to impose its own understanding of what an ordered colonial 
landscape was supposed to be on both the Indian and European inhabitants of the area. It 
did this by forcing residents to pay for the upkeep o f the Indian houses and by trying to 
force the Indians to reside in them. In this way, the English attempted to bring order and 
control to the area outside the gates and at the same time tried to expand their influence 
over the land.54 The houses were built in order to maintain order and control. However, 
as the English were trying to bring order to relations among the various Indian tribes and 
Europeans in the Hudson Valley by building the houses, illicit trade continued outside of 
the Albany gates. In April 1676, a month before the magistrates committed to building 
the Indian houses outside of the city, Governor Andros issued an ordinance forbidding
52 Ibid., 135-136.
53 Merwick, Possessing Albany, 196-205; also see John Stilgoe, Common Landscape o f  America, 10, and 
pages 43-58 for his discussion on N ew  England landscapes, and pages 58-77 for his discussion o f  
Tidewater and Piedmont landscapes. Stilgoe, however, offers no discussion o f  landscapes o f  the 
seventeenth-century Middle Colonies.
54 Miller’s and Romer’s maps both depict an ordered, improved landscape outside o f  the gates, with its 
layout being quite similar to that o f  the appearance inside the gates.
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any inhabitant of Albany, “be his capacity what it may,” to conduct any trade with the 
Indians outside of the city gates.55
It was not only merchants and traders who were difficult to control. In August 
1677, several women and girls were brought before the court and fined for having been 
seen in the vicinity of the Indian houses. Mews Hoogeboom, the father o f several of 
these girls, was brought into the court again in March of 1680 “because the defendant 
continually lets his children go to the Indian houses on the hill with all sorts of trinket, 
knives, paints, etc. to sell to the Indians, having caught them at it on July 12 and 22, 
August 17 and February 20 last.” Hoogeboom denied the charges, but was nevertheless 
condemned to pay a fine.56
The Hoogeboom daughters were part of a larger threat to the authorities’ control 
over trade between Europeans and Indians. While Andros continued to issue ordinances 
forbidding trade with Indians outside the city of Albany, the practice continued on both 
small and large scales. Ordinances were written for the benefit o f Albany residents who 
traveled outside the gates to conduct their illicit trade, and ordinances were “written for 
the benefit of the town of Schenectady” whose residents often posed the greatest threat to 
Albany’s advantageous position with the Indians. Of course Andros’s attempts to control 
trade outside of the city of Albany were another example in a long line o f ordinances that 
were similarly ignored. However, the illicit trade that took place in the woods in the 
1670s led the court to state that such trade outside of Albany continued “at peril to all at
55 Van Laer, Minutes, 2: 91.
56 Ibid., 473.
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this verry dangerous Juncture of time” as the English and Indians were embarking on new 
forms of negotiations, shifting alliances and power struggles.57
From 1672 to 1677 the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys experienced drastic 
change as Albany’s continually changing cultural landscape was transformed into a new 
diplomatic landscape that served as the center of Anglo-Indian relations between 
Carolina and Canada. The real significance of this change however is that Albany rose to 
its prominence as a new diplomatic landscape not as the result of a single person or 
colonial policy, but as the result of negotiations and conflicts between diverse groups 
including English, Dutch, French, Iroquois and Algonquian. Moreover these negotiations 
would not have happened without the four colonial conflicts that took place in the 1670s. 
As a result o f these negotiations and conflicts, which took place in the span of five, short 
years, European and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape o f the East Coast 
of America. By 1677 Albany truly took its place as a prominent feature on the colonial 
diplomatic landscape.
57 Ibid., 91 ,245-246 , 361-362.
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CONCLUSION
“Brethren of Virginia, Wee are come here in the Prefixed house where we are 
used to make Propositions, and have understood that which is by you Represented.”1 
This statement was made by the Onondaga Sachems Carachkondie, Otrewachte, 
Cachisuhtoe, and Onuerachton to Colonel William Kendall agent for Virginia in the 
Albany courthouse on November 1, 1679. The meeting between the Iroquois tribe and 
the English colony was the last to be held during the decade of the 1670s, and 
Carachkondie’s statement clearly illustrates the long-standing importance of the Albany 
courthouse, which was both a prefixed place and the place where the Onondagas were 
used to making propositions. This meeting was also the culmination o f decades of cross- 
cultural trade, information exchange and warfare that established Albany as the colonial 
center o f European and Indian relations.
Although not often mentioned with the other European colonial centers o f power 
in the seventeenth-century like Boston, Montreal or Jamestown, by 1680 Albany stood 
alone as the new diplomatic center for English and Indian affairs in North America north 
of Carolina. English representatives from New England, Virginia and Maryland had to 
travel to Albany to conduct business with, primarily, the Iroquois Indians who by the end 
of the 1670s spoke for many o f the surrounding Indians who were now under their
1 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 60.
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protection. Albany would serve as the home of the Covenant Chain between the 
Iroquois and English until the formation o f the United States over a century later.
The creation o f this new diplomatic landscape was the result o f decades of 
struggle and compromise between and among Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and 
Algonquian peoples both inside and outside of the Hudson River Valley. The struggle 
over the control of land led to new understandings of how individuals and groups of 
different ethnic and cultural origins defined proper land use and proper land ownership. 
Each group came into the situation with preconceived ideas of what it meant to occupy 
and control land and spaces, whether it was through occupation by individuals, legal land 
titles, placing the land under agricultural production or having the power to keep others 
out. All o f these notions were challenged as the different cultures encountered one 
another and worked to establish their own understandings of power and control o f land. 
Because o f the challenges to each other’s authority over the land no one power, either 
European or Indian, was able to fully establish its own authority over all o f the land of the 
Hudson River Valley at this time. As a result o f this fluid situation new definitions of 
proper land use and ownership of certain lands and spaces were constantly being created. 
This was particularly true for the region of Fort Orange/Albany, which held a unique 
position in colonial North America.
Albany’s location as an interior settlement at the intersection of lands claimed and 
contested by several ethnic groups, including the Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and 
Algonquian made it an ideal location for its formation as a new diplomatic landscape.
2 After 1664, whenever such tribes as the Esopus or Catskills needed to speak with the English, it not only 
occurred at the Albany courthouse, but the Mohawks or the Mahicans were present to speak for the other 
tribes. However, when it came time to renew the peace made between the Dutch and the Esopus prior to
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Albany’s relative isolation from the larger centers of Montreal, Boston and New York 
City also allowed its residents, both Indian and European, the freedom and independence 
to chart their own path that led to Albany’s unique position among the English centers of 
power in North America. This isolation was particularly important in the Dutch period, 
and it caused communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam to be difficult at 
best. As Stuyvesant spent a good deal o f his time fending off threats from English and 
Swedish sources, especially from 1647-1655, residents in Fort Orange and 
Rensselaerswyck set a precedent for independent actions, especially in their dealings with 
the local Indian population.
Once Stuyvesant turned greater attention to issues dealing with Indians, such as 
running in the woods, illegal alcohol sales to Indians and Indians within town walls, Fort 
Orange residents continued to pursue an Indian policy to their benefit. Sometimes 
officials at Fort Orange worked in conjunction with Stuyvesant and the Council in New 
Amsterdam. WIC officials in both communities worked to control the problem with 
runners in the woods. This issue was o f particular importance for the leaders o f Fort 
Orange to retain control over the fur trade in the area. However, the leaders at New 
Amsterdam and those at Fort Orange differed on many other matters, especially those 
that would restrict Indian movements within the town of Fort Orange, which would, in 
turn, restrict the fur trade o f the community. Moreover, the Indian populations also 
wished to retain the influence that they were gaining within the town and would not be 
pleased with restrictions to their movements. The Iroquois were particularly interested in 
expanding their access to the court system of Fort Orange, and because the Dutch
the English takeover o f  the colony, the Esopus Sachem, typically Calcop and his son, would speak for their 
own people within the courthouse.
241
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
depended on the Indians, particularly the Mohawks, for furs all parties involved at Fort 
Orange worked to maintain the a site for open European/Indian trade and diplomatic 
negotiations.
Fort Orange’s isolation also provided ample opportunity for the non-Iroquois 
Indian groups who lived between these two centers to assert their own influence on how 
Indian and European relations would develop. While Albany’s new diplomatic landscape 
would primarily serve the English and Iroquois, the process that created that landscape 
included the participation o f many more groups and individuals. These often-overlooked 
players included the Indian groups of the Esopus, Catskills, Wappingers and 
Hackensacks. O f course, other non-English European colonists, such as the French and 
particularly the Dutch, also contributed to the creation of a new landscape at Albany.
Each of these cultural groups actively participated through wars, threats of wars, trade, 
religious expression, exchange of information and diplomacy to create a new diplomatic 
landscape in the Hudson River Valley. This landscape was neither purely Indian nor 
purely European, but a combination of elements from all these groups. In this way the 
new landscape was navigable by all groups involved.
The process of how this new diplomatic landscape came to be has shed light on 
the critical role o f Indians in seventeenth-century North America. While it would be the 
Iroquois who would dominate much of Indian affairs through the last quarter o f the 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century in this region, this was not a foregone 
conclusion in the mid-seventeenth century. The actions of and events surrounding many 
other Indian groups created the environment for the Iroquois to rise to their own 
dominant position in seventeenth-century North America.
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Wars between the Dutch and Indian tribes of the lower Hudson River Valley in 
the 1650s, particularly the Peach War of 1655, ended the resistance of those tribes to the 
Dutch presence in the area. As a result, there remained no truly independent Indian 
power near Manhattan Island after 1655. In this respect the year 1655 stands out as a 
significant turning point in European-Indian relations in general and the rise of Albany at 
its center in particular. In response to the war Stuyvesant changed his tactics in trying to 
gain control over the movements and morals of Indians and European residents of the 
Hudson River Valley. He tried to restrict Indian movements within Dutch towns and 
Dutch movements outside o f towns in order to keep individuals from invading the space 
of other ethnic groups. This way, in Stuyvesant’s Calvinist informed view, the 
wilderness of the Indians and the ordered landscape of the Dutch would remain separate, 
until the Dutch could bring order to the wilderness outside of the towns. The Esopus 
region proved to be the most significant area where Stuyvesant actively pursued the 
creation o f a Dutch landscape through the takeover of an Indian landscape. This, of 
course, led to the Second Esopus War of 1663-1664.
Stuyvesant’s exclusive reactions to the Peach War of 1655 added to the already 
fractured nature of relations between the Dutch settlements o f Fort Orange and New 
Amsterdam, as Fort Orange less than enthusiastically implemented these new tactics.
The residents of Fort Orange were not interested in eliminating Indian power in the 
region as their livelihoods depended on the Indian participation in the fur trade. They 
resisted Stuyvesant’s restrictions on the merging of Indian and Dutch landscapes, thereby 
allowing for the creation o f a new landscape that would eventually result in a new 
diplomatic landscape.
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Furthermore, with the elimination of the Lower Hudson River tribes as 
independent powers, Stuyvesant was forced to move north first to the Esopus and then to 
Fort Orange to conduct relations with remaining independent Indian powers, namely the 
Esopus and the Mohawks. While he tried to conduct Indian policy out of New 
Amsterdam, the Esopus Indians, prior to 1664, and the Indians o f the upper Hudson 
Valley, including the Iroquois and Mahicans continued to wield enough power to make 
Stuyvesant shift his negotiations closer to their territories. However, at the same time, 
the Indians were successful at keeping the Dutch, and then the English, out of their 
villages and political spaces, allowing them to retain their traditional landscapes. This 
forced the creation of new diplomatic spaces within Dutch settlements, particularly 
within Fort Orange.
In the few years after 1655, hostile activity between the Dutch and Indians 
occurred in the Esopus region located between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. These 
hostile actions, known as the Esopus Wars, were the result o f the struggle between the 
Dutch and the Indians to control the development of the landscape. As the Dutch worked 
to create a Dutch, agricultural landscape, the Esopus worked to keep this Dutch influence 
to a minimum. With no room to compromise because the two groups maintained 
opposing and exclusive goals concerning how the land would be occupied and by whom, 
the end of the Esopus Wars would result in the elimination o f one group from the region. 
It was the Esopus Indians who were eliminated as an independent Indian power along the 
Hudson. With the elimination of the Esopus Indians as an independent power, it opened 
the way for the Dutch, and then the English to dictate how the landscape would be 
developed. This was not the case further to the north.
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During these wars between the Dutch and the Indian tribes below Fort Orange, the 
Mohawks were able to take advantage of the situation and start to impose their authority 
on the landscape of the Hudson River Valley, and particularly on the diplomatic 
landscape o f Fort Orange. With Fort Orange’s natural physical isolation, and the Esopus 
and Peach Wars, which further served to isolate Fort Orange from the political center of 
New Netherland on Manhattan Island, the Dutch WIC authorities had to rely on Indians 
as their source of communication and information. While the Dutch did have easy access 
and greater control over the waterways o f the colony, Indians, particularly the Mohawks 
and the Mahicans, controlled the flow o f information over land. With the Dutch highly 
dependent on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers for information, all Indian groups 
were able to wield a certain amount o f power by controlling European access to 
information.
Indian groups and individuals placed themselves in advantageous positions by 
informing the Dutch how they stopped an attack on a certain settlement or how they 
heard of an imminent attack on Dutch settlements. In return for much of this 
information, the Indians often received material goods, but more importantly, they 
received access to European leaders and towns and eventually into the Dutch and then 
English legal systems. In this way American Indians played a prominent role in the 
creation o f a new diplomatic landscape on which they asserted significant authority.
During the Esopus Wars, particularly the second one from 1663 to 1664, the 
Dutch authorities continually turned to the Mohawks to find out the location and 
intentions o f the Esopus Indians. They also became dependent on information from the 
Catskill Indians. Stuyvesant distrusted the Catskills, but since they were under the
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authority o f the Mohawks, Stuyvesant and other WIC officials were forced to accept 
Catskill intelligence as they would Mohawk information. The Dutch WIC also asked the 
Mohawks to become actively involved in their war with the Esopus Indians because of 
the Mohawks knowledge o f the land in which the Esopus were hiding and their ability to 
travel with ease upon that land. While the Mohawks were busy with their own wars with 
Algonquian Indians in New England, the events that took place in the late 1650s and 
early 1660s allowed the Mohawks to increase their already valuable position within New 
Netherland as the Dutch came to rely on them for information and diplomacy.
The WIC also relied upon the Mohawks to provide the company with the highly 
valuable beaver pelts, the trade of which was centered at Fort Orange. Because of this 
Dutch dependence on the Mohawks, the Mohawks and Dutch created a very different 
landscape in Fort Orange than elsewhere in the colony. In the Esopus region, the Dutch 
and Indians fought for control of the land with the Dutch calling for the elimination of the 
Esopus Indians in order to establish a Dutch, agricultural landscape in the region. 
However, Fort Orange’s dependence on trade with the Indians required the presence of 
Indians in the town and required good relations with those Indians. As the Mohawks 
were the closest to the Dutch outpost, it was they who were able to wield the most 
influence within its walls.
With the welcome, indeed necessary, presence o f Indians within the Dutch town 
at Fort Orange, the two groups had to find ways to coexist. However, their compromises 
were often contrary to official WIC policy as directed from New Amsterdam. The leaders 
at Fort Orange had always displayed an independence from New Amsterdam that was 
also reflected in how they dealt with European residents of the community. The leaders
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and residents in Fort Orange were more lenient with individuals guilty o f selling and 
smuggling alcohol to Indians, as well as individuals who acted contrary to the moral 
regulations put in place by Stuyvesant and the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church 
such as Lutherans and Catholics. Yet because of Fort Orange’s isolation and different 
circumstances in regards to their relations with New Amsterdam and with the Indians of 
the upper Hudson River Valley, both Indians and the Dutch created a new cultural 
landscape that was significantly different from any other in the colony. The continued 
presence of the Indians within the town walls of Fort Orange for trade purposes would 
allow the relations between the Dutch and Mohawks to evolve beyond their trade 
relations.
Because the Dutch were so dependent on the Mohawks for their economic 
survival and gave the Mohawks concessions to maintain good relations, the latter became 
more aggressive in their dealings with the Dutch and eventually began making requests 
then demands from the Dutch. Moreover, they did this within the Dutch legal system 
located in the fort at Fort Orange. By requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with 
the French, the Mohawk began involving the Dutch at Fort Orange with Mohawk goals. 
The Mohawks soon began using Fort Orange for meetings with other Indian groups. 
Soon, the Mohawks established diplomatic precedents within the Fort Orange court 
system and continued to build on them. This Dutch dependence and accommodation of 
Indians did not occur anywhere else within New Netherland. Dutch and Indian relations 
in the Esopus region were almost purely contentious and there was little to no room for 
compromise. Dutch economic dependence and lack of desire to take over Mohawks’
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lands near Fort Orange provided an atmosphere to allow the Mohawks access to the 
town.
Furthermore, while doing this the Mohawks also restricted Dutch access to their 
own territory. This practice had been going on for decades as Iroquois as well as Esopus 
Indians worked diligently to keep Europeans from having free access to their villages and 
centers o f power. Therefore the Indians of the Hudson River Valley, not just the 
Mohawks were fully in charge of the woods and their villages beyond Fort Orange and 
other Dutch settlements such as Esopus. Moreover, at the same time the Mohawks were 
increasing their influence over the landscape within Fort Orange.
By 1664, when the English took over New Netherland, the Mohawks had 
established themselves as the dominant Indian power in the region as a result of the 
Peach War, Esopus Wars and Dutch dependence on them for communication. The date 
of 1664 in this context is not as relevant for relations between Europeans and Indians in 
the Hudson River Valley. However, 1664 is quite significant in this context as the year 
that the Mohawks stood as the most influential independent Indian power in the region. 
With the surrender and break up of the Esopus Indians in 1664, all dealings with 
independent Indian power shifted to the Iroquois and to their base o f operations with 
Europeans at Fort Orange.
In this respect, 1664 becomes a crucial turning point along with 1655. Events in 
both dates created a significant shift in the geography of Indian and European 
negotiations in this region northward toward Fort Orange, and then in 1664, to Albany. 
While in 1664 the European powers changed from Dutch to English, it was the Mohawks 
who retained and increased their control of Indian and European interactions in the area.
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The Mohawks, and the English, would continue to utilize the same negotiating systems 
and locations as had been present during the Dutch period. The meetings were still held 
within the confines of the fort, now renamed Fort Albany, and the Mohawks continued to 
dominate those meetings.
After the English established New York, the Mohawks and the English took 
advantage o f events outside of the immediate area to increase the importance o f Albany 
as a meeting place for European and Indian diplomacy. The Five Nations’ War with the 
Susquehannocks, the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Bacon’s Rebellion and Metacom’s War all 
allowed for the influx of new Indian populations under the control o f the Mohawks and 
for the continued use of Albany as a site for meetings between Indians and English.
These events all took place in the 1670s and were the next significant turning point for 
Indian and English relations because they helped to extend Albany’s influence beyond 
the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys. Now Indians from the Chesapeake and New 
England had moved into the region to live under the authority o f the Mohawks. 
Additionally, English officials from Virginia, Maryland and New England all had to 
travel to Albany in order conduct any type o f diplomatic meeting with these Indians.
It was also during this period that the meeting place changed from the fort, which 
stood as the symbol of Dutch authority on the landscape, to the Albany courthouse, which 
stood as the symbol of English power on the land. The presence of the Mohawks in 
either venue was significant because in both places the Mohawks were able to use the 
European legal proceedings to further their own ends within the legal authority of 
European powers. These actions by European powers gave greater validity and value to
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Mohawk actions and allowed the Mohawks to provide significant and dominant 
contributions to the creation of the new diplomatic landscape at Albany.
By the time the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie addressed Colonel Kendall of 
Virginia in Albany’s courthouse on November 1,1679 years o f trade, rumors, wars, 
negotiations and compromises between Europeans and Indians allowed for the creation of 
a unique diplomatic landscape centered in Albany. While Indians and Europeans were 
able to establish dominance of certain areas within the Hudson River Valley and thereby 
dictate how that landscape was to be used, the space within Albany became a space 
utilized effectively by both Europeans and Indians.
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